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W. F. BOESELAGER

THE SOVIET CRITIQUE OF NEOPOSITIVISM

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THE SOVIET CRITIQUE OF NEOPOSITIVISM

The History and Structure of the Critique of Logical Positivism and Related Doctrines by Soviet Philosophers in the Years 1947–1967

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE VII

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1

1. The Object of this Study 1
2. The Significance of this Study 1
3. Some Difficulties 2
4. On Method 2
5. The Questions 3

CHAPTER II: FIRST HISTORICAL APPROACH: POSITIVISM AND NEOPOSITIVISM 4

1. The Notion of Positivism 4
2. The History of Early Positivism (pre-1921) 7
3. The History of Neopositivism (post-1921) 13

CHAPTER III: SECOND HISTORICAL APPROACH: NOTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELATIONSHIPS TO POSITIVISM IN MARX, ENGELS AND THE EARLIER SOVIET PHILOSOPHERS (UP TO WORLD WAR II) 21

1. Marx 21
2. Engels 25
3. Lenin 28
4. From Lenin to Stalinism 39

CHAPTER IV: THE SOVIET CRITIQUE OF NEOPOSITIVISM 42

1. Systematic Background 42
2. Historical Background 45
3. Igor Sergeevič Narskij 49
4. Vladimir Sergeevič Švyrev 74
5. Pavel Vasil'evič Kopnin 83
6. Various other Soviet Authors 95
7. Outcome 102

PREFACE

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Many friends were present at the birth of the ideas contained in this book. By naming K.G. Ballestrem, T.J. Blakeley and M.F. Gagern, I do not want to slight any of the rest. It was A. Spiekermann in Höllinghofen who saw to it that other preoccupations did not rob me of all the time needed for the study of the subject-matter and to the composition of this treatise. Of particular help in getting sources from the libraries of the world were Miss Lifschitz of the Institute of East-European Studies and Mr. Uldry of the Cantonal Library in Fribourg, Switzerland.

Finally, my patient typist, Mrs. Frey in Münster, deserves special mention for her beautiful work.

Fribourg, Switzerland

May, 1970

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. THE OBJECT OF THIS STUDY

The past twenty years have seen in the Soviet Union a flood of writings which are critical of 'neopositivism' or of 'contemporary positivism'. A reasonably complete list of these is to be found in the bibliography.

This Soviet critique is the direct object of our study. Since both the criticised and, therefore, the critics talk mainly in terms of problems which are metaphilosophical, epistemological and which fall in the area of philosophy of science, these questions will be prominent in our account. Wherever we have transcended the limits of the Soviet critique of neopositivism, this has been done in order to facilitate examination of the main object of study. This comment is particularly pertinent to our preliminary remarks on the history of positivism and neopositivism and on the history of the Marxist-Leninist tradition. We have had to be relatively complete because historical clarity is a *sine qua non* for understanding the relationships between them; and the available secondary sources are incomplete in this regard.

2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY

The Soviet critique of neopositivism is deserving of a study concentrated on it alone because it makes up the bulk of the contemporary Soviet response to Western philosophy. History has shown that discussion and exchange between philosophers of completely different schools has been one of the most important stimuli for progress in philosophy. This dialogue is furthered by a careful study of the many arguments and counter-arguments, more than by participation in conferences and study trips. Even if one restricted oneself to reporting the Soviet critique, this would represent something of value for the Western reader.

That there is in the Soviet Union so much preoccupation with positivism is due to the fact that its central themes are also those of Marxism-Leninism. The experiences with Machism and mechanism have not been forgotten. Positivism claims the very same scientific standards which Marxism-Leninism holds to be its own monopoly. Positivism uses efficient technical devices,

like semantics and formal logic: although these met with great resistance in some circles in the Soviet Union, the scientists hold them in high esteem. It is understandable that positivism exercises a great attraction for Soviet scientists since the Party has interfered so often in the sciences in the name of philosophy. And it is understandable that the official Party philosophy is afraid of this attraction.

What we want to do here goes beyond merely Sovietological interest, since the works we are examining supply an extensive and systematic survey and critique of logical positivism from a realistic and generally rationalist viewpoint, and on a scale seldom seen in the past.

3. SOME DIFFICULTIES

A study of the Soviet critique of neopositivism meets a peculiar set of obstacles. The object – i.e., a presentation and critique of the Soviet presentation and critique of the positivist critique of philosophy – is quite complex. The primary sources are very hard to get at and when one does one finds that a strangeness (both literal and allegorical) of language and of categories makes interpretation very difficult. To this one has to add the mutual suspicion which pervades Sovietological work. According to Leninism, a study such as ours has to be motivated and colored by class-conditioned prejudice and one is tempted to conform to this super-prejudice.

There is the final difficulty that Soviet writers frequently do not refer to each other by name. Connections between them are more often than not a matter of supposition.

4. ON METHOD

In view of these difficulties, we will use an analytical approach. Contrary to the usual Soviet (and even Sovietological) talk in terms of broad movements or schools (e.g., 'bourgeois philosophy', 'neopositivism', 'Soviet philosophy'), we are going to distinguish carefully certain works of certain epochs of the activity of certain authors. Many Soviet writings on neopositivism contain examples of the bad results of taking for granted the monolithic character of a philosophic school.

Since we cannot deal with all the works or with all the authors, we have limited ourselves to cases which are particularly representative and interesting. Our account of these authors is prefaced by a descriptive survey of the position of Soviet handbook philosophy on the issues under discussion, as

well as by an overview of the historical development of scholarship on neopositivism.

Our own philosophical opinions are expressed in this study only indirectly through our critical arguments whenever they go beyond the limits of a purely immanent critique.

5. THE QUESTIONS

We are here studying our complex object with these questions in mind: (1) what can we learn about Soviet historiography and critique of Western philosophy from the specific instance of 'neopositivism'? (2) What influence has preoccupation with positivist theses had on Soviet philosophy itself? (3) Do the scholars under scrutiny give alternative solutions to the problems discussed by the positivists?

CHAPTER II

FIRST HISTORICAL APPROACH: POSITIVISM AND NEOPOSITIVISM

An understanding of the Soviet critique of what they call 'neopositivism' and the relevant philosophic issues, requires a knowledge of the historical background. It will be the task of this chapter and the succeeding one to outline the two historical series:

(1) The history of positivism in Western Europe up to its most recent form as 'logical positivism' or 'neopositivism'.

(2) The history in Marxism-Leninism – from the 'classics' to late Stalinism – of the concept of philosophy and of the reaction to positivism.

These two histories together form the prehistory of the present, intense critique by the Soviets of neopositivism. Although we can only sketch them here, this will be enough to show why the critique of neopositivism occupies such an important place in the works of Soviet philosophers who are more dependent than many other philosophers on the history of their own school.

This historical excursion will have to be prefaced by some comments on the word 'positivism' because of the way it is misused, even by philosophers.[1] The present chapter will thus have three parts: (1) The notion of positivism; (2)The history of positivism up to 1921(date of publication of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*); (3) The history of neopositivism (the term used by the Soviets to designate logical positivism and related movements). The historical sketch will follow the consensus of several historical works[2] with only limited reference to primary sources (more frequent for the more recent forms).[3]

1. THE NOTION OF POSITIVISM

The word 'positivism' has taken on so many meanings that it can be used only after being precisely defined. Of the many meanings of the word, the following are *not* meant here:

(1) There is an *unprofessional* use of the word 'positivism' or 'positivist', which can be left completely out of consideration.

(2) 'Positivism' is also used to designate a legal theory which is opposed to natural law theory in that it declares legislation to be the only basis of law without any moral foundation. This meaning is related to the theories

we will deal with here. However, since the Soviets almost never consider the legal-theory side of the question, we can leave this meaning aside.

(3) 'Positivist' is often used in the sense of a *personal* and unreflective tendency in *interests,* tastes or styles, away from metaphysical or idealist speculation and toward the facts of natural science.[4] This meaning is sometimes used to put disputed questions into a subjective framework, where they can no longer be discussed. Such a process can be due to animosity, or to a desire to protect another, or to an effort at psychological clarification. This last can be of great interest for historical or practical questions, but we are going to limit our attention here to the contents of propositions. The personal or subjective element can be very important to a doctrine but 'positivist' will be a descriptive name for the content of such a doctrine.

(4) 'Positivism' is sometimes taken as a *method* or a rule which excludes certain philosophic perspectives – either temporarily or in a categorically final way. Only the latter deserves to be called 'positivism' in some sense. However, here we will be interested not as much in the method as in the *doctrine* which underlies it.

(5) Throughout the history of positivism, the rejection of philosophy has been rightly or wrongly connected with an anti-*religious* or anti-theological position (with a concomitant lack of distinction between a philosophic metaphysics and a theology of revelation and belief). This has given 'positivism' an anti-religious ring. We will consider here none of the religious implications: we take 'positivism' as a purely philosophical designation.

(6) Very often we find 'positivist' used in a relative sense – somewhat like 'light' and 'dark', 'right' and 'left', i.e., valid only from a certain point of view. In this sense 'positivism' is a collective designation for various theories that deny, question or limit the possibilities of philosophy. This means that there are as many positivisms as there are views on what is being denied, questioned or limited, i.e., on philosophy. In polemics, this use of 'positivist' comes in handy: anyone who does not see the validity of my methods or the seriousness of my questions is a 'positivist'; Aristotle is a positivist for Platonists; Marx became more positivist with age; Engels is the most positivist of the classics; and so on. Even Hegel has "positivist elements".[5] To this use of language (which is connected with all the above), we will oppose a definition which designates 'positivism' as a *clearly delineated* doctrine which is either accepted or rejected: one is either a positivist or one is not. This is the only way we can proceed.

One is tempted simply to take Auguste Comte's definition, since he was,

after all, the founder of the movement. But this would be impractical since it corresponds to no contemporary usage of the word; neither that of the Soviets, nor that of Western historians of philosophy. It would result in excluding many classical positivists, like John Stuart Mill (who criticized Comte's 'positive universal facts')[6] and others who did not share Comte's utopian vision.

Instead, we will take what is common to what one usually calls positivism as the core of our definition. Common to the various forms of positivism we find three internally connected assertions: (1) *A scientific, ontologically and metaphysically grounded philosophy is, for epistemological reasons* (sensualism), *impossible or without object* (empiricism); (2) Nevertheless, *a fully rational, scientific explanation of the world is possible* (rationalism in the broader sense; or anti-irrationalism); (3) *This explanation of the world is supplied by the sciences alone* (scientism). These three theses define 'positivism' for our purposes here. The various forms of positivism mainly differ from each other in the varying emphasis they put on one or other of the assertions. For example, many positivists assume but do not explicate the epistemological empiricism.[7] All positivists accept all three – at least implicitly. They find their ontological (rather, 'anti-ontological') presuppositions in some form of phenomenalism: there are only phenomena, with no essence, being or in-itself-ness hiding behind.

This definition enables us to distinguish positivism from two other movements:

(1) Positivism is no anti-theoretical doctrine of an irrational, pragmatic or nihilist stamp. It holds to a scientific explanation of the world while these others tend to reject the other sciences along with their rejection of philosophy. Positivism is *'rationalist'* (or anti-irrationalist) in the broad sense.[8] It belongs to the trends of thought that hold that it is possible and useful for man to know and to express theoretical, objective, critically founded and logically coherent propositions. They demand that the irrational (whether it be the individual as part of the cognitive process or as subject; the will; feeling; praxis; belief) never determine cognitive method and presentation in the carefully developed domains of science – even though it can occur as *object* in these domains.

(2) Positivism with its *epistemological* arguments differs from those opponents of philosophy who use extra-philosophical (scientific, ethical, social or theological) arguments. The positivist limits or rejects philosophy on *philosophical* grounds.

Positivism in the above sense has had a rich and varied history, to which we now turn.

2. THE HISTORY OF EARLY POSITIVISM (pre-1921)

Philosophy as rational, universal and radical theoretical activity and as the science of ontological and metaphysical foundations has, throughout history, had to defend itself against serious foes who questioned its right to exist. In ancient times there were the sophists, the cynics and the sceptics: latter-day positivists remind one of no one so much as of Sextus Empiricus and friends. Even in medieval times, philosophy was threatened by mystical and nominalist varieties of scepticism.

Positivism is a modern form of reiection of philosophy. For a long time, while the sciences (at first only the natural sciences but, with time, the social sciences as well) were being held to strictness in method and to critical self-examination, philosophy continued along a dogmatic or naively speculative path. Even more striking is the fact that the methodological and critical spirit of science was the work of philosophers who were using philosophic methods which could not stand up under their own rules. Francis Bacon, a great critic of method and forerunner of scientific methodology, rejected the whole philosophic tradition and yet remained a philosopher in the traditional sense. Descartes had a great influence on the development of thinking about method; but, the 'rationalism' that flowed from him led to the metaphysical systems (Spinoza and Wolff) which precisely evoked the empiricist reaction. It is understandable that this development saw an ever increasing antagonism between the sciences and philosophy. Pride in science's success and mistrust of philosophy are the premisses for positivism.

The greatest forerunner of positivism was David Hume (1711-1776), who gave to it an epistemological basis. In Berkeley's so-called idealism the denial of a reality standing behind representations was limited to the realm of the sensual and corporeal. Hume generalized this in his empiricism to a denial of all substances and causality – spiritual as well as corporeal. These basic notions of ontology were dissolved into psychological relations of 'ideas'. For Hume, there could be no ontology or metaphysics. Especially in view of the consequences for religion, his doctrine is often called 'scepticism': he himself called it 'moderate scepticism'.[9] It is important not to confuse scepticism and positivism. The former involves universal mistrust of human knowing; the latter contains a strong dose of epistemological optimism. Since Hume accepted both the sensual perception of facts and mathematical proofs as sure, he was in fact not a sceptic[10], and he explicitly refuted scepticism.[11]

The impossibility of any ontology or metaphysics is a consequence of

Hume's sensualism and nominalism. What he himself called the 'true metaphysics'[12] is epistemology and psychology, to be carried out along the lines of Newtonian physics. Hume wished thereby to ground knowledge and to set its limits.

Hume was an opponent of Aristotelian logic. He had a thoroughly psychologistic account of logic.[13] The only domain of analytic and demonstrative knowledge was for him mathematics which, however, he did not see as rooted in logic: a matter that Hume never satisfactory cleared up.[14] Hume is, nevertheless, closely connected with the logical positivists of the 20th Century, especially because, in addition to empiricism, he held for a strict distinction between empirical, sense 'facts' and analytic, demonstrative 'relations of ideas'.[15] Hume's epistemological and psychological foundation broke down. In his account of natural belief he was forced to assume subjective feeling as point of departure[16] and this, of course, cannot provide an objective foundation for knowledge. No later positivist adopted Hume's 'grounding'. However, to the extent that every one of them defended knowledge against scepticism, with energy but without allowing any possible ontological foundation, they were living examples of precisely this 'belief'.

The doctrines of Bacon and Hume had a great influence on the French Enlightenment; e.g. on d'Alembert's initiation of the *Encyclopedia* and on the sensualism of Condillac.

Auguste Comte (1798-1857) was the founder of the first system to be called 'positivism'. In French-speaking regions positivism is often synonymous with his doctrine.[17] This is not accurate: the basic ideas of positivism – different from other philosophical doctrines – are not the work of one man but the content of a broad movement, which is expressed by especially talented spokesmen.

During 1826 and again in 1829 (with a break due to illness and a suicide attempt), Comte gave lectures which appeared in 1830-42 in six volumes as *Cours de philosophie positive.* This forms the basis for our presentation. Although Comte did not say so, the word and the concept of the positive come, along with many other notions, from Saint-Simon, of whom Comte was both disciple and secretary.[18]

Comte's doctrine is inspired by the desire to reform a society which had been morally and socially damaged since the revolution. Science seemed to him to be the only stable locus of authority.[19] While Saint-Simonism wanted to subordinate science as a tool to reform, Comte wanted to build a system, the practical authority of which would consist in its scientific and theoretical rigor.

There are three main components to Comte's positivism: (1) an empiricist epistemology and theory of science; (2) an application to the realm of society and history; (3) historically potent conclusions about the nature of philosophy. These elements are already apparent in Comte's use of the term 'positive' (and 'positivism'). 'Positive' simultaneously means (1) empirically given, real, actual (as already in Bacon's works), (2) effective, constructive, what serves men, and (3) free of useless, abstract, chimerical, 'metaphysical', speculation.[20] The three elements explicate themselves as follows:

(1) Comte held a strict *empiricism*, where all knowledge and every science contains only sense-perceivable facts, i.e., phenomena, as content. Instead of looking for causes in the strict sense or for teleological goals, one has only to discover 'laws' – i.e., constant relations between phenomena and their conditions – (which are themselves phenomena).[21] The study of nature provides only relative knowledge. There is no known or unknown absolute which would underlie the relative and phenomenal known. However, science is not the mere collection of single facts (which Comte pejoratively called *'empirisme'*) but rather of laws. Comte believed that science gets generalizations – up to the invariability of the laws of nature – as the result of a gradual induction from individual and social experience; and obtains them purely phenomenally as universal facts.[22] In fact, they have so much validity in Comte's eyes that one can predict and plan in function of them. Comte goes no further: the rest is guaranteed by his limitless belief in an absolutely certain science.

(2) Comte was particularly interested in applying his phenomenalistic 'positive' method of the natural sciences to the *social sciences*. He saw himself as the founder of a scientific sociology, which he also called 'social physics'.[23] It is through careful study of history and of society that one discovers the laws which also determine the future. This knowledge of the future can be used to plan in such a way that society can be reformed in accordance with its proper laws. Comte thought he was setting this reform in motion and that he was the founder of a scientific movement for improvement of the world.

The law of the three stages is Comte's most universal law of history.[24] It is positivism's foundation in a theory of history: having passed through the theological and metaphysical periods, the progress of mankind is now entering the 'positive' period, where all previous, primitive explanations and speculations are replaced by scientific knowledge of the facts. This historical

foundation of positivism is also its *application* to the social sciences: according to Comte, the law of the three stages follows as a 'universal fact' from the unspeculative and unmetaphysical study of history.

(3) 'Positive' *philosophy* is not a special science or realm of knowledge with its own object. It is but the systematization of all other sciences. It uses its historical overview to reject metaphysics back into its rightful place as fruitless speculation of a past era and limits itself to the encyclopedic collecting and classifying of the sciences (hierarchy of sciences). Its greatest contribution for Comte is that it provided sociology with its rightful place.

Comte has no clear view on the nature of logic and mathematics. Logic does not occur in his system as an independent domain.[25] Mathematics is the first and most fundamental science; and it has 'abstract' and 'concrete' parts: the former is 'calculus' which is an 'expansion of natural logic'; the latter includes geometry and mechanics and is an experimental-observational science.[26] It seems that the 'abstract' part of mathematics (and logic) is psychologistically interpreted.

Comte's positivism has lived on up to the present in the form of a rejection of metaphysics and a limitation of philosophy by means of a 'scientific' method. However, for Comte himself positivism is the whole of his doctrine: otherwise, he might as well have called it 'negativism'.

In his later years, Comte founded under the name of 'positivism' a sentimental, religious movement which was also called the 'religion of mankind'. This development had not much in common with the rationalistic and scientistic positivism of his youth. It was the former rather than the latter which had enduring influence.

Next to Comte, the most influential positivist of the 19th Century was John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), who knew Comte well[27] (and even assisted him financially) and was an enthusiastic supporter for a time, but whose own development was independent of Comte. Reacting to the German idealism that was invading England via Coleridge, Carlyle and Hamilton and indirectly relying on Hume (through Bentham, Hartley and James Mill, his father)[28], Mill concentrated both on inductive logic and method – where his greatest contributions were made – and on an empiricist[29], sensualist and psychologistic epistemology. Mill held that all laws – even those of logic and mathematics, as well as those like that of the uniformity of nature – are inductively obtained from indubitable individual facts of experience. They are basically psychological laws of association. Objective substance becomes the 'constant possibility of experience' and spiritual substance becomes a 'constant possi-

bility of feeling'. Mill either did not see or dismissed as 'practical difficulties' the great problems of his grounding of logic and mathematics and of his concepts of law and substance; on the other hand, he admitted there was a problem with the notion of a series of feelings (spiritual substance) which would be conscious of itself as a series.[30]

Depending on how one uses the term, Mill is sometimes a positivist, sometimes not.[31] In the light of our definition above[32], his views are positivistic. Despite his rejection of any ontological basis for knowledge, he holds fast to its validity. His entire philosophical focus is on the epistemological-psychological justification of this validity. For him, philosophy (or 'metaphysics') is methodology, theory of knowledge and theory of science (with special attention to the social sciences). The fact that Mill's phenomenalism – like that of all positivists – logically leads to scepticism or irrationalism and, therefore, away from positivistic rationalism is no counter-argument, since Mill did not take that path.

It is among the scientists and outside of philosophy that the ideas of Comte and Mill have had the greatest influence. Examples are Durkheim the sociologist, Ribot the experimental psychologist, Taine the historian, and Littré the philologist. Some of Comte's disciples were brilliant writers, like Taine and Renan. The great success of all the 'positive' natural and social sciences seemed to corroborate the positivist theories. In post-Hegelian Germany there was a punctilious attitude toward philosophy and in England Mill gave new impulses to empiricism. All of this worked in favor of a vast movement which lasted through the turn of the century, merged with the developmental theories of Guyau and Spencer and with ethical utilitarianism and hedonism (e.g., Bentham) and produced a wide-spread indifference or opposition to philosophy, combined with blunt scientism, naturalism and even materialism.

The most influential of all these theories was the evolutionism of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). He announced a universal law of development as the result of applying positive methods to all domains of knowledge and as the highest organic synthesis thereof. (For his contemporary, Darwin, it was mainly a question of the organization of organic nature; for Spencer it was a matter of the totality of the world, extending to psychology, ethics, sociology and history). Philosophy has the unique task of explicating this synthesis as the highest generalization of the sciences. The absolute is unknowable, and precisely as such, the object of religion. (Therefore, there can be no genuine conflict between a truly 'scientific' science and a truly 'religious' religion).

Though Spencer rejected the specific doctrines of Comte – including the law of three stages and the hierarchy of sciences – he was definitely a positivist. Nevertheless, one does not find in Spencer a precise viewpoint on the basic questions or even a coherent formulation of his very superficial phenomenalism. He was a propagandist and a very successful one at that. Through Spencer (and Darwin) evolutionism became one of the main components of the arrogant positivistic naturalism of the educated bourgeoisie.

Many philosophical schools in the Germany of the second half of the 19th century exhibited positivistic traits. Ludwig Feuerbach's progressive distantiation from Hegel's idealism and spiritualism has positivistic characteristics, and his doctrine could be called 'German positivism'.[33] However, his main interests were anthropology and philosophy of religion rather than epistemology and theory of science. Ernst Haeckel and Emil Dühring too – both materialists – came up with some positivist assertions.

The rebirth of German speculative philosophy in neo-Kantianism had its effect on the further development of positivism. On the one hand, some Marburg and Baden neo-Kantians used the Kantian critique in a positivist way as the counterpart to metaphysics. (To the extent, however, that they held for a truly transcendental idealism and not just for a 'transcendental logic' of the subject, they were not positivists at all. Only one-sided phenomenalistic interpretations of Kant can be really positivistic.) On the other hand, we find Ernst Laas and the empirio-criticists, in open opposition to Kant. Both proponents and opponents of Kant remained mired in epistemological problems – which can always lead very easily to positivism.

The same is true of Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius, the founders of empirio-criticism. They are reminiscent of Berkeley: as elements of both reality and thought, there are only the sense-contents which are present in consciousness, so that there can be no opposition between inner world and outer world and all dualism is overcome. The goal of knowledge is a description free of metaphysics, the truth-value of which takes on secondary importance as compared to its biological, pragmatic value ('economy of thought'). The theories of Avenarius are very complicated but hardly profound or original. He remains in the (supposedly overcome) phenomenalism of all positivism. The important questions of ontology are not understood and dismissed as poetic.

Empirio-criticism is of mainly historical interest. It forms an important bridge from the 19th Century into the newest formulations of logical positivism (and, incidentally, to Anglo-American pragmatism). Lenin's opposition to it is among its biggest claims to fame.

3. THE HISTORY OF NEOPOSITIVISM (post-1921)

Shortly after the first World War, there began an intense development of new theories which were given the names of 'neopositivism', 'logical' or 'logistical positivism'. Since the Soviets usually use 'neopositivism' (or 'contemporary positivism') we will use this rather weak and vague name.

The publication date of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, 1921, can be taken as the beginning of this movement. The book itself cannot be considered positivist but it contains many hints at what later became main theses of neopositivism, especially the assertion that all propositions that are not singular propositions are only 'truth-functions' (i.e., purely logical connections) of such propositions, and that all propositions of logic are 'tautological', i.e., empty. No single piece of writing has had such a great influence on logical positivism as this peculiar little book. In the very next year, Moritz Schlick was named to his position at the University of Vienna and the Vienna Circle began to form around him and around the theses of the *Tractatus*.

It seems quite reasonable to speak of the many philosophic doctrines that took form here as positivism. Despite some differences, the main views of a whole series of philosophers had a common foundation and showed serious agreement with the older positivism. From the 1930's up to the present, the members of the Vienna Circle have gone different ways. It would be as inaccurate to call all of them 'logical positivists' as it would be useless to abandon the designation 'logical *positivism*'. The most distinctive elements of this new positivism – as compared with the earlier variety – have to do with logic: it would be best, then, to speak of '*logical* positivism'.[34] We shall now turn to examine the doctrines and history of neopositivism.[35]

3.1. *Origins and Developments*

Four historical influences were at work in the coming-to-be of neopositivism: (1) *Classical empiricism* and *positivism* – especially through the English tradition and German empirio-criticism.[36] (2) The development of formal *logic* in its newest 'mathematical' form up to the *Principa Mathematica* of Russell and Whitehead, with its completely logical reduction of mathematics.[37] (3) The atomistic interpretation of *language*, strongly influenced by Russell and formulated in the *Tractatus*.[38] (4) Research into the foundations of science – especially the French *critique of science*, and recent developments in physics – especially those of *Einstein*.[39]

Neopositivism developed in the 1920's mainly in the Vienna Circle. The center of this group was Moritz Schlick (1882-1936) and his seminar. The most influential member of the group and its leading logician was Rudolf

Carnap (b.1891). Other important members were: O. Neurath (1882-1945), H. Hahn (1880-1934), F. Waismann and H. Feigl. Among the philosophers who were only temporarily connected with the group, the most important was Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953) who sometimes shared the leading role (from Berlin) with Carnap but who gave up positivism rather early on, and Alfred Ayer (b.1910) who, after a long visit in Vienna, spread neopositivism in England with great energy and conviction. Karl Popper also stood close to neopositivism and had (especially through his critique) a great influence on its development. There were also German, Polish, Scandinavian and, later, English philosophers, logicians, mathematicians, etc., who shared in the development or at least were very interested in it. The following groups should be noted: 'The Society for Empirical Philosophy', around Reichenbach in *Berlin*, including C.G. Hempel; a number of *Polish* logicians and philosophers with A. Tarski; some of the *English* analytic school with J. Wisdom and G. Ryle. However, the connections between these and other thinkers were variable and loose: the main connections had to do with common technical (above all, logical and logical-scientific) interests and trends of research.

1928 saw the foundation of the *Verein Ernst Mach* which largely coincided with the Vienna Circle; in 1929 the Vienna Circle began its publications and congresses; as of 1930 it had its own journal (*Erkenntnis*; as of 1939, *Journal of Unified Science*, ending in April 1950). In the years before the war, it was one of the most powerful philosophic movements. As fast as it came to be, logical positivism quickly dissolved as a school, even though its influence lives on – especially in Anglo-Saxon lands. Analytic philosophy is strongly influenced by it.

3.2. *Basic Stance*

Like many philosophers, the partisans of neopositivism saw themselves as accomplishing a 'turn in philosophy'.[40] The distinctive trait of their movement was to them a certain motivation and methodical posture rather than a fixed doctrine. Many historians of philosophy have agreed with them in this.[41] The logical positivists saw their basic task in making *philosophy scientific*. Russell had already specified that philosophy should be even more exact, strict and scientific than the other sciences. The neopositivists were convinced of having succeeded where Kant had failed. The newly scientific character of philosophy included: uncompromising logical and methodological exactness and self-criticism; supplying verifiable justification for all assertions; undogmatic readiness for discussion; recognition of the constant need for improvement; preservation of linguistic intersubjectivity; sharp

separation of rational knowledge from religious, moral and artistic experience, excluding all of this from philosophy; solid knowledge of the foundations of formal logic and of the other sciences – most of which were requirements of many philosophers but remained (for all philosophers, according to the neopositivists) dead letters. Special attention was devoted to questions of logic, methodology, language, science and epistemology. Like all the positivists before them, the logical positivists announced that philosophy was finally capable of truly scientific progress.

In direct contradiction with the actively espoused rules of scientific rationality, the logical positivists evidenced a seldom seen *dogmatism* and *sectarianism* toward all 'non-believers'. They presented their own philosophic views with absolute self-assurance and with enthusiastic rejection of all other philosophies, past and present. Metaphysics was beaten from pillar to post by people who knew little about it. Scientific method became a case of 'scientific prejudice'.

3.3. *Philosophic Doctrines*

As foundation of their scientific and formal methods and style, the philosophers around the Vienna Circle had certain fundamental philosophic doctrines in common, although they were hardly ever developed in any systematic way and were ultimately abandoned. The most significant are:

(1) The sensualist *principle of verification,* which is also called the empiricist criterion of meaning. The only form of receptive non-formal knowledge is the single sense-perception. Consequently, only those sentences have cognitive meaning which directly or indirectly express single sense-experienced (verifiable) facts. Such sentences are the one kind of scientifically acceptable sentence.

(2) In contradistinction to the earlier empiricists, the logical positivists assert the apriori universality of *logic.* But its propositions are without any content; they are 'empty of meaning', 'analytic', purely 'formal', 'tautological', 'syntactic' propositions about the internal rules of *language.* That they are non-contentful and non-verifiable is not a lack but their essence; They are the second kind of scientifically admissible (and important) propositions.

(3) Outside of these two types of proposition, there is nothing scientific or even meaningful to say. All conceivable, correct propositions are completely and adequately divided into the two classes. As far as the propositions of *traditional philosophy* do not fit into one of the groups, they are only pseudo-propositions and should be rejected. They are like poetry in that

they express feeling but say nothing. The corresponding 'metaphysical' questions are not unanswerable; they are *unaskable.*

(4) As a 'logic of science' the *new, scientific philosophy* was to establish, develop and apply the rules of science. All of its propositions fall into the domain of formal, logical science or its application.

These four theses can be combined as follows: There are only two sorts of meaningful propositions: the empirical and the logical (theses 1 and 2). Traditional philosophy belongs to neither of these and, therefore, is meaningless (thesis 3). The philosophy of neopositivism itself is the logic of science and belongs to the second sort (thesis 4).

3.4. *Technical Works and Philosophy*

An understanding of neopositivism is made difficult by the technically complicated *style* of many works. With previously unreached and unsurpassable formal care and subtlety, Carnap above all has developed and used logical and semantic terminology and other technical aids. Many logical positivists are fascinated by technical problems, the elaboration of which lies outside the domain of philosophy but which color their writings. The greatest *achievements* of the whole movement are to be found in this 'technical' domain: Carnap alone has contributed to the analysis of definitions, explanations and descriptions (with Hempel); to the development of the axiomatic method; to research on scientific protocolls (with Schlick, Neurath, Popper, and Pap); to probability (with Reichenbach, Popper, von Mises and many others); and to semantics (above all with Tarski).[42] Many areas of foundational and methodological research and of semiotics and formal logic have been decisively influenced by authors who are neopositivist or close to neopositivism.

But, the extreme (and at times seemingly unnecessary) technical complexity of the philosophic writings is not the main basis of difficulty – which lies rather in the fact that philosophy is systematically identified with the technical works. Philosophy is supposed to be the logic of science, so that all philosophical opinions in the normal sense of the term are inadmissible and have to be sought where they insinuate themselves between the lines or where they are implicit in the method. Differentiation of the mixed-up technical and philosophical theories is absolutely necessary since, otherwise, the completely neutral technical works (even logic itself) are rejected as positivistic or on the contrary considered as arguments for the correctness of logical positivism; i.e., one confuses the methods of the two fields and can come to no agreement on basics.[43]

3.5. *Philosophical Developments*

An external characteristic of logical positivism is the frequent change of opinion of its proponents. Dogmatism and obstinacy are remarkably absent from these discussions. However, one cannot escape the impression that theories are developed out of formal and gamemanship motives, pushed into the finest details, and then abandoned. (An extreme example of this is Carnap who himself always came up with the best arguments against his own previous views.) The development of logical positivism can be briefly summarized in three steps:

First Stage of Development: Sensualism. At the founding of the Vienna Circle there was basic agreement on the sensuous origin, the sensuous basis and the sensuous content of all objective knowledge. This view was consistently held by Schlick until his death. He spoke of the 'given' which is recorded through observation, through direct experience'.[44] The meaning of all knowledge consists in these recordings, although knowledge itself, in the linguistic expression which is essential to it, is knowledge only of form and the experienced content has to exist completely outside of it.[45] This is, therefore, a semantic version of meaning.

In his famous *Logischer Aufbau der Welt,* Carnap develops a system, where all meaningful concepts are reduced to relations between elementary sense impressions. He thereby attempted to accomplish what all other empiricists had only announced.[46]

Ayer also interpreted verification in the strict sense as reduction to propositions about sense perceptions. He defended this sensualism against later formalistic theories (see below).[47] Even during the formative period of the Vienna Circle this sensualism was partially abandoned and there were lively discussions.

Second Stage of Development: Formalism. Carnap and Neurath with their theory of so-called physicalism were the protagonists of this level. Carnap himself criticized the phenomenalist bases of his *Aufbau* as incapable of providing a foundation for the theoretical concepts and the intersubjectivity of science. Also, the application of the principle of verification to the previous theories caused problems. Since propositions *about* the sense-given, about the relation between it and observational or protocoll sentences, and therewith about verification itself are not empirical propositions, they have to be logical propositions; otherwise, they would have to be condemned as 'metaphysics'. For example, Neurath called Schlick's references to the given metaphysical.[48] Such considerations lead logically to formalistic and con-

ventionalistic conclusions: the meanings of all words are determined by the relevant formal and syntactic rules. Every consideration of the semantic relation between language and the extra-linguistic is for Carnap now only a 'contentful manner of speaking' which relates only to the formal, i.e., which must be syntactically interpreted.[49] The selection of the observational sentences about directly given sense objects, as basic or protocoll sentences of science, has to be seen as purely conventional. Propositions of any other kind – as long as they belong to physicalist languages – could as well play the role.[50] The whole trend is called 'physicalism' since, instead of personal sense experiences with their solipsistic dangers, propositions about public physical events are taken as basic. It can still be called positivist as long as the conventions of physicalism are taken as sacrosanct. The unfounded convention is not much different from the unfounded belief in the 'given'. It only seems that phenomenalism has been abandoned. In fact, what we have instead of propositions on real sense impressions are propositions about possible ones: what does 'public physical fact' mean if not 'sense perceptible' fact?!

After a few years, Carnap had to give up the logical but unsatisfactory viewpoint of conventionalism. He turned to intensive preoccupation with semantics[51], while Schlick and Ayer defended themselves against physicalism and remained faithful to sensualism.[52] However, conventionalistic explanations often recur among positivistic analysts.[53]

The conflict between sensualism and conventionalism is implicit in the heart of logical positivism, in the mix of empiricist verificationism and logical formalism. When the difficulties of the two alternatives became evident, no further system of logical positivism came to be; on the contrary, it began to dissolve as a movement.

Third Stage of Development: The Dissolution of Neopositivism: Analytic Philosophy. The analytic trends in contemporary philosophy – principally in Anglo-Saxon lands – differ widely one from the other. However, they have the following in common: they are all greatly influenced by logical positivism; they all shy away from great speculative syntheses which they call 'metaphysics'; but, not one of them holds a properly positivist doctrine. (Even the name 'empiricist' does not apply to most of them without limitations.) Rather than a radical phenomenalism, one more often finds a careful withdrawal from the relevant questions.

Various problems contributed to this development. Already in 1938, Reichenbach – who had made interesting developments in the doctrines of

the Vienna Circle, with the help of probability theory,[54] – had fallen away from positivism and had begun to deal with 'metaphysical' problems like those of a cognition-transcendent reality and of the psycho-physical relationship.[55]

An even more extensive influence was exerted by the gradual dissolution and finally the almost general abandoning of the principle of verification. No one arrived at a satisfying definition of the verifying protocolls. Popper, who criticized the logical positivists with their own tools, described the protocolls as conventions.[56] Above all, however, Popper showed that the vast majority of propositions of science could not be verified. He proposed falsifiability in the place of verifiability. It soon became clear that the falsification of scientific propositions of a certain form (conjunction of existential and universal propositions) is in principle as impossible as their verification. The principle of verification, then, had to be loosened: Carnap now required only incomplete and indirect confirmability[57] and finally had to be satisfied with a certain predictive relevance in order to make possible propositions with theoretical concepts and dispositional predicates.[58] Hempel made decisive contributions to the overcoming of the principle of verification.[59] Pap supplied a devastating summary of the critique of this principle.[60] The same authors also recognized the untenability of the strict division of all scientifically admissible propositions into synthetic and analytic, which had been demonstrated by W.V. Quine.[61] Ayer said that the principle of verification had always been considered only a convention and that the verifying propositions related to experience, not however to that of a definite person.[62] If one agrees with Pap's definition of a logical positivist as one who accepts the principle of verification[63], then there are hardly any of them left.

Another important breakdown of logical positivism came from the insight that the reductive analysis of natural language, its reduction to a certain kind of simple proposition about sensations, and its translation into an ideal, truth-functional, extensional language, not only was practically unsuccessful but also seemed theoretically suspicious. Already at the end of the 1930's J. Wisdom had expressed reservations[64], while the older Wittgenstein and the bulk of the English analysts had abandoned analytic reducibility.[65]

The abandoning of some of these positivist views showed itself clearly in the fact that analytic philosophers began to deal with many *old philosophic problems* which the logical positivists had rejected as senseless metaphysics. Among these we find the problem of universals (e.g., Goodman as nominalist against Church as Platonic realist[66]); of a transcognitional reality

(e.g., Reichenbach); the body-soul problem (e.g., Feigl[67]); and ethical problems (e.g., Stevenson and Hare[68]). Even Carnap – since he began to deal with semantics and has admitted propositions about the relationship between language and the extra-linguistic – has readmitted many kinds of objects.[69] Constant and exclusively epistemological 'sharpening of the knives' had become not only boring but impossible.

A few years ago one could summarize analytic philosophy in two tendencies: (1) Carnap and his partisans who try to define the basic concepts of science in ideal, artificial languages. They lean toward a pragmatist and operationalist philosophy. (2) The partisans of G.E. Moore and of the Wittgenstein of the *Investigations* who study ordinary language and find almost any kind of proposition acceptable. They conceive of philosophy as a method of 'therapeutically' eliminating linguistic confusion of the kind that leads to philosophic problems.[70] Besides these, there were always other philosophers who were analysts in method and style but belonged to neither group.[71]

Most recently, both logical positivism and empiricism have all but disappeared from the analytic schools. One has the impression that the theses are rejected because it has become impossible to hold on to them, while the methodological consequences – e.g., the limitation of philosophy to the analysis of language – are retained simply because there is no epistemologically acceptable alternative. The most recent peripaties no longer belong to neopositivism or to our account.

20th Century logical positivism was a high point in the history of positivism. The rationalist fervor and rigor of its partisans impelled them beyond it and brought this history at least temporarily to an end. The critiques of the Soviet philosophers thus come a bit late and are of mainly Sovietological interest. One can hope that in these critiques the reasoning of Marxism-Leninism is advanced and sharpened, even though there is monologue and no discussion. Before analysing this, it will be helpful to review the opinions of the 'classics' of Marxism-Leninism about positivism and about philosophy.

CHAPTER III

SECOND HISTORICAL APPROACH: NOTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELATIONSHIPS TO POSITIVISM IN MARX, ENGELS AND THE EARLIER SOVIET PHILOSOPHERS (UP TO WORLD WAR II)

Positivism was not the only anti-philosophical philosophic theory of the 19th Century. Marxism also contained ideas, rejecting philosophy as a speculative and necessarily contemplative explanation of the world; this was Marx' doctrine of the *Aufhebung* of philosophy in revolutionary praxis. This and an outline of the subsequent history of philosophy's role in Marxism-Leninism is the subject of the present chapter. Already Engels was not true to the basic thought of the young Marx on this central issue. Lenin and the Soviet philosophers between the wars completely abandoned the anti-philosophical side of Marx' thought. This background is, of course, important for an understanding of the internal and external relations of Soviet philosophy with positivism: the Marxist *Aufhebung* theory brings it dangerously close to positivism but makes it in a sense immune to it.

As in the case of the history of positivism and logical positivism, this is a relatively unresearched field. We must, nevertheless, limit ourselves to a glance at (1) Marx, (2) Engels, (3) Lenin, (4) the earlier Soviet philosophers. The historical and systematic relationship to the various positivist doctrines will be indicated as we go along.

1. MARX

In some of his works, Karl Marx showed himself a decided opponent of speculative philosophical theories: this anti-philosophic attitude is even to be seen as a basic element of his whole philosophic position.[72] However, to call this position 'positivist' is either false or the result of a very careless use of language.

One can understand Marx' explicit and implicit views about philosophy only by considering his dependence on Hegel. For, in the first place, Marx himself was strongly influenced by Hegel's philosophy and, in the second, the philosophy with which he was confronted was that of Hegel and the Hegelians.

In Hegel's doctrine, philosophy is carried to a speculative and systematic

summit. It was the highest form of the self-actualizing Absolute Spirit and thereby the intrinsic goal of history. This meant that concrete, technical, economic and political history is only the bearer of history proper, i.e., of the history of Spirit; and that the final dialectical unity of theory and praxis was to be seen in philosophy as the highest form of *theory.*[73]

Marx turned against this 'total philosophy'[74] of Hegel. He saw the dialectical unity of theory and praxis in the highest form of *praxis,* i.e., in the revolution. History proper was for him 'actual' and 'unphilosophic', technical, economic and political history. The goal of history could not, therefore, be some sort of knowledge, or philosophy, or knowing Spirit; rather, history runs toward a social order, to be achieved through action, i.e., toward something practical, an *act* (nonetheless spiritual). Philosophy thus looses for Marx the primacy it had for Hegel. Only as *critique* can it serve what is really important – the praxis of revolution.

Corroborating this view of philosophy is the fact that Marx nowhere in his works develops philosophic notions in any systematic way. Instead, he practices critique as the 'praxis of philosophy', as the 'actualization of philosophy'[75] – first the critique of religion in Feuerbach's sense[76], then, in most of his youthful writings of a philosophic nature, the critique of philosophy and, finally, more and more the critique of political, social and economic conditions. In his critique of philosophy, he mixes his arguments against Hegel[77] and the Hegelians[78] with critical comments against philosophy in general.[79] (Seen from Marx' historical standpoint, Hegel's philosophy is philosophy *as such*; its overcoming is the suppression of all philosophy.) Marx' anti-philosophic notions are to be found in most of the writings of his youth; most clearly in 'Notes to the Dissertation' (1850), in 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction' (1843/44), in the 'Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts' (1844), and in *The German Ideology* (1845/46, together with Engels). In these places he speaks of the 'loss', the 'negation', the 'condemnation' of philosophy, and of its 'loss' of its 'existential milieu'.[60] In Marx' later works the theory of the practical *Aufhebung* of philosophy is confirmed precisely by the fact that he *no longer* writes about it or about philosophic questions. As of 1848, he devotes himself entirely to the critique of legal-political and economic-social conditions and to revolutionary praxis. The fact that one can divide Marx' writings according to 'younger' and 'older' should not be understood to mean that his views on philosophy had changed: just the opposite. The philosophical theory of the young Marx was anti-philosophical and the unphilosophic doctrines of the later Marx can be seen as a logical development of the earlier views.

His basic *idea* on philosophy is the following: the proletariat, as collectively acting man who is becoming conscious of himself, establishes in his praxis the dialectical unity of thought and reality; this means that at the same time philosophy becomes visible, act, concrete and real, the material history becomes self-conscious, ideal, philosophic. This basic idea on the *Aufhebung* of philosophy is prepared for already in the 'Notes to the Dissertation'[81], further developed in 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction'[82] and finalized in the famous 11th thesis on Feuerbach.[83]

There are still many difficulties in interpreting Marx' thought. However, it is perfectly clear that by *'aufgehobene'*, 'actualized', 'practical', and 'critical' philosophy he did not mean a theoretical, speculative and systematic philosophy in the strict sense of the word. What is not negated in Marx' *Aufhebung* of philosophy and is translated to a higher level is an ideal property of reality and cannot be called philosophy in any normal sense of the word. Marx was an opponent of philosophy.

There are occasionally historians who call Marx' doctrine *positivist.* At first glance, there seems to be something to this. Closer inspection, however, belies this first impression. Despite the rejection of philosophy that they have in common and even with regard to this rejection there is a basic difference between Marx and the positivists, and they should be kept strictly separate.

It was the Czech philosopher and statesman, T.G. Masaryk, who most clearly asserted that Marx was a positivist. In his *The Philosophical and Sociological Bases of Marxism* (1899) Masaryk asserts that during his stay in Paris Marx was greatly influenced by Comte (going so far as to call Comte Marx' 'teacher').[84] G.A. Wetter repeats this assertion in his *Dialectical Materialism* and quotes Masaryk in support.[85]

It is true that there are similarities between the doctrines of Marx and Comte: both taught a law-bound development by steps of the history of mankind; both sought progress; both are rightly seen as founders of sociology; and both agree in limiting or rejecting philosophy. There are even isolated sentences – especially in *The German Ideology* – that can be interpreted as positivist: e.g., where Marx and Engels talk about the 'real positive science' which destroys 'the existential milieu' of an 'independent philosophy'.[86]

There is also a temptation to make a historical connection. When the 25-year-old Marx came to Paris in 1843 for two years, Comte had just published the last volume of his main work, *Cours de philosophie positive.*[87] Marx could have been interested in Comte because the latter was secretary to Saint-Simon during his last years (1817-1824).[88] One could even want to

call Marx a positivist in view of his strong dependence on Feuerbach who was called the German positivist because of his empiricism and sensualist epistemology.

All of these arguments remain *unconvincing*. The basic inspiration of Marx' views was distinct from that of all positivists. As we have already seen[89], the central problem of positivism is epistemological. Common to all positivists is an epistemological phenomenalism which involves an absolute restriction to what is directly given in the senses, and that excludes all ontological or metaphysical considerations. In contradistinction, Marx' point of departure lies in *metaphysics of history* and far from epistemology.[90] There is no consistent way to state positivist theories in Marxian terms; nor can a positivist accept Marx' ideas as meaningful. To simplify the state of affairs: Marx was an opponent of philosophy only because, for philosophic reasons (metaphysics of history), he was an opponent of all theory; positivism is an opponent of theory only in so far as, for theoretical (cognitive-critical) reasons, it is an opponent of philosophy. It seems confusing to designate two such different positions with the same term. On the other hand, a clear distinction between them can be very helpful for an understanding of the development of Marxism-Leninism.

Some of the above-mentioned similarities are only superficial – like the establishment of sociology or the idea of progress. Neither is a specific trait of positivism. On the other hand, there are misunderstandings here. For example, there is often no clear distinction made between Marx and Engels. One talks about 'positivist Marxism' and cites only Engels.[91] Finally, in the passage quoted from *The German Ideology* the 'real, positive science' is not a positivistically understood science with empiricist methods but the 'presentation of practical activity, of the practical, developmental process of man', of 'real life' over against an 'abstraction' which is isolated from real history.[92]

Nor does the tale of a meeting in Paris of Marx with Comte or his ideas hold water. Masaryk provides no evidence for his assertion[93], and Wetter cites only Masaryk.[94] In Marx' letters from Paris (including his second stay in 1849), which have been published[95], he does not mention Comte once. In all of his works and letters, Marx mentions Comte only four times, always pejoratively and never in a way that would show any influence.[96] On the contrary, it is almost certain that Marx read Comte for the first time in 1866 and that there is no doctrinal connection at all.

The common dependence of the two men on Saint-Simon could be an interesting starting point for a comparison. We will not go into it here since

the common factors lie in the field of socialism; neither Comte nor Marx could have learned positivism from Saint-Simon.[97]

Finally, one cannot use Feuerbach as a bridge between Marx and positivism. In the first place, Feuerbach's anthropological sensualism was so different from the positivist empiricism[98] that the name 'positivist' hardly fits him. In the second place, what Marx precisely criticized in Feuerbach was his epistemological notions, where 'sensuality is conceived only in the form *of the object or of intuition* but not as *sensuous human* activity, praxis; not subjectively'[99] – i.e., where Feuerbach stood closest to positivism!

Our conclusion has to be: Marx has an anti-philosophical and praxeological anthropology and philosophy of history which has no essential connection – either historical or systematic – with the anti-philosophical phenomenalism of positivism. There are rather two completely different challenges made here to philosophy – even though they were later mixed. The confusion began already with Engels.

2. ENGELS

Marx' theory of the *Aufhebung* of philosophy and all theory into praxis was not included in the theories Engels developed thirty or forty years later.[100] Engels' most important philosophical writings came into being in Marx' last years or shortly after his death: *Dialectic of Nature* (sketches and fragments from the years 1873-1883)[101], *Anti-Dühring* (1876-1878)[102] and *Ludwig Feuerbach* (1887).[103] What one reads in these works about philosophy is not a further development of the ideas of Marx but a completely new theory. Some of the expressions remain the same but instead of a historicist praxeology we find a scientism and *positivism.*

As distinct from Marx, Engels developed a broadly philosophical system. It is rather superficially and carelessly expressed but it so decisively determined the development of Marxism-Leninism that his name should be in the designation. But, fortunately for Soviet philosophers, Engels' positivist doctrine *about* philosophy was abandoned.

There are many places in Engels' works, where the right to independent existence of *philosophy is challenged*; e.g., it can only talk about *thought,* all other questions falling into the domain of the sciences.[104] Even where Engels contradicts this view and speaks positively of philosophy[105], he obviously means theory in general and not philosophy in its specific sense.[106] He also does not mean a dialectical ontology when he speaks about the 'science of the universal dynamic and developmental laws of nature, human

society and thought'.[107] In order to avoid crass contradiction between this definition of the dialectic and the places where Engels limits the dialectic and philosophy in general to 'pure thought'[108], one has to keep in mind that for Engels the objective dialectic – the connections and movements of reality – is object of philosophy only as long as the sciences of nature and history have not taken them into account. However, the modern sciences are more and more turning to look at the dialectical aspect of reality and are gradually making philosophy superfluous except as science of thought and of the history of the dialectic.[109] Therefore, in addition to the distinction between subjective and objective dialectic, there is an ambiguity in the use of 'dialectic' as a science. Sometimes it is the doctrine on thought, i.e., on the subjective dialectic; as such, it is – according to Engels – the 'philosophy' of the future. At other times, it is the doctrine of the connections and transformations of all phenomena, i.e., of the *objective* dialectic; as such, it belongs in philosophy only as long as science has not taken it over. Thus, *Engels dialectical philosophy is in no way an ontological enterprise.* He remains captive of radical scientism.

Despite their long and close collaboration and friendship, Engels did not adopt Marx' idea on the *Aufhebung* of philosophy (and of all pure theory) into historical praxis. It would be interesting to follow, in the rich correspondence between the two, the development from Marx' doctrine of the 1840's to that of Engels in the 1870's and to see how each influenced the other, how their views changed, etc. What has to be kept in mind, in any case, is that the failure of the revolutions of 1848/49 in which both had been intensively involved caused a more sober appraisal of the metaphysical visions of history. Marx reacted in a logical way by devoting the rest of his life to carefully detailed work on the scientific proofs for the necessary downfall of capitalism and for the necessary proletarian revolution. Engels was just as logical in turning to the elaboration of a broad scientific and philosophic doctrine to help orient, educate and organize the proletariat in order to speed up the revolution.[110] This involved abandoning the *Aufhebung* idea of the young Marx. If Marx turned Hegel's theory from the head (philosophy) on which it was standing onto its feet (praxis), then Engels put it back on its head (scientific *Weltanschauung*). It is true that the expression *'Aufhebung'* occurs in Engels' writings but it means a scientistic or positivistic reduction of philosophy to the sciences.[111] Philosophy is negated here not because it is pure theory and therefore dated and alienative – on the contrary, Engels insisted on the value of radical theory[112] – but because philosophy as an independent science, 'floating above the sciences', would

be rendered empty and superfluous by the development of the sciences[113], and its pretention to supply a final system would be replaced by the limitless progression of the sciences.[114] 'Praxis' for Engels means something other than it did for the young Marx: it is supposed to solve epistemological problems which, however, Engels does not seem to take too seriously.[115] What remains of Marx' doctrine are some general statements about the importance of 'social action'[116] and of active man.[117] It is important to note that Marx and Engels do not contradict each other on the *Aufhebung*: they simply mean different things. Marx talked about the meaning and value of philosophy for man and for history, and Engels worked for a more cosmocentric theory of science.

According to our above definition, positivism includes, in addition to rationalism and scientism – which we have already shown in Engels – an epistemological empiricism.[118] Although only confusedly and implicitly, this last also forms part of Engels' views. For, (1) Engels never talks about a receptivity of intellectual understanding: what he does talk about is reflection, *Abbild*, etc.[119] – which he takes as purely sensuous – and about 'thought'.[120] (2) The only thing that Engels opposes to empiricism is the dialectic; but this is not taken ontologically: it remains entirely in the realm of empirical 'fact'.[121] (3) The idea that praxis solves the problems of epistemology can only be taken to mean that Engels naively remains on the phenomenal level and – angrily or laughingly refusing to push the matter any further[122] – grounds one phenomenon in another.[123] Thus, even though Engels talks against empiricism, it seems presupposed by much of his theorizing.[124] He comes out against the undialectical or agnostic views of the empiricists but not against empiricism itself. In an energetic stand in an 1895 letter, Engels criticizes Comte on several counts but does not take on empiricism (or the essentials of positivism).[125] Engels' doctrine differs from positivism only in that he wants, in a superficial way, to have the positivist consequences of empiricism without accepting empiricism itself. It would be a little too scrupulous to refuse to call Engels' views positivist just because he does not have any epistemological basis, not even an empiricist pseudo-basis for his rationalism and scientism.

What we have to keep in mind here is that the later Engels did not adopt the anthropological and historicist views of the young Marx; he rather replaced them with an equally anti-philosophical positivism. When one insists – like Plekhanov, Lenin and followers – that the 'Marxism' of Marx and Engels is a unitary doctrine, then one gets a strange mixture of three mutually exclusive versions of philosophy: (1) the praxeological metaphysics of

history of the young Marx; (2) the positivist theory of science of the older Engels; (3) the de facto effort of both, nevertheless, toward philosophical theory and system.

It proved to be a boon for the further development of Marxist-Leninist philosophy that Engels had not spelled out more clearly his positivist views. Otherwise, a diahistomat based on Engels' work would not have been able to develop in a non-positivist, genuinely philosophical way.

3. LENIN

Vladimir Il'ič Uljanov, called Lenin, is the indisputable founder and highest authority of Soviet Communism. This is as true for the *philosophy* of diamat as it is for all other practical and theoretical realms of the Communist system. For our present purposes the following should be stressed: (1) Following G.V. Plekhanov, Lenin propagated a synthesis of the philosophical views of Marx and Engels[126], that became the basis of a unitary doctrinal system, called Marxism-Leninism or diahistomat. (2) Unlike the praxeology of the young Marx, Lenin stressed rather *rationalistically* (in the broadest sense)[127] the great importance of theory. (3) Lenin did not accept Engels' positivism; on the contrary, he developed – in the fight precisely against positivism – the basis for an ontologically and epistemologically grounded *pro-philosophical* theory.

It is the last two points that are of interest here. Therefore, after (a) some general historical remarks, we will examine (b) Lenin's doctrine on the importance of theory, especially of philosophical theory, and (c) his views on its independence vis-à-vis other sciences, and (d) the epistemological foundation he provides for it, and, finally, (e) his attitude as a whole toward positivism.

There are many problems in interpreting Lenin's views – which is why we will provide copious references, particularly where there are divergent views of what he meant, but we will not argue out each disputed point.

3.1. *Some Historical Remarks*

The founder of the Soviet Union with his extraordinary talents and successes was a remarkably complex man: highly energetic and pragmatic revolutionary, on the one hand, and serious philosopher, on the other. The best characterization of Lenin that we can find is to describe him as an engineer.[128] Like a modern engineer, he believed in the absolute validity and enormous importance of theoretical knowledge and, like the engineer, he used every-

thing, including pure theory, for the practical realization of his plans – for the construction of a new man and a new world. Leninism as a whole is marked by this personal union in Lenin of contrary elements of theory and praxis.

Lenin took up philosophy rather late in life.[129] He was introduced to philosophy mainly by Plekhanov, whom he regarded as his teacher.[130] He did not provide a systematic presentation of his philosophic views; this have to be gained from his various works and come out as follows: (1) Lenin wrote the book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*[131] in 1908 as a polemic against the so-called Machists.[132] It is purely argumentative and presents Lenin's own thought only indirectly and unsystematically.[133] (2) Lenin shows himself more carefully and reflectively in the *Philosophical Notebooks,* which contains excerpts, notes, commentaries and sketches from the years 1914-1916 and which was published posthumously in 1929.[134] In addition to the minor role played by polemic, there is a qualitative increase in Lenin's own philosophic work. On many questions he shows great philosophic interest and perspicacity, at least compared with the former work. Unfortunately, these are only notes and in many cases it is very hard to decide which are Lenin's own opinions. (3) Finally, there are relevant passages about philosophy in various articles and pamphlets.[135]

3.2. *Lenin on Theory*

On the question of the nature and importance of theory, Lenin expresses a very differentiated opinion which, however, is not carefully elaborated and therefore seems contradictory in some places. In order to exhibit his basically rationalist position, we will examine the following points: (1) Lenin's *general* evaluation of theory; (2) his theory of praxis; (3) the theory of *partijnost'*; (4) Lenin's own *behavior* vis-à-vis theory.

In many of his works, Lenin generally stressed the *importance of theory.* Marxism, in particular, is for him a scientific system, the 'omnipotent' superiority of which lies precisely in the fact that it is free of all 'dreaming', belief and other irrational elements; in full agreement with natural sciences, it contains objective truth.[136] Only through true theory can the working class and the Party be united and led to correct praxis.[137] This is why Lenin combatted overemphasis on the 'spontaneity' of the working class and stressed the role of the 'conscious element', i.e., of theory, and of the intelligentsia responsible for it.[138]

In the place of Marx' almost mystical expectation of the proletariat's revolutionary act of liberation – which the philosopher can abet only

through critique – Lenin espoused a firm propaganda fight to win over the revolutionaries who, in Russia, were mainly intellectuals. They had to be convinced and united by means of theoretical arguments. Conscious and disciplined action required systematic and radical theory. (Philosophical differences between Marx and Lenin are due also to the fact that Lenin did not know the early, philosophical works of Marx and saw him only through the eyes of Engels.)

Lenin's theory of praxis is at least partially in contradiction with his stress on theory. In the 'golden booklet' of 1894 – his first published work – he wrote that Marxist theory basically unites 'scienticity with revolutionary spirit'; the revolution is the task and goal of science.[139] The contradiction between this view and Lenin's stress on theory can be resolved only by taking what he says for a youthful exaggeration of the following: theoretical work serves (valuable) practical work; theory, the internal goal of which is true knowledge, leads with the help of this to correct action.[140]

Lenin's expanded theory of 'praxis' in his later works is also difficult to interpret. There is no question of the young Marx' *Aufhebung* of theory (and Lenin expressly rejects making praxis an 'otherness' of logic in the Hegelian sense).[141] For Lenin, praxis has an epistemological meaning.[142] He attributes to praxis such an important role *in* 'theoretical' knowledge that he seems to eliminate the distinction between them. We will examine this doctrine more in detail below.[143] We need only call attention here to the fact that praxis for Lenin takes on an epistemological function and ceases to be something 'practical'. Therefore, it is possible that 'theory' remain theory even when 'praxis' is absorbed in it.

However, there is an element of praxeology to be found in Lenin's theory of *partijnost'* ('party-minded-ness'); an element that at least somewhat dulls the edge of his rationalism. As presented in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism,* the theory of *partijnost'* includes four notions[144]:

(1) In the basic question of philosophy there are only two extreme opinions possible: whoever is not for materialism is for idealism. It is basically impossible to be neutral, to mix some idealist theses with materialist ones, or to leave the questions open. The radical 'either-or' is for Lenin the central core of his doctrine of *partijnost'*.[145] Even if this assertion is simplistic and dogmatic, it is no irrationalist claim.

(2) Whether one is of materialist or idealist views depends on *causes* that lie outside of philosophy[146]; e.g., on one's position in class war. Whoever is not on the side of the progressive class is *not able* to know materialistic truth. We can see from the context that one need not take the word 'cause'

in the strict sense of *causa*; it can be taken as *conditio* in the sense of necessary condition. Then there is no conflict with rationalism; for theoretical knowledge or truth is not identified with position in class war or with 'interests', but only psychologically and sociologically made possible by these.

(3) The opinions of philosophical parties have consequences outside of philosophy. Even the 'well-meaning' idealist serves religion[147] and reaction.[148] Conversely, materialism has great importance for the social praxis of progress. These assertions about the necessary consequences of true and false philosophical knowledge, too, are not contrary to rationalism.

(4) Finally, Lenin's theory of *partijnost'* contains the idea that philosophic knowledge itself, in its very *content*, is not value-free; it is morally good or bad and is emotionally *committed*. This point is deduced from the previous one. It is here that an irrationalist element becomes visible: man is obliged to know the truth; if he errs, he is not just dangerous but also guilty and to be fought. *It is not only the act of philosophizing but also its content that depends on the will.*

The abandoning of the rationalist standpoint that is in evidence here does *not* imply a *universal irrationalism*. Two points have to be kept in mind:

(1) Lenin relates irrational *partijnost'* and the voluntaristic influencing of cognitive content to bourgeois and revisionist schools[149], i.e., only to the negative case, to *untruth*. There is no irrational account of truth or of the knowledge of truth themselves (as distinct from their conditions, effects and secondary phenomena).

(2) Lenin espouses a generally rationalist version of theory, of knowledge, of science, and of truth.[150] And he always defends his opinions with *rational arguments* and not with his good will or his position in class war. He describes Marxism as 'correct'[151], 'progressive'[152], 'scientific', 'in agreement with science', or as of 'rigorous and supreme scientific character'[153], as 'consequent', 'finished', 'homogeneous', etc.[154] He does not speak about a moral or fideistic acceptance of Marxism.

These facts show that Lenin limited *the subjectivism of partijnost' to the opponents of truth*[155]; because of his *partijnost'* the reactionary is unable and unready to know rationally; he is an idealist because of class-interests and because of a persisting and constitutive bad will. But the militant class-interests of a member of the progressive class cause the opposite effect; precisely because of his class-belonging-ness and his *partijnost'* he comes to know the truth objectively and rationally. An objective attitude toward the cognitive object is precisely the essential characteristic of progressive philosophy and, simultaneously, the most universal meaning of 'materialism'.

Interpreted in this way, the theory of *partijnost'* is an irrationalist theory of error connected with a universal rationalism ot true knowledge.

Lenin's own *conduct* confirms his rationalist convictions and his great appreciation for theory. His way of discussing, in particular, does nothing to contradict a rationalist interpretation of his theory of *partijnost'*.

There is no proof that Lenin cynically subordinated knowledge to practical goals or that he had a utilitarian or voluntaristic attitude toward truth. It was in the doctrine and conduct of the later Leninists (led by Stalin) that his name was connected with the degradation of theory to a tool of politics (and police).[156]

The most simple proof for Lenin's appreciation of pure theory is his own scientific and philosophic work. A revolutionary who despised theory and believed in manipulating it would hardly have taken the time to analyse something like Hegel's *Logic*. Even the relatively superficial *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* was not written by an enemy of theory. What is more, it is not true that Lenin wrote it merely to prove the connection between philosophy and politics: just the contrary. His philosophic opponents, Bogdanov, Bazarov and Lunačarskij were his political allies in the bolshevik wing of the Party. This is why Lenin tried as long as he could to keep political and philosophic issues separate; until his menshevik opponents made this impossible by connecting their (false, in Lenin's eyes) policies propagandistically with what Lenin considered the only correct, orthodox philosophic doctrine (of Plekhanov).[157] It seems that in publishing this book Lenin had no further political goal in mind than to refute this identification. But even if he had been seeking a purely political goal – as had doubtlessly been the case in his previous neutrality vis-à-vis the Machist bolsheviks – this would say nothing against his rationalism. Lenin would have been a very bad politician if he had ignored the practical political meaning of the *expression* of purely theoretical opinions. As a matter of fact, he was a political genius – pragmatic and even opportunistic in all political questions. He even ordered that religious views go unanswered in public (but only in public), if there were tactical advantage for his revolution in doing this.[158] This was consistent with his own view that action is more important than theory.[159] But this view and the corresponding actions do not imply that practical or tactical necessities influence truth or falsity, and they do not militate against Lenin's high opinion of theory.

It is far more difficult to reconcile Lenin's dogmatism and intolerance in discussion with his rationalism. With a supercilious and dogmatic self-assurance, he held that his own assertions and proofs were irrefutable and unique-

ly true. He rejected counter-arguments without trying to see how the position of the 'enemy' was to be understood, interpreted, and criticized soberly and objectively. He gave evidence of an emotional, moralising attitude.

A rationalist is known by his ability and readiness to analyse the views of others objectively and by his readiness to let his own views be called into question. Lenin fails this test. It seems more accurate, however, to trace this back to his tempestuous *character*, rather than to any relinquishing of the rationalist viewpoint. It is true that his attitude contributed to the development of a Party dogmatism which, under Stalin, led to the downfall of rationalism. But it seems that Lenin himself did not have in mind a subjection of truth to political will and goals. One should not confuse his character faults with irrationalism.

3.3. *Lenin on Philosophy*

In contrast to Engels' scientism, Lenin holds the 'philosophy of Marxism'[160] to be a domain independent of the sciences. It is true that in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* he puts so much stress on natural science that sometimes philosophy seems to be superfluous.[161] In fact, however, he only wanted to stress the *close connection* between materialism and modern science.[162] This can be seen in his efforts to distinguish between the 'form' of Marxist philosophy, which changes with progress in physics, and the 'essence' of this philosophy.[163] It is for this that Lenin designs his famous philosophic definition of 'matter', to be distinguished from the physicist's use of the same word.[164] Also in reference to *partijnost'*, Lenin draws a clear line between science and philosophy.[165]

Lenin does not express himself clearly in the *Notebooks* on the subject of philosophy[166], but he interprets the dialectic as ontology and identifies it with philosophy.[167] Still even in his 1922 article we find a clear differentiation between the 'philosophic basis' and every 'science, whatever its form'.[168]

The object of philosophy is for Lenin the ultimate explanatory principle of reality.[169] In *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism,* we find the superficial methods of Engels mixed with philosophical notions. Thus, Lenin tries to ground his epistemological realism on Engels' production of alizerin, on the existence of the world before the coming-to-be of man, etc.[170] On the other hand, he interprets matter ontologically as real being, attributes to it the 'property of sensation' as well as infinity and inexhaustibility, denies the possibility of conceiving movement without matter, etc.[171] In the *Notebooks* it is above all his commentary on the objective dialectic[172] and on

dialectical knowledge that show what he understands as a philosophic problem. Lenin shows no signs of a positivist restriction in either book.

It would be worth a separate study to see in how far Lenin thought through any philosophical problems consistently at all.[173] For our present purposes it is enough that he *wanted* to establish an ontologically grounded theory with a scientific method, and that he made serious tries at this. The following survey of his epistemological grounding of philosophy can serve as example of such a try.

3.4. *Epistemological Foundations*

Lenin's epistemological explanation for and grounding of his rationalism and his pro-philosophic position are contradictory and unsatisfactory. His writings contain sensualist assertions but also a theory of abstraction. The concept that he thinks will overcome such problems, including those of empiricism, is an epistemologically understood 'praxis'.

In *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* there is a clear *sensualism* which should lead to an empiricist assertion of the impossibility of philosophy. Lenin calls it 'objective sensualism'[174] and asserts that the existence of the real, external world is given to the senses[175], and he appeals to the naive realism of sound (but pre-philosophical) human understanding.[176] He therewith ignores the fact that –although he cites them copiously – the English empiricists and Kant proved the impossibility of a *sensuous* knowledge of reality, causality, necessity, etc.[177] Lenin invokes no knowledge other than the sensuous and simultaneously asserts the objectivity of these categories, i.e., the results of intellectual intuition. He refuses even to understand the critical question.[178] To this extent his realism is not much different from positivist 'belief'[179] and logically he should exclude philosophic theory. (Some of Lenin's other arguments for realism are pre-philosophical; e.g., Engels' alizerin.)[180]

Lenin's theory of abstraction is relatively explicit first in the *Notebooks*. There he speaks of 'comprehension' as a dialectical level, a step above the 'empirical'[181], and as understanding of essence, causality, etc.[182]; he approves of the distinction between sensible and intelligible[183] and refines his reflection theory to fit.[184] However, there is no real development of this doctrine and so he does not ask the question as to what kind of power there has to be if sensuousness does not suffice. This would also be the power that man needs to philosophize. The problem leads to Lenin's doctrine of praxis.

In both of Lenin's major philosophic works, the concept of *praxis* frequently occurs in epistemological contexts. One can even speak of an episte-

mological theory of praxis[185] – which we shall now examine. It is, first, an important example and central component of Lenin's philosophy; secondly, it shows forth his Hegelianism; third, it is necessary for a comparison with the praxis of the young Marx.

One can distinguish the following, quite unequal, epistemological theses on praxis:

(1) In praxis, i.e., in acting, men *de facto* assume, in *unreflected certainty,* the truth of knowledge.[186] This quite trivial observation is not essential to Lenin's doctrine.

(2) *Logical* laws obtain their axiomatic validity in praxis through the *repetition* – 'billions of times' – of inference.[187] This extremely psychologistic thesis is also not essential to Lenin's thought.

(3) Praxis is counterposed to 'purely' conceptual speculation and thereby takes on the meaning of *experience.*[188] This repeated and central concept includes narrower meanings (4 and 5):

(4) Praxis is understood as a necessary *third cognitive operation* or as including and using this.[189] Sense data (results of the first operation) are elaborated in 'thought' (second operation) and then the result is tested in 'praxis' (third operation). Praxis here comes in as a return to the sensuous foundation; a sort of verification of abstracted thought in individual and social activity. This point hangs together with the following:

(5) It is in praxis, i.e., in goal-oriented and conscious material activity that the *intelligible objects show themselves in their objective reality and truth*[190], because praxis is itself universal and 'immediately real'. The function of praxis on this account differs from the previous in that it is not a return (to sensuousness in order to test the results of thought) but a progression toward capture of the object as really existing. The results of praxis here are not just true knowledge but also the knowing of the objective truth of just these true knowings. The previous point remains on the phenomenal level; here praxis attains the noumenal.

(6) In conjunction with the concept of praxis, Lenin introduced the notion of *life* into epistemology.[191] It is not clear if he has in mind knowledge as an expression (therefore, effect) of life or as a promotion (cause) of life through praxis. In any case, the dialectical totality of knowledge is to be maintained against the schematic and mechanical character of sensations and of 'thought'.

(7) Praxis expresses in two different ways within epistemology the idea that knowledge *develops* and is historical. First, knowledge *progresses* throughout history: the unknown becomes known and thus 'in practice' –

i.e., by looking at the factual course of things – there is no radical border line between the known and the unknown.[192] Technological progress is the result thereof and the proof for it.

(8) Secondly, history leads to a 'unification' of theory and praxis which is not further explained by Lenin. What is important is that he does *not* describe it as *Aufhebung* of theoretical knowledge, as its overcoming and fulfillment in a historical act like the revolution (as does Marx). He also is not thinking about some sort of highest level of the idea (like Hegel). What he is thinking is hard to fathom.

Lenin's thoughts about praxis in epistemology project praxis as a problematic and variable notion. There are three different possibilities of interpretation for Lenin's thoughts: First, there is the *unphilosophical* or pre-philosophical interpretation, according to which Lenin refused to take the critical question seriously. He (with Engels) takes reality, causality, necessity, etc., unphilosophically along with *ordinary human understanding*. This would mean that the above arguments for realism remain on the phenomenal level. They would use phenomena to prove the existence of phenomena, though no one had questioned this existence. The whole theory of praxis would be a description of the 'practical' conditions, forms, secondary phenomena, etc., of the cognitive process. A philosophic explanation about objectivity beyond all phenomenality is outside of its range, as is the refutation of something like the transcendental effort of Kant. The theses of (4) and (5) would become an abuse of the concepts and unintelligible while all the others would become trivial.

It is hard to see why Lenin should not have come out clearly with such a philosophic opinion. He did not need all the ontological 'stuffing', as he could rely on Engels' positivism. This is why this first interpretation seems an unacceptable simplification. Second, one could give a complete Hegelian interpretation of Lenin's ideas on praxis. If one assumes the *identity* of thought and being, of the logical and historical, and of thought-content and thought-process (*conceptus objectivus* and *conceptus subjectivus*) as basic metaphysical truths, then there is no longer any question about the objectivity of knowledge. On this reading, what Lenin wanted to say would be: the unity of conception and concept also includes the activity of the subject, which is closely connected with conception. The concept, then, is, as cognitive content too, marked by traits of the activity: it is real, material, living, developing. Truth as a process is a material process and therefore objective. This interpretation of Lenin would make points (2), (7) and (8) more intelligible than they would otherwise be. But Lenin would have to have said that, rather

than refuting Hume and Kant, he was not even asking their questions. Finally, Lenin can also be interpreted *realistically*, while still using Hegelian notions in the description (but not interpretation) of the cognitive process. This would mean that with the introduction of praxis Lenin wanted to express the experiential, living, total and dynamic nature of the intellectual cognitive *process*, in order to distinguish an (implicitly assumed) intellectual intuition both psychologically and ontologically from an 'abstract', Platonic intuition. He would have been afraid that such an intuition would not be tied to reality and would lead to idealist and religious phantasies. The unity of theory and praxis would then be a parallelism between knowing and doing. Praxis would be criterion of truth in the sense that an action-related capacity of the intellect would arrive in activity at an intuition of truth. It is especially the fifth point that supports such an interpretation. Lenin's basically materialistic and realistic tendencies also make it more likely than the previous one, In fact, it seems that there is something true in both, the second and the third interpretation. Lenin's views are a mixture of Hegelian and realistic notions or an effort at synthesis thereof. We do not intend to solve this problem here. The point rather is that both these interpretations show Lenin involved in his theory of praxis – and in accord with his rationalism and pro-philosophical inclination – in grounding *transempirical knowledge.* It is noteworthy that he makes use of the notion of praxis – which shows that he remained far removed from Marx' *Aufhebung* theory.

Lenin's greatest importance in this context seems to lie in the fact that he

1. posed the philosophic problem of knowledge, and
2. through his contradictory statements, left open and encouraged many possibilities of further development. Any kind of dogmatic positivism would have made further philosophizing impossible for the Leninists.

3.5. *Lenin on Positivism*

These notions of Lenin – especially his epistemological theory about praxis – make it clear why he was an opponent of any positivism. His whole *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* is directed against the positivist revision of Marxism, against Mach and Avenarius, as well as against Hume.[194] 'Positivism' had an explicitly pejorative meaning for Lenin and in his rejection of it he cited Marx and Engels.[195]

It is here that Lenin develops his own *historiographical method,* which is very important for later Soviet historiography and critique of positivism[196]. It contains the following elements: (1) the *partijnost'* of dialectical materialists means that their relationship to positivism as an anti-

diamat philosophical school always has to be a battle. (2) This battle consists above all in an *exposé*. One shows that the positivists in reality hold views different from those which they proclaim; e.g., one 'discovers' that they are actually anti-scientific, pro-religious and in favor of other forms of irrationalism and idealism. (3) In order to make the exposé more convincing, one shows that the positivists really argue for the sake of their *class-interests*: Popper quite rightly calls this reduction of objective arguments to class-interests 'socio-analysis'.[197] (4) Furthermore, it is characteristic of the method to lump together authors with sometimes very different views. Lenin explicitly stated that the differences between the various positivists did not interest him.[198] (5) The synthetic method is also applied to different centuries and decades by *identifying* the views of an author with those of others – like Berkeley or Hume – which have already been condemned. (6) Finally, the viewpoint being criticised is often 'refuted' by being set up against the views of Marx and Engels. These *dogmatic* arguments from the infallible 'classics' have now been extended to Lenin himself so that the method we are describing is included as 'classical' – much to the detriment of its power of conviction. We will come back to this later.

3.6. *Summary*

Lenin's view of philosophy and the related doctrines are not carefully worked out and perhaps not coherent, either. However, the following theses can be definitely attributed to him:

(1) *Rationalism.* Lenin stresses the importance of theoretical, objective and rational knowledge. He works on the study, the development and the presentation of purely theoretical theses and he distinguishes theory from practical politics. For Lenin, praxis is not to *eliminate* but to ground theory. Lenin's doctrine of *partijnost'* does include an irrationalist account of error but not of truth. However, Lenin personally did not have the character of a scientist or of a rationalist philosoper

(2) *The Overcoming of Empiricism.* In contrast to his sensualist assertions, Lenin holds to knowledge of real ontological categories and develops elements of a theory of abstraction. His difficultly interpretable comments on praxis in epistemology are intended to ground transempirical, real knowledge.

(3) *The Overcoming of Scientism.* As time went on, Lenin more and more clearly recognized an independent realm of philosophic activity, which he sharply distinguished from science. He developed explicitly philosophic (e.g., ontological) concepts and theses.

These notions put Lenin in clear opposition to positivism. The metaphysics of history of the young Marx was far removed from positivism but had no common ground for working against it. Engels held an imprecise positivism himself. This is why it is of great importance that Lenin took an anti-positivist and pro-philosophical position. It meant that of the three views the pro-philosophy one would predominate. We will see in the next section that this was not without travail.

4. FROM LENIN TO STALINISM

In 1925, the year after Lenin's death, there was a great discussion in the Soviet Union about the nature and the scientific justification of philosophy. It was the famous battle between A.M. Deborin and his followers, on the one hand, and the Mechanists, on the other. The latter were condemned in 1929, while the victorious Deborinites were put down in the Winter of 1930 by the Stalinist Party philosophers who stifled philosophy for political reasons and subjected it completely to the Party. It was this 'Stalinism' that after the War – partly under the influence of Stalin himself – gave birth to freer developments that we are now observing. Since none of those involved gained any sort of permanent status, we will be content with sketching the period on the basis of René Ahlberg's presentation.[199]

Still in Lenin's lifetime, among the many philosophic tendencies there were strong positivist groups, especially among the scientists and vulgar materialists. A famous example is O. Minin's article, 'Philosophy Overboard!' (1922), where the exclusion of all philosophy in favor of the sciences is demanded.[200] This demand was anchored in the anti-philosophical attitude of many Soviet scientists, whose spokesman was E.S. Énčmen. To be kept in mind is the fact that many important works of the 'classics' (Marx' *early works,* Engels' *Dialectic of Nature,* and Lenin's *Notebooks*)had not yet been published. What was known was Engels' positivism and this opened the door to a philosophically primitive 'Enčmenism'.

In the period 1922-1925 a more advanced philosophy developed – mechanistic materialism, including A.K. Timirjazev (1880-1955), I.I. Skvorcov-Stepanov (1870-1928) and L.I. Aksel'rod (pseudonym = Ortodoks, 1868-1946).[201] In addition to the undialectical – purely mechanical – explanation of all organic and inorganic processes of development (whence the name), these thinkers held that, with the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, philosophy had lost its right to exist in socialist society and as a field of enquiry. The sole rational foundation for the social order is positive science, free of philosophy and self-sufficient. They rejected the

dialectic or interpreted it in a purely mechanical way: they turned against the influence of Hegel and appealed to Lenin against Plekhanov.[202]

The critique of Deborin and his disciples was turned against the theses of the mechanists.[203] A.M. Deborin (b.1881), a brilliant philosopher, held views which were strongly influenced by Hegel. Against the mechanists, he defended the importance of a philosophic system which would serve both as general world-view and as scientific methodology.[204] The dialectic as logic, ontology and epistemology formed the core of this philosophy. Encouraged by the publication of Engels' *Dialectic of Nature* (which was first called *Dialectic and Nature*) – which they interpreted to their own advantage – Deborin *et al.* launched a full-scale attack against the mechanists. They claimed that abandoning Marxist philosophy would be 'capitulation to bourgeois philosophical doctrines'[205] and that social and scientific development would be impossible without philosophic direction and control.[206]

The Deborinites won the day after long discussions at the 'Second All-Union Conference of Marxist-Leninist Research Institutes' in April 1929 and the mechanists were condemned in a resolution.[207] This condemnation was pronounced not by the Communist Party but by the professional philosophers themselves, without even any reference to the Party. One had the impression that it was Deborin's arguments that triumphed over those of the mechanists.

Deborin's victory was a victory of philosophy over positivism but, as Ahlberg points out, it contained a threat for philosophy. In the long run, the philosophical self-confidence of the Deborinites was incompatible with the demands of a Party ideology. In 1929 the Party used the condemnation of the mechanists 'as a political weapon in the fight against all opposition ... which arose ... against the general line of Stalinism'[208], i.e., against Bukharin, Rykov and Tomski. In addition, the total claims of the Deborinites' 'dialectical method' seemed an ideal tool for Party control over the development of the sciences.[209] In order that philosophy be used, however, it had to be 'brought under control': the joy of the Deborinites was short-lived.

In 1929, Deborin was personally, philosophically and institutionally very influential. His disciples demanded and received a broad 'philosophical leadership'.[210] The campaign against them began in the very next year – at the hands of M.B. Mitin (b.1910), P.F. Judin (b.1899) and V.N. Ral'čevič.[211] They claimed that the development of philosophy under Deborin had moved away from practical, political work, that it had become too theoretical and not partisan enough. What is more, Deborin did not pay enough attention to the Marxian revolution in philosophy and especially its Leninist stage.[212]

The object of this critique from the side of the Party was to ideologize the philosophy which Deborin had interpreted too aristocratically, and to subject it to the interests and to the control of the Party. Immanent criteria were to be replaced by that of Party utility. this politicization took the concrete form of identifying the Deborinites with the 'left deviation' in politics, i.e., with Trotskism, just as the mechanists had been brought into relation with Bukharin's 'right deviation'. The slogan of the new Party philosophers was the 'battle on two fronts', with politics being ideologized and philosophy subjected to this ideologized politics.[213]

Deborin and his partisans defended themselves but their theoretical arguments were of no avail, even though they caught their opponents in the crassest contradictions. Stalin intervened in the waning days of 1930. He condemned Deborin's philosophy and called it 'mensheviking idealism'. The condemnation became official on January 25, 1931 through a decision of the Central Committee.[214] More important than the details of this momentous condemnation and Deborin's self-critique is the fact that here, for the first time, the Party enters as the decisive authority on the philosophical scene and literally takes over. Henceforth, the Marxist 'unity of theory and praxis' and the Leninist *'partijnost'* of philosophy' mean that philosophy becomes a political tool of the Communist Party.

Stalinism had, therefore, no problems with the positivist critique of philosophy. The dogmatic methods which now ruled diamat made it impossible to talk of 'philosophy' in any genuine sense.[215] It is evident that such a philosophy could not have any positivist doubts since its function became political and it became indispensable to the Party. For Stalinism there was no question of limiting philosophy for methodological reasons in favor of the positive sciences, but only the question of how 'philosophy' could best be controlled for political purposes and used to control and influence all other sciences, as well as the whole intellectual life of the country. This state of affairs ended only with the partial resurrection of philosophy in the 1950's and 1960's and with the extensive preoccupation with neopositivism – to which we can now turn.

CHAPTER IV

THE SOVIET CRITIQUE OF NEOPOSITIVISM

The object of this chapter is a report on the extensive presentations and critiques that a series of Soviet philosophers make of positivism, especially in its most recent forms. We have made a selection by concentrating on three authors: Narskij, Švyrev and Kopnin. We will use the first two sections to provide the necessary systematic and historical background. In the first section we will recall to the reader the answers which official Soviet philosophy gives to the questions and problems that arise in discussing neopositivism. This information will help us later, when it is a question of deciding whether the conflict with positivism has motivated the Soviets to ask new questions or to change their answers to old ones. The second section will present a historical sketch of the development of the Soviet critique of neopositivism in the period after 1947. This will mean surveying the more important authors, publications and discussions, in chronological order. Both of these sections will be limited to the minimum necessary for orientation.

1. SYSTEMATIC BACKGROUND

For the basic theses of the systematic background we turn to the textbooks and secondary literature, published around 1960. In the Soviet Union the important questions usually are answered in more or less the same way every time. We will, therefore, limit ourselves to the presentation to be found in the *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii* (1958)[216] and to the reports by Wetter Bocheński and Blakeley.[217] The themes in question belong to the field of epistemology – the nature and validity of knowledge, especially of knowledge which is not given any direct empirical grounding – in particular of the propositions of philosophy.

1.1. *Realism*

Soviet philosophy expressly affirms the existence of an objective reality which is independent of the knowing subject and is 'reflected' by the latter. This material world which transcends knowledge of it comes to be before man, whose knowledge and consciousness (the process as well as the content

of it) are secondary phenomena in comparison to it. Energetic realism is the core of Leninist materialism – though it often occurs in confusing conjunction with cosmological materialism.

1.2. *Knowability of the World*

This reality which is independent of the subject can – according to dialectical materialism – be represented ('reflected') by man in his knowledge just as it is. There is objective and even absolute truth both in the realm of the sensuous and in that of the conceptual. In the conceptual realm man knows laws, essential relations and the essences of real objects. The optimism of Soviet philosophy goes so far that it does not recognize anything to be in principle unknowable. Any access to reality, other than the rational and scientific one – e.g., in belief – is definitely rejected as superfluous and impossible.

1.3. *Dialectical Empiricism*

Soviet philosophy has a vague and contradictory view on that objective knowledge which transcends the contents of sense knowledge. On the one hand, it holds that there is no intellectual intuition and all knowledge ultimately comes from sense knowledge. This is the empiricism of Soviet philosophy. On the other hand, this assertion is modified in such a way that there is a dialectical 'leap' between sensation and thought: between the two realms there is dialectical unity and there are dialectical oppositions. Knowledge of laws, of causal relations and of essences is supposed to result from purely empirical, single sensations of external phenomena. The 'dialectical' approach to this process takes into account that, like all processes, it is contradictory and that it comes to be as a unity of many parts, as a totality of many single sensations of many individual men. It is not clear how this dialectical attitude is supposed to solve the problem of empiricism. That there is a dynamic process, that there are internal oppositions, that there is organic unity on the psychological and social levels – all of these are not a sufficient foundation for the objective validity of contentful propositions, which transcend what is sensuously available and verifiable. Even Leninist philosophy's newly introduced notion of praxis as basis for and criterion of true knowledge does not provide any solution. There is rather a serious question as to what this epistemological praxis really is and how – precisely as sensuous material praxis – it is supposed to support the ideal contents of a theoretical knowledge which transcends sense knowledge.

1.4. *Philosophy as a Distinct Realm*

Philosophy itself is an important example of knowledge that goes beyond sensuousness and which is recognized by Soviet philosophy. Dialectical materialism understands itself as seeking the most general laws of reality. It distinguishes itself from other domains of knowledge through its greater generality, not through a lesser degree of reality in its content. The most general laws as object of philosophy remind one of the ontic structures that are sought by more ontologically inclined philosophies. But it is stressed in official Soviet philosophy that knowledge is the specific object of philosophy: the 'basic question' of all philosophy is that about the relationship between thought and being. This epistemological conception of philosophy reminds one of philosophy's positivistic limitation to logic, methodology or psychology and is in open contradiction with the ontological claims. The contradiction culminates in the assertion that in Marxism-Leninism dialectic, logic and epistemology 'coincide', But this assertion is itself vague and disputed.

The metaphilosophical assertions of official diamat are in no way clear and satisfactory. But it is perfectly clear that philosophy is a field of scientific knowledge which is to be distinguished from all other branches of study and that it is most important both for scientific theory and for political practice. All that is left of Engels' positivistic dissolution of philosophy in the sciences is at most the rejection of an apriori speculative philosophy of nature which would hover and rule over the sciences.

1.5. *The Lack of Critique*

It is a very characteristic shortcoming of Soviet philosophy that it contains no critical investigation and justification of its most important theses. It has often been pointed out in the secondary literature that its naive and uncritical realism is defenseless against the arguments of a critique of knowledge.[218] The same is true of its theses about philosophy. Confronted by opposing opinions, all it can do is resort to dogmatic repetition of its own claims and a polemical rejection of the opponent's views. Few of the problems are recognized and thought through at all. The lack of a critical perspective weakens both realism and the defence of philosophy. One of the things we are looking for in this study is to see if and how the encounter with neopositivism has made Soviet philosophers go beyond the naive official doctrine of diamat.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Here we want to survey the Soviet works which have appeared since World War II and which deal with neopositivism, especially to situate the most important works of the leading authors, which will be dealt with in detail later on.

Three periods can be distinguished. First, it took about ten years after the resurgence of Soviet philosophy in 1947, for some authors to develop an interest in a closer analysis and also, to some extent, to have the necessary information. In the meantime, there was only wholesale vituperation against neopositivism, instead of any genuine discussion. This fitted in with the general 'Scholastic' attitude of Soviet philosophy of the period.[219] Then came a few years when neopositivism was more carefully presented and criticized in many books and articles. 1961 and 1962 brought the summit of interest. The seven years between 1957 and 1963 constitute the period of most active involvement with the critique of neopositivism. Since 1964, there has been a decrease in the number of works published on the subject. The period from 1964 to 1968 represents a time of reworking what had already been accomplished: the critique of neopositivism was integrated into wider subjects of study, e.g., into the critique of Anglo-Saxon philosophy, or of epistemology.

2.1. *1947 to 1956: Dogmatism and Polemics*

1947 saw the beginning of renewed interest in philosophy – an interest which has lasted up to now. At that time, A.A. Ždanov demanded – in a famous speech – in the name of Stalin that Soviet philosophers do more independent and courageous work and that they discuss unsolved questions.[220] Stalin was not satisfied with what his captive philosophers had done since 1931 and as their work was to be important for the Party he wanted it intensified. Thus, the journal, *Voprosy filosofii* (Questions of Philosophy), was founded in this year. Subsequent years saw discussions on, for example, the nature of language, psychology, logic, philosophic questions of biology and physics, etc.[221] However, it was not until the end of the 1950's that systematic works began to appear, that were more than repetitions of the 'classics': it was only then that the earlier tradition began to be developed here and there in an independent and interesting way. In a similar manner, the critique of neopositivism needed some time before it started to become relevant.

It was for the first time in 1948 that Soviet philosophers were able – with

the help of the Russian translation of Maurice Cornforth's *Science Versus Idealism*[222], or in articles by G.A. Kursanov[223], M.E. Omel'janovskij[224] and M.B. Mitin (1949)[225] – to read about neopositivism and related philosophical trends. The *Kratkij filosofskij slovar'* of 1940 contained no entries for neopositivism, logical positivism, logical empiricism or for any of the leading figures of the school.[226] Cornforth's works had a great influence for many years, at least as long as there were no Soviet works.[227]

In the beginning, neopositivism was treated with the quite inappropriate *Leninist method of historiography* and of critique which we have already described above.[228] In addition to the above mentioned articles by Kursanov (1948) and Mitin (1949), there was an article (1953) and a pamphlet (1955) by K.S. Bakradze[229] (who is known as one of the first defenders of formal logic in the Soviet Union), and the first article by I.S. Narskij (1953). Although Narskij's work was also of the aforementioned caliber, he nonetheless realized that much remained to be done and he asked for a more detailed and open discussion.[230]

2.2. *1957 to 1963: Scrutiny*

T. Blakeley has noted that somewhere around 1957 a group of Soviet philosophers began to work intensely on problems of epistemology.[231] The same year marks the beginning of an increasing involvement with neopositivism. The quantitative dimension can be seen from the yearly increases in our bibliography: 1957, 14; 1958, 15; 1959, 20; 1960, 20; 1961, 29; 1962, 39; 1963, 42. There was also a qualitative improvement, conditioned mainly by a better acquaintanceship with the object of study. Helpful to this was the publication of translations of works by Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Frank and Reichenbach.[232] Even more important was the fact that Soviet presentations began to depend more and more on Western sources. Longer and shorter passages from the concerned authors began to appear in Soviet works. For example, the works of I.S. Narskij and V.V. Mšvenieradze from this period contain many quotations from and reports on Western works.[233] A.I. Korneeva's *Critique of the Neopositivist Views on the Nature of Knowledge* is an extreme case in that it consists mainly of page-long quotations from foreign texts.[234] Even when such quotations are used for the 'quote and club' technique, they still represent a source of information for the reader.

A great number of philosophers were involved in investigating the various aspects of neopositivism. In addition to Narskij (cf. below) – who was the great initiator and the main authority in this domain of activity – the fol-

lowing were dealing with neopositivism in general and with its epistemology: Mšvenieradze[235], Korneeva[236], A.F. Begiašvili[237], and Ju.P. Mixalenko[238]. Ju.A. Aseev's pre-announced book[239] has not appeared; so that we have to be satisfied with his very interesting articles.[240]

Some of these authors, along with others, also wrote during this time about neopositivism and *special* questions. X.M. Fataliev[241], T.N. Gornštejn[242], A.R. Pozner[243] and V.S. Stepin[244] have written about neopositivism and science. V.S. Švyrev (cf. below), E.P. Nikitin[245] and V.N. Sadovskij[246] wrote on positivist methodology. The logician, P.V. Tavanec[247], and Aseev[248] dealt with the neopositivist attitude toward philosophic questions of formal logic; L.O. Reznikov[249] with the positivist attitude towards semiotics; V.A. Zvegincev[250] with that toward linguistics. There were also works by K.A. Švarcman[251] and O.G. Drobnickij[252] on ethics and neopositivism; by I.S. Kon[253], G.M. Andreeva[254], É.V. Beljaev[255] and N.V. Novikov[256] on neopositivism and sociology. Aseev[257], Mixalenko[258] and L.A. Žuravlev[259] investigated the relationship between neopositivism and irrationalism and religion, and tried to show that there is a close connection.

Two events in 1961 and 1962 evidenced official interest in the discussion with positivism and encouraged it. (1) In February 1961, a large *All-Russian Conference* on neopositivism took place in Moscow. At least 300 philosophers took part and the results were published in a *sbornik* with twenty-seven articles (and the first bibliography on the subject).[260] (2) In March 1962, the English positivist, A.J. Ayer visited the Soviet Union and spoke in Moscow and in Leningrad[261], after an article by him had appeared in the *Voprosy filosofii*.[262] Many commentaries and critiques of the visit, the speeches, the article and Ayer's later comments to the English press, appeared in the Soviet Union. These came from Narskij[263], the editors of *Voprosy filosofii*[264] and of the *Kommunist*[265], M.B. Kedrov[266] and I.V. Kuznecov.[267] Even though this personal exchange of ideas ended in anger on both sides, it further contributed to the factual discussion of neopositivism.

2.3. *1964 to 1967: Elaboration*

As of 1964, there begin to be less and less Soviet works, devoted explicitly to the study of positivism or neopositivism as a whole. The period from 1964 to 1967 saw the following work done:

(1) The application of the already developed critiques to *special problems* was carried even further. Švarcman[268] wrote a book about bourgeois ethical theories and there were articles by Narskij[269], Drobnickij[270] and

V.N. Šerdakov[271] on the neopositivist views about ethics. There was a book by Kon[272] and a pamphlet by S.D. Allaxverdjan[273] about positivism and neopositivism in sociology. Most of these works are but further developments of previous works by the same authors. More important are the detailed studies by Narskij and Švyrev on problems of the theory of science.[274] Švyrev's book (1966), *Neopositivism and the Problems of the Empirical Foundations of Science*[275], is in many respects a high point in the Soviet discussion with positivism. We will look at this in detail below.

(2) Some Soviets used these years to further their research into the *historical contexts* relevant to positivism and neopositivism. 1964 saw a *sbornik* on contemporary philosophy and sociology in Western Europe and in the U.S.A.[276] and a book by A.S. Bogomolov on Anglo-American philosophy in the era of imperialism[277] – both over 400 pages. The next year saw an equally large book by D.V. Ermolenko on contemporary bourgeois philosophy in the U.S.A.[278]: the same object was described in the 1967 book by Kopnin and Mšvenieradze.[279] All of these works have broad presentations of neopositivism, but there is nothing essentially new in comparison with the previous period. It is rather a question of refining the previous work and of spreading the results – as can also be seen from the relevant articles and sections in the large, official textbooks and encyclopedias; e.g., in Volume 6 of the *History of Philosophy* (1965)[280] and in the *Filosofskaja énciklopedija.*

(3) Neopositivism was also criticized in a *broader systematic context.* For example, there was hardly a Soviet discussion of epistemology of science during this period that did not include extensive references to neopositivist theories. As we shall see later, Kopnin's books are a prime example of this: all of his epistemological discussions seem directed toward answering neopositivism.

(4) Another occasion for secondary but significant mention of neopositivism was provided by the few works on the Wittgenstein of the *Investigations* and on the English School of linguistic philosophy; e.g., the works of Begiašvili and Zaičenko.[282] There are regular references in these works to neopositivism, where its connection with analytic philosophy is often exaggerated.

Examination of the Soviet works of these years shows that they were neither numerous nor original in comparison with those of the previous period. However, it was by no means a 'dead period' as is shown by the fact that the works of Švyrev and Kopnin – which we will be analysing in detail below – were produced precisely during this period.

3. IGOR SERGEEVIČ NARSKIJ

3.1. *Historical Notes*

The Scholar. The most productive and well informed Soviet historian and critic of logical positivism – even when compared with similar scholars outside of the Soviet Union – is Igor Sergeevič Narskij (b. 1920)[283]. Since 1962 he has been professor of philosophy at the University of Moscow, where he teaches the history of foreign philosophy. Since 1963 he has been on the editorial board of *Filosofskie nauki*. In addition to writing on logical positivism and related themes – with a bibliography of about fifty items – Narskij has also written on Polish philosophy[284], English philosophy[285], on Hegel[286], existentialism[287], contradiction[288], the dialectic[289], and alienation.[290] Narskij is a representative of the new Soviet scholars who base their arguments on primary sources. He has also contributed to making such sources available to Russian-speaking readership – participating in translating and editing works of Locke[291], Hume[292], Dembowski[293], Kotarbinski[294] and other Polish philosophers.[295] His knowledge of English, German and Polish is of great importance in this research, since most works of a logical or empiricist character are written in these languages today.

Another advantage he enjoys is his positive attitude toward formal logic, especially in its mathematical form. He himself is not a logician.[296] However, he is sympathetic to logical argument and has defended formal logic against the attacks of the dialecticians. Already in 1959, he made a clear distinction between the 'serious scientific contributions' of Carnap and others in formal logic, and their neopositivist philosophy.[297] He later said that all the accusations against formal logic – even those of Engels – were based on a confusion of formal logic with its anti-dialectical abuse.[298] In a very recent writing, he supports formal logic and asserts that its mathematical form is the only valid modern one.[299] This corresponds to the fact that Narskij's references in his works to other Soviet philosophers involve mainly formal logicians and people sympathetic to formal logic, like Zinov'ev, Tavanec and Švyrev. His main work on neopositivism is under the editorship of Tavanec and in its preface he thanks Janovskaja who can be called the leading fighter for formal logic in the Soviet Union.[300]

All of these talents, plus his careful, analytic way of researching and writing, stand him in good stead when it comes to dealing precisely with the history and content of logical positivism

His Works About Neopositivism. Narskij's numerous articles, pamphlets, and books about positivism, logical positivism and related semantic and

analytic trends in philosophy – he himself interprets to call them 'neo-positivism' or 'contemporary positivism' – cover all three periods we have mentioned and form a substantial contribution to the literature. One can detect a certain evolution.

His first contribution on this theme is an article of 1953 which is still on the 'exposé' level. In any case, he ends with the demand: "In this field much remains to be done. A critique can be satisfactory only if it is accompanied by a detailed and positive elaboration of all the problems, about which the pseudo-scholars of the neopositivist and semantic camp are speculating."[301] This text is a good sample of Narskij's polemic attitude and of his correlative view that it takes good arguments to convince someone.

In the subsequent years, Narskij tried to meet this demand. He did not abandon the Leninist historiographical method[302], but he did supplement it with detailed information and factual arguments. He made available to the Russian reader a significant amount of material on the subject.

Narskij's most important works on neopositivism were published in the period around 1961 and 1962, the kingpin being his *Contemporary Positivism* (1961)[304], where he spends over 400 pages presenting and criticizing many aspects of logical positivism, including: the object of philosophy, fact and reality, and the criterion of truth. Since most of what he has had to say about neopositivism before or since is contained in this book, it will form the mainstay of our presentation and other works of Narskij will be brought in only as supplements.

Shortly before this major work, Narskij published a smaller book, *Studies in the History of Positivism*[305], containing a description of the historical development of positivism from the English empiricists and Comte down to the present. The last chapter, 'Contemporary Positivism', is written in a clear and orderly way, though it is of course much shorter than the corresponding section of the larger book.

Various articles on the subject preceded and followed these books. The earlier articles are quite general and polemical[306]; those from 1959 and 1960 are preparations for various sections of the larger book, including the object of philosophy[307] and the criterion of truth.[308] At about the same time Narskij published two works on how to criticize neopositivism in the light of Lenin's critique of empirio-criticism and of the directives of the 21st Congress of the CPSU.[309]

By 1961 Narskij had attracted a great deal of attention to his field of specialization. In February of that year there was an important conference in Moscow on contemporary neopositivism, with the participation of about

300 philosophers and other scholars. Narskij spoke on the Vienna Circle[310] and edited both the published speeches[311] and the resulting *sbornik.*[312] Narskij's own contribution to the latter dealt with epistemology.[313]

Around the same time, Narskij played a big role in the activities which surrounded Ayer's visit to the Soviet Union. Narskij wrote a report on Ayer's talks[314], a critique of Ayer's article in the *Voprosy filosofii*[315] and an answer thereto in the form of an article on the notion of truth for the English journal, *Mind.*[316]

Since that time, Narskij has contributed little new to the critique of neopositivism. There have been a few smaller works; most of which repeat earlier points; some of them, however, deal with points which were not treated too thoroughly in earlier works; e.g., the notion of meaning[317] and the neopositivists' views on ethics.[318] On the other hand, Narskij has been occupying himself with the various outgrowths of neopositivism, i.e., with various forms of 'analytic philosophy'[319] and with 'general semantics'.[320] He has also been writing appropriate articles for the large official works; e.g., he did the chapter on neopositivism in the *History of Philosophy*[321] and the articles on neopositivism, Carnap's philosophical views, and on Russell in the *Philosophical Encyclopedia.*[322] There is no doubt that Narskij counts as *the* recognized Soviet authority for the presentation and critique of neopositivism.

3.2. *Narskij's Presentation of Neopositivism*

I.S. Narskij works mainly as a critic, as can be seen from the titles of many of his works. This fits in perfectly with the Soviet idea of what a historian of philosophy should be – especially when dealing with non-Marxist-Leninist trends in contemporary philosophy.[323] As is usual in critical works, he mixes historical and systematic perspectives and, since he cannot depend on any Soviet sources, his critique presupposes a thorough description of his object.

The Object. Narskij never makes it perfectly clear what his object really is. He supplies neither historical nor doctrinal delimitations for neopositivism.

His big book, *Contemporary Positivism,* contains, for example, a great deal of information about the views of a great number of philosophers. Hundreds of quotations inform his readers about the various views of Russell, Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, the Polish School, up to and including the analysts and semanticists in Britain and the U.S.A. Next to Carnap, Russell is the most quoted author and is designated as the 'founder of the British form of neopositivism'.[324] Schlick and Wittgenstein *(Tractatus)* are the

'founders of neopositivism'.[325] In addition to the classics of the Vienna Circle (Carnap, Schlick, Reichenbach, Frank, Neurath, von Mises, Ayer, etc.), he includes all sorts of other people: Popper, Pap and Quine are 'neopositivists'[326]; Morris is an 'American positivist'[327]; the Wittgenstein of the *Investigations,* Ryle, Austin and Wisdom have the 'basic attitude of logical positivism'[328] or belong to a 'derivative form of neopositivism'.[329] Of the Polish logicians, Narskij quotes and names, above all, Twardowski, Łukasiewicz, Kokoszynska, Ajdukiewicz, Lesnewski and, of course, Tarski, with Twardowski being described as 'close to neopositivism'[330], Ms. Kokoszynska as neopositivist[331]; Ajdukiewicz was still 'in the framework of the positivist tradition' even in his materialist period after World War II[332], while Tarski had a supposedly 'positivistic point of departure'[333] and developed 'positivist views'.[334] In his contribution to the *History of Philosophy,* Narskij wrote that one should not reckon all members of the schools of Lemberg and Warsaw among the neopositivists. However, on the same page, he names Tarski and Łukasiewicz as 'prominent leaders of neopositivism'.[335] Finally, he even counts as positivists the representatives of 'general semantics', Korzybski and Rappoport.[336] This shows that *historically* the concept Narskij has of neopositivism is very imprecise. It is very confusing to have all of the above called neopositivists. It is true, for instance, that the logical atomism of Russell and also of Wittgenstein was very important for the Vienna Circle; but, even as a type of ontology it is completely distinct from logical positivism. Łukasiewicz was an Aristotelian; Tarski was quite unphilosophical; Popper always attacked positivism, and so on. Narskij's weak procedure here is an example of the synthetic method of Leninist historiography.

Narskij also fails to distinguish among different forms and shades of what he calls neopositivism. He is interested only in 'the broad stream', and in the condemnation thereof. In view of this condemnation, Narskij concentrates more on questions of content than on questions of history.

However, Narskij is still interested in the history. In other words, he is not interested in the content of neopositivism as such but in the content of the historical phenomenon of positivism. Not that he uses the historical figures as illustrations for handling the problems: he wants to criticize certain doctrines. But his delineation of these doctrines is just about as poorly done as his historical presentation of positivism. The closest he comes to a definition is an enumeration of 'the most important parts' of the 'general system of views of neopositivism': namely, 'the new view on the object of empiricism and of verification, conventionalism, the positivist interpretation of the semantic meanings of truth, and physicalism'.[337] Nor does Narskij

take any pains to work out of the very diverse philosophies he is dealing with the common elements that are there. He is satisfied with general statements like: "All positivists have in common that they deny the scientific importance of the battle of the two basic camps in philosophy".[338]

Narskij's Sources. Narskij usually depends on primary sources, more rarely on Western secondary literature (Bergmann, Bocheński, Copleston, Cornforth, Fischl, Kraft, von Mises, Passmore, Pap, Schaff, Stegmüller, Urmson, Weinberg, etc.). He quotes frequently and at length.[339] Since there are few available texts in Russian[340], Narskij makes extensive use of German and English originals. He apparently has access to one of the most complete collections of this kind on the European continent. Although references to his colleagues are rare, he does thank Janovskaja in the introduction to his larger book.[341] A few other Soviets are mentioned in the book (e.g., Birjukov, Kol'man, Subbotin, Švyrev, Tavanec and Zinov'ev – all logicians or friendly to logic) but the fact that their names do not occur in the name index shows the state of discussions among them.

Narskij's Methods. In General, Narskij conforms to the method we have described as the Leninist historiographical methods.[342] He therefore looks on the history of neopositivism, in the light of *partijnost'*, as a *battle*[343], where the opponents of Marxism-Leninism, of a scientific world-view, of science, hide their real convictions and motivations. They must, therefore, be exposed.[344] The trick is turned in that Narskij subjects them to socioanalysis[345], trying to show the role their doctrine plays in capitalist society and how they use it to defend their class interests. Narskij presents the view that neopositivism serves capitalism directly by declaring senseless the formulation of the universal laws of social development (which are anti-capitalist) while simultaneously furthering science (which is necessary for the technology of capitalism).[346] The other form of the exposé method consists in identifying neopositivism with empirio-criticism, with Hume, Berkeley or Kant – i.e., with something or someone already condemned by Lenin.[347] In this direction, all the views and opinions of the various neopositivists are *synthesized.* Differences are left behind and gross similarities are stressed until one gets the impression that neopositivism is a 'school' in the same sense that Marxism-Leninism is a school. The final twist of this method is the use of a *Lenin quote* at almost every turn. For, "This work of V.I. Lenin (*Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*) is the textbook of every researcher who wants to take a genuinely Marxist position in the critical analysis of neopositivism."[348]

Most of Narskij's texts are structured in such a way as to 'condemn' neopositivism. For example, the book *Contemporary Positivism* is divided ac-

cording to subject matter: historical and doxographical presentations have to fit the systematic scheme, suited for critique. If we also recall that Narskij's synthesizing beclouds historical lines of demarcation, then it is clear why is is difficult to say what Narskij means by neopositivism.

Despite all its weaknesses, Narskij's work is not useless: he does try to make his condemnation of neopositivism *objective and grounded.* He is ready to follow an author into the finest details, although this does not save him from some uncomfortable errors.[349] Because he quotes so much, some of Narskij's articles contain a lot of description and little critique.[350] In his *Philosophical Encyclopedia* articles about Carnap and Russell, Narskij distinguishes carefully between the two and between their various periods. It is in the critical portions of such articles that he falls back into synthesizing.[351]

Narskij often uses *immanent critique.* He is good at showing how in the course of development certain theories of the neopositivists became problematic and had to be changed because they had proved to be false: for example, he illustrates the difficulties they had in applying the principle of verification to the sciences; he goes into the problem of protocoll or foundational sentences and of intersubjectivity on the basis of the discussion between Schlick, Reichenbach, Neurath, Popper, etc.[352]

For the orientation and stimulation of the Soviet reader, Narskij's presentation is of unquestionable value. Despite the critical bias, he provides some insights but he can tell the Western reader nothing new about his subject-matter. His views are interesting to the Western reader precisely for the light they shed on his own orientation, philosophical position, etc.

3.3. *Narskij's Critique of Neopositivism I: Metaphilosophy*

Characteristic of neopositivism is – as we saw above (Ch. II) – a rejection of *traditional philosophy* on epistemological grounds. Narskij singles this doctrine out for presentation and critique. In his *Contemporary Positivism* (1961) he spells out the various forms of 'elimination' of philosophy.[353] Already in 1959 he had written a pamphlet and in 1960 an article, on the relationship of positivism to philosophy.[354] His critique can be summarized as follows:

The neopositivist assertion that all concepts and theories of traditional philosophy are unverifiable and thus meaningless is false. According to Narskij, some of them are meaningful, others meaningless; among the meaningful, some are demonstrably true (materialism) and others demonstrably false (idealism). Praxis provides the proof.[355] Modern scientific progress

has proved the groundlessness of idealistic science of science and of other idealistic theories. What is more, some branches of the older philosophy have been absorbed into the sciences. The neopositivists engage in false generalization when they claim that *all* previous philosophical themes have either become objects of science or are scientifically ungrounded. They fail to see the increased necessity for philosophy, due to the progress of science.[356]

The logical positivists want to retain under the name 'philosophy' only metapropositions about other sciences, but no propositions about the world of objects. They reduce philosophy to logical analysis. Narskij has two critiques of the *new philosophy of the positivists*:

First, philosophy cannot be carried out in an 'absolutely unmetaphysical' way (in the sense of the positivists, not of diamat).[357] It is always either materialist or idealist since neutrality in these matters is impossible. Philosophy does depend – but not completely – on the sciences. It is up to philosophy to investigate the cognitive function of the sciences.[358] The very principles of logical positivism itself are not unmetaphysical. For example, the principle of verification can be explained only as a convention and it then implies subjective idealist views on experience and truth.[359]

Secondly, the very formal logic that the neopositivists value so much that they sometimes identify it with philosophy cannot – according to Narskij – get along without an epistemological, 'dialectical' grounding.[360] It cannot ground itself. Philosophy is neither identical with formal logic, even partially[361], nor completely independent of it.[362]

Narskij thinks that these arguments show that logical positivism's effort to find a new kind of philosophy failed. He goes on to show that these false views have kept them *from solving* a lot of philosophical *problems*. For instance, the elimination of philosophy and their 'closing of their eyes' in the face of the problem of grounding logic, leads them to ground it conventionally[363]; lacking a philosophical account of truth, they replace it by the purely logical semantic definition of Tarski (Carnap)[364]; experience therefore, is taken as atomistic (Carnap, following Russell and Wittgenstein)[365] and existence as inexpressible (Schlick, Ayer, etc.). Narskij also holds the denial of the 'contradictory character of the development of objects' as false and as caused by the limitation to formal logic.[367] As we shall see below, this is only one of the many evils that Narskij sees flowing from the neopositivist idea of the elimination of philosophy: some others are an inability to explain causality or the denial of it (e.g., by Frank)[368], a lack of explanation for 'the real unity of the world'[369], and the weakness of a purely

formal intersubjectivity in science.[370] As a Marxist-Leninist and, therefore, historical materialist, Narskij is particularly troubled by the 'historical-philosophical nihilism' of people like Reichenbach and Popper[371], by the denial of the scientific character of theoretical and normative ethics and their emotional interpretation (e.g., by Reichenbach, Ayer and Neurath)[372], and by the denial of philosophical esthetics and sociology.[373] He accuses the neopositivists of amoralism and lack of principles in reference to metaethical problems.[374]

These examples are enough to show that, for Narskij, neopositivism is wrong because it tries to explain philosophical problems away instead of trying to solve them.

Narskij further finds *masked subjective idealism* already in the very way neopositivism refuses to pose philosophical problems. In Soviet terminology, 'subjective idealism' means that the objective world is made to depend on the cognitive activity and the cognitive tools of the knowing subject.[375] It is Narskij's opinion that the exclusion of the question on the independence of the known from the knower as a senseful question is in itself a 'camouflaged denial of this independence'.[376] Even more arbitrary is Narskij's claim that the positivist principle of verification is masked anti-materialism because it renders meaningless all propositions about objective reality, and that it is masked idealism because it makes propositions about God and soul meaningless 'but not false'.[377]

Narskij is less far afield when he sees in neopositivism a tendency to support *irrational and unscientific* world-views. By being declared meaningless, the real problems of philosophy are removed from the realm of rational treatment and are rejected into the realm of feeling, of myth and of religion.[378] Thus, Carnap describes earlier philosophy as a type of mythology[379], as a surrogate for art, especially music[380]; Schlick speaks of poetic intuition[381], and Russell of instinct.[382] Narskij sees a sort of 'division of labor' between the neopositivists and the irrationalist philosophers in the West (pragmatism, existentialism and Thomism).[383] According to Narskij, these three trends of idealism have in common with neopositivism that questions about the 'essence of consciousness and being' are relegated to the realm of the irrational. (Narskij puts Thomism in this group because he sees it as mixing philosophy with matters of faith). Narskij finds confirmation of this view in the fact that several neopositivists (Ayer, Wittgenstein, Russell, Frank) have claimed that their doctrine and science do not conflict with religion.[384]

By showing this connection between neopositivism and irrationalism,

Narskij makes his claims about the principle of verification more plausible. The elimination of philosophical statements from the realm of theoretical knowledge is acceptable for idealism, but not for materialism.[385] The most important philosophical thesis of materialism is precisely that the objective world is knowable as such and that this knowledge has to be rational and scientific because this is the only way for it to be objective. Idealism's subjective account can, on the contrary, be irrational because it gets along subjectively without rational knowledge of the objective: objective idealism contains as its central notion God – an irrational element on the Soviet account.

The 'ideological alliance'[386] between neopositivism and irrationalism corresponds in Narskij's eyes to the partisan character of philosophy: all bourgeois philosophical trends belong to basically the same party. The other side of this coin is an inimical relation to the other party and its philosophy, i.e., to Marxism-Leninism.

It is also the *direct opposition* of the neopositivist theories to *dialectical materialism* that demonstrates for Narskij the falsity and the masked idealism of neopositivism. He cites Popper, Frank, Ayer, the Austro-Marxists and various Polish 'revisionists' (Kołakowski, Baczko, Krajewski, Szacki, Malewski) who use the positivist rejection of metaphysics against Marxist-Leninist philosophy and its world-view.[387] Narskij distinguishes three ways that modern Anglo-Saxon sociologists, who are influenced by neopositivism, take an anti-histomat position: (1) the sharp distinction between sociology and philosophy on the part of all U.S. sociologists; (2) the 'empirical sociology' of Lundberg, Lazarsfeld and Dodd, and (3) the elevation of language to the status of decisive factor in the social, through linguistic analysis (especially Wisdom) and 'general semantics' (e.g. S. Chase).[388] Narskij, of course, sees Bogdanov (with the critique by Lenin) and the mechanists of the 1920's as further examples of where the rejection or limitation of philosophy has to lead.[389]

As far as Narskij is concerned, all attempts to link positivist theories with materialist ones or even the assertion that certain forms of positivism (like physicalism) are materialist only serve to 'cover up' the opposition and to 'mask' idealism. Some Soviet scientists who favor a positivist rejection of philosophy do so only because they do not see the contradiction between Marxism and positivism.[390]

In sum, the positivist notion of philosophy contradicts the facts, is illogical, implies subjective idealism, irrationalism and opposition to Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

3.4. *Narskij's Critique of Neopositivism II: Epistemology*

As Narskij rightly points out, epistemology is so important for neopositivism that many people identify them.[391] Narskij himself concentrates very heavily on epistemological critique. He sees it as very characteristic of the neopositivists that they are not sceptics but epistemological optimists who do not want to limit but to liberate knowledge.[392] But he denies that they have succeeded and tries to show again and again that the epistemology of neopositivism in fact destroys knowledge and has the direct consequences: subjectivism, agnosticism, irrationalism.

According to Narskij, neopositivism has a false view of the *nature of knowledge.* This basic error takes many forms. Above all, rational knowledge for neopositivism reduces to the purely *'formal' ordering* of atomic empirical facts. The author's under review have seen that knowledge is more than the recording empirical facts. But for them the only other type of senseful propositions are the formal, logical propositions[393], and this means that the whole of rational knowledge and science is reduced to logical elaboration. comparison, ordering, 'construction', etc.[395] This separates it from sense knowledge and questions or destroys the independence of real things and processes from logical constructs.[395] Such a knowledge cannot be a 'solid reflection of reality' or of 'the essence of things' and Narskij thinks it false to even speak here of 'knowledge'. Neurath is correct when he says that one can no longer have epistemology under these conditions.[396]

This version of knowledge as the establishment of formal relations is often exaggerated, as when the logical positivists overemphasize the role of language. Narskij's examples for this are: Wittgenstein's "The limits of my language are the limits of my world" (*Tractatus* 5.6); Carnap's theory of 'formal mode'; physicalism; the attempt at a formalist grounding of logic. Narskij detects here a 'subjective-idealist verbalism' which cares 'only for the logical possibility of linguistic transformations at the expense' of objective knowledge.[397] Knowledge reduces to designation, ordering of signs, and changes of signs.[398]

One of Narskij's constant critiques of neopositivism is that it has to have recourse at all turns to *convention*: he has written a whole article about this[399], where he refers not only to the 'radical conventionalism' of Ajdukiewicz, but also to examples from Carnap, Reichenbach, Hempel, Frank and others. 'Convention' serves neopositivists to explain many different things: the establishment of protocoll statements; the choice of a truth criterion; assumption of the principle of verification itself; as well as the grounding of the axioms and rules of logic, of the theoretical concepts and logical con-

structs of the sciences, of causality, of intersubjectivity and even the choice of world-view. They cannot give an explanation based on content and on reflection.[400] It is clear that Narskij the realist holds any conventionalism to be a subjectivist falsification of knowledge.[401]

Narskij further complains that neopositivism does not even have a correct notion of *truth*. While the early Vienna Circle held for a break between sensuous and rational and a sharp separation of logical and empirical truth, gradually increasing formalism led to a greater and greater generalization of the coherence theory.[402] In an article on the relation between truth and criterion of truth. Narskij indicates to the neopositivists that their identification of the two means a dissolution of realist truth.[403] The move toward a formalistic version of truth was strengthened by Tarski's semantic definition. This last has a logical meaning which is relatively independent of epistemology and plays a 'progressive role in science' but it is used epistemologically by logical positivists (like Carnap) to ground a view of truth as the systemic agreement of propositions with each other, to dissolve (factual) *F*-truth into (logical) *L*-truth or (systemic) *S*-truth.[404] This formalism means that truth can only be a 'formal property of propositions'.[405] According to Narskij, the identification of truth with verification or the verifiability of propositions also leads to a coherence view, as soon as the verification itself is understood formally, as comparison of propositions (e.g., in Carnap's 1932/33 article about protocoll sentences).[406]

The neopositivist version of knowledge means that a connection between facts or between protocoll statements can only be logical. On this reading there are great problems with the notions of causality and law. Narskij says that in the beginning Schlick, Carnap and Frank wanted to explain the laws of nature as rules of language; even later they took them to be a logical construct and held it to be impossible to give an objective grounding for them.[407] This meant that the neopositivists could give no grounds for statements about future events, even for scientific *predictions*. All attempts to overcome the non-verifiability (and vacuity) of all prediction (cf. Russell) were doomed to failure.[408] For neopositivists, like Carnap, Reichenbach and Neurath, the very object of the logical constructs of science is to predict future sense perceptions. But Narskij sees them as unable to give any reason whatsoever, why predictions, which are theoretically derived from systems, should coincide with real future perceptions of man.[409] Added to this difficulty is that – as Narskij sees it – of a verification of past facts.[410] Narskij sees in all these difficulties evidence that neopositivism is incompatible with science.

Narskij goes on to criticise the fact that neopositivists completely ignore the *process* of knowledge, its 'historical' trait. They are always caught up with the mere internal connections of already achieved knowledge. In an extreme case of 'hypertrophy of Husserlian antipsychologism', they do not see the dialectical connection between the results in content and the process of knowledge. This means, for Narskij, that the connection between subject and object 'is not considered as a matter of principle'.[411] He is apparently assuming here that this connection exists only in the process of knowledge and not in its result.

According to Narskij, the neopositivist attempt to reduce rational knowledge to formal relations is false and unworkable. It gets in the way of a genuine explanation and grounding of knowledge. The only alternative then becomes some form of irrationalism, which Narskij sees as built in to neopositivism.[412]

Not limiting himself to criticizing the neopositivist view of knowledge as the ordering of empirical facts, Narskij also criticizes their views on the *empirical facts* themselves. His main thrust is against the *'idealist sensualism'* of the earlier neopositivists. By 'sensualist' a Marxist-Leninist means any doctrine that holds sense perception to be the sole source of knowledge: and materialist sensualism is distinguished from the idealist variety by the fact that the former holds sense perceptions to be caused by and reflections of objective reality while the latter sees nothing or at least nothing knowable behind them.[313] Although the question about an objective reality independent of the subject is a pseudo-question for the neopositivists, Narskij puts a negative answer in their mouths. With their basic limitation to the sense experience of the subject and to the 'simply given' sense datum as final limit of the analysis, the neopositivists differ only accidentally from the subjectivism of Berkeley and Mach. Narskij even finds some statements in Schlick, Ayer, Carnap, Russell and Frank, that support this interpretation.[414] Even Reichenbach's view – which is on its way from positivism to realism – that the existence of the material world 'is very highly probable' is quoted in support because it does not take this existence as certain.[415] Though the neopositivists could not (and would not) say it, their empirical base is phenomenistic and subjectivistic. Narskij sees no important difference between phenomenism and subjective idealism: all that counts for him is the basic non-realistic tendency. 'Given-ness' annihilates objects external to it as well as the epistemological relation between subject and object.

Narskij further sees as false the neopositivists' division of the experiential ground of knowledge into *atomic* elements. This view – which goes back to

the 'logical atomism' of Russell and Wittgenstein – sees all complex propositions as truth functions of logically simple and mutually independent empirical statements. It is these empirical elements that are involved in Schlick's epistemology, in Carnap's 'logical structure of the world', and in the conflict about protocoll sentences. Narskij objects to this that there are neither atomic facts, nor atomic perceptual processes, nor atomic sense information. None of these is independent of others or absolutely simple and elementary. It is rather the case that reality and knowledge are 'dialectically organic wholes'.[417]

Narskij also points out the difficulties of linguistic expression of the so-called atomic facts. He describes the evolution from Schlick's 'records' to the *'protocoll sentences'* of Carnap and Neurath and the relevant discussions. This is a cardinal point. The members of the Vienna Circle and their friends were agreed that any non-formal proposition must be verifiable in order to be meaningful; difficulties began as soon as it was a question of exactly providing propositions (or procedures) for verifying scientific propositions. There are difficulties already in formulating elementary protocoll sentences about complex scientific observations. However, the most agonizing problem is: how can the observation of one person (or several persons) at a given time and in a given place be formulated so that they have general validity for the verification of propositions of other people at other times and in other places? And how are they themselves verified? According to Narskij, there is no satisfactory answer. Applied in this form, the principle of verification leads to the destruction of scientific theories.[418]

Equally doomed to failure, on Narskij's account, are the neopositivist attempts to establish the *intersubjectivity* of the propositions based on sense perceptions. (He mentions Carnap's various attempts, above all in *The Logical Structure of the World,* and the discussion in *Erkenntnis* between 1931 and 1934.) Since neopositivism does not have the materialist notion of objective reality and its capture via praxis, it cannot transcend the purely subjective nature of sense perception. When different subjects speak about their sensory experiences, they speak about different things.[419] The neopositivists could find intersubjectivity neither in the content of propositions nor in their logical structure, nor in the graphic form. There was no bridge between knowing subjects.[420]

In view of all these problems, it seems natural to Narskij that Carnap finally interpreted verification as a purely linguistic operation and abandoned sense verification altogether. This is in total accord with the reduction to the linguistic, which Narskij criticized above.

As third element of neopositivism, Narskij rejects its views on *formal logic* (while not rejecting formal logic itself[421]). Among his other works, he wrote a long article on the relationship between formal logic and epistemology in a *sbornik*, collected by Kedrov.[422] As on many other occasions, his presentation and critique are both quite sketchy; instead, Narskij goes into detail on his own views on philosophy of logic (cf. below). Among other things, he accuses neopositivists of 'ripping' formal logic 'loose' from any epistemological grounding, absolutizing it and rendering it 'autarkic'.[423] They believe that formal logic can exist apart from any philosophy or any *epistemology*, and can ground itself precisely as logical analysis of the sciences.[424] Narskij holds this to be false. He recognizes the value of logical analysis – just as he generally defends formal and modern symbolic logic against devious attacks[425] – but he criticizes logical analysis supposedly freed from investigation of knowledge and of 'reflection'.[426] The neopositivists want to examine only the ready-at-hand results of knowledge but not knowledge itself, not the 'dialectical' process of its development: they leave this to psychology.[427] This leaves formal logic itself without the necessary epistemological analysis 'of its coming-to-be, development and structures, without its own means and methods', without the philosophical grounding and limiting of its relative independence.[428] It is Narskij's view that the lack of an epistemological grounding leads to a conventionalist 'grounding' of formal logic.[429] Instead of being grounded in reality, its axioms are based on the 'fact of inclusion' in a system.[430] Its laws and rules are falsely interpreted as 'independent of sense experience' and without 'empirical foundation', as if logic were an 'uninterpreted calculus'.[431] Reference is usually made to non-Euclidean geometry and many-valued logic. The real content of logic which 'ultimately is taken from empirical reality' is lost.[432]

As a result of a conventionalist view of logic, 'convention, i.e., the principle of arbitrary selection' becomes – according to Narskij – the most important postulate of neopositivist epistemology.[433] We have already seen the various forms of subjective idealism that Narskij criticizes in this regard. Because the neopositivists do not ground formal logic epistemologically but put it in the place of epistemology, they are forced *epistemologically to generalize* falsely research results which are valuable to logic. Two cases in point have already been mentioned: logical atomism and Tarski's definition of truth. Another is the analysis of the notion of existence. Narskij concedes that 'existence in general', in the sense of the logical operator or bound variables does not designate any property but is empty. This is a positive

result of Russell's 'theory of descriptions' and other formal-logical investigations.[434] However, the neopositivists come to false philosophical conclusions, namely that existence cannot be expressed at all, not even as the epistemological notion of objective reality. This leads to a subjective-idealist transformation of existence into a fact of consciousness.[435] It is in this sense that Russell says that one can say 'being' of everything, about which one can think or speak[436], and Carnap says that to be real means to be an element of the structure.[437] Instead of lying in its objective being, the unity of the world lies in its knowability for Schlick and in language for Carnap.[438] Narskij also sees Carnap's 'ontological liberality' within formal logic – where there is a fact for every proposition (in the object language as well as in the metalanguage) – as leading to false philosophic generalizations: to the elimination of the limits between the objects of reality and the objects of logic, between being and consciousness, and between the real and the ideal.[439]

In an overview of Narskij's *critique of neopositivism's epistemology and conception of philosophy,* we can see that the very complex and close connection between the epistemology of neopositivism and its theories about philosophy returns in Narskij's critical views about these two sets of opinions.

Narskij sees in the 'elimination' of philosophy – as unverifiable and meaningless – above all an attempt to overcome the basic question of philosophy about a reality independent of the subject, i.e., an attempt to eliminate epistemology. This anti-philosophical and anti-epistemological position is in turn built on epistemological claims namely the false reduction of knowledge to the logical ordering of sense impressions. In Narskij's eyes, it is the false epistemology which is at work in the destruction of philosophy. Instead of criticizing idealism, one destroys the foundations of realism ('materialism') and of rational knowledge. In a similar way, the false epistemology taints the logical analysis which the neopositivists put in the place of the earlier philosophy. Narskij sees it as incapable of solving the problems of earlier philosophy or as doing so only in a subjective idealist way.

3.5. *Narskij's Own Philosophic Views*

Contrary to the positivist doctrines, Narskij sees philosophy as a domain of knowledge which is distinct from the other sciences but which is also rational, even scientific. He provides the usual Marxist-Leninist definition of philosophy: philosophy is the science of the most general laws of the development of nature, society and knowledge.[440] Further, he includes the 'basic

question of philosophy' into the definition. He says that dealing with the 'basic question' (about the relationship between being and consciousness) provides philosophy with its specific character and with its qualitative difference from the other sciences. Therefore, philosophy is 'at the same time, the most universal science and a special science'.[441] Narskij's preoccupation here is evidently the following: there are no special objects or special modes of knowledge which would be philosophy's alone, i.e., would not be available to other sciences (as in idealism). It is rather the case that philosophy and the sciences deal with the same, real, material things, with philosophy handling the more universal aspects. The formation and verification of the theses of philosophy happen 'in basically the same way as for the theses of every science'.[442] In fact, philosophy is only possible 'on the basis' of generalizations of the sciences and in close collaboration with them.[433] In order that philosophy not suffer a positivistic reduction to a generalizing and ordering of the sciences, i.e., to a theory about the sciences not about the world[444], it is given a formal object – so to speak – of its own, namely the 'basic question'. However, Narskij himself stresses that the content of philosophy should not be reduced to the 'basic question'.[445] It remains unclear how philosophy, if its specific content is the relation of being and consciousness, can deal with other unrelated themes; e.g., the dialectic, historical materialism, ethics, esthetics. For Narskij, epistemology has to be the center of philosophy. He is also unclear as to how philosophy is to be qualitatively distinguished from such other sciences as deal with the relation between being and consciousness; above all, from psychology. In any case, it is clear that for Narskij philosophy and science are qualitatively distinct and that the 'basic question' is fundamental to the distinction. This distinction is also responsible for the fact that philosophy is partisan and class bound while the sciences, including formal logic, are not partisan.[446] Within Marxist-Leninist philosophy class ideology and sciences meld into scientific ideology.

In connection with his critique of the neopositivist identification of *formal logic and philosophy,* Narskij says the following about their differences and relations. First, formal logic and philosophy are two different domains which do not intersect even partially. (This is intended to defuse the Soviet dispute over formal logic and philosophy.[447]) Secondly, both formal logic and philosophy are interdependent, with the latter supplying the foundation for the former.[448] Thirdly, the philosophical grounding of formal logic consists in investigating its origins and validity, i.e., in its epistemological metatheory. Since for Narskij dialectical logic is the same as epistemology, formal logic is philosophically grounded by dialectical

logic.[449] He even says that the laws of formal logic are 'a sort of inference from the laws of the dialectic'.[450]

Against the positivist assertion that the propositions of philosophy in the traditional sense – which is also Narskij's sense – are not verifiable, Narskij says that philosophy is *verified through praxis.*[451] What he means by this will become clear below.

Narskij's own views of *knowledge* are fundamental to his critique of the neopositivist assertions about philosophy and epistemology. This involves in particular the epistemologically *critical* questions since the whole of neopositivism is 'critical' in this sense. An examination of Narskij's view on this subject is also of Sovietological interest since epistemology remains – as we saw in our description of the 'classics' – relatively open: Marx had no epistemological interests; Engels took a generally empiricist position while simultaneously refuting the consequences of empiricism in the name of a naive realism; Lenin was halfway along toward a philosophically grounded realism (with the help of some Hegelian concepts). Even official Soviet philosophy has no satisfactory answer since it accepts the psychological theses of empiricism while denying its epistemological consequences. This is the background to Narskij's epistemological efforts.

If we ask Narskij a question like 'What kind of knowledge is it that recognizes and verifies what philosophy says?', we can be sure that he will have in mind rational and scientific knowledge. For him this rational knowledge cannot be reduced to sense perceptions; nor can it be taken as purely formal. The question thus becomes 'What kind of knowledge transcends the sensuous and the formal?' 'How does one know the universal laws and relations which are the object of philosophy and how does one establish the objective validity of propositions about such laws and connections?' 'How does one know and prove that the basic question is correctly answered by materialism, i.e., that there is a knowable and cognitively transcendent reality?' The answer has to deal with the facts of such a knowledge and proof, as well as with their validity.

Narskij's answer is unclear. He wrote no systematic work on critique of knowledge. (In his little *Actual Problems of Marxist-Leninist Epistemology* (1966) he deals with other questions: dialectical and formal logic; dialectical contradiction; information.)[452] But, many insights can be gained from his historical works.

Much of what Narskij says looks like an *empiricist* reduction of knowledge to sense experience. He himself says that he holds a 'materialist sensualism' which differs from the idealist version only because of the (seemingly

uncritical) acceptance of objective reality.[453] He rejects 'synthetic judgements which are not of empirical origin', where 'empirical' means the result of sense experience[454], not of isolated impressions but of many impressions together.[455] Non-sensible objects of knowledge are said to have 'indirect sensibility'[456] and logical knowledge is dependent on sensation.[457]

Incompatible with such a strictly empiricist view, however, is Narskij's critique of the empiricism of the positivists. We have seen how he rejects the necessarily 'idealist', sceptical, subjectivist, and conventionalist consequences of these theses: he sees them as rendering impossible an objective grounding of knowledge, as excluding a knowledge of essence, as hindering a realistic grounding of logic and theory of truth, as dissolving important concepts like causality and law, and as making scientific prediction inexplicable. According to Narskij, sensualist empiricism destroys a scientific world-view. This is why he cannot himself accept a strict empiricism, as is also clear from many of his writings. He seems to admit a non-sensuous but nevertheless objective form of knowledge, but only rarely. He once says that 'perception of the object as object includes the activity of understanding' and contains 'an element of thought'.[458] In another place he distinguishes the sensuous from the 'rationally perceptible properties of objects'.[459] However, these quotations are not sufficient to prove the assumption by Narskij of 'insight' or something similar. If he held for such a form of knowledge, he would have said so more clearly. Instead, he regularly and explicitly speaks of something else: praxis. Wherever the consequences of empiricism are criticized or to be avoided, Narskij speaks of *praxis* as the basis, goal and *criterion* of knowledge. Seldom does he make an important epistemological statement without reference to praxis. Praxis as criterion is the most fundamental concept: that it is basis and goal of knowledge are secondary theses; they are mostly historical and psychological descriptions or reducible to the verification claim. (The basis is epistemologically important as the possibility of verification and the goal is important precisely as verification.) In the context of critique, Narskij is quite right in emphasizing praxis as criterion of truth[460] and we will follow him along this path.

Narskij's central thesis reads: praxis is the criterion of the truth of all knowledge. This means that praxis proves the adequacy of the reflection of objective reality in consciousness and it proves the existence of an objective reality which is reflected.[461] A comment on the use of language will be useful here. Narskij uses *'kriterij istiny'* for the 'criterion of *truth*' of the positivists, although he clearly distinguishes between truth as true content *(istina)* and truth as the logical property of a true proposition *(istinnost')*.[462]

It would be more correct to say: praxis is the criterion of the true content of knowledge. This does not make the assertion any clearer but it also does not change its essential content.

The thesis on praxis as criterion of truth stems from Engels and belongs to the commonplaces of Marxism-Leninism.[463] It is not clear what is meant by it. Can it be rephrased objectively as saying that the decisive measure of the theoretical value of a theory is non-theoretical? or, subjectively, that a non-theoretical activity plays the decisive role in a process of theoretical knowledge? Both of these seem to be contradictory. Praxis as criterion of truth seems to be possible only if it is something cognitive and, therefore, not really praxis, e.g., knowledge of the practical result, or reflection about praxis. (Or, the 'theory' to be 'verified' is not really theory but something practical – as in pragmatism). These difficulties have led Sovietologists to reject praxis in this sense as unintelligible or as nonsense.[464] However, it is worth going into the question one more time if only because this is a very *important* thesis of diamat: there is no other grounding or verification of knowledge in the whole of Soviet philosophy.

Narskij accepts the usual Soviet definition of praxis as the active transformation of the material world through consciously acting men.[465] He expands on this definition and describes the essence of praxis. There are six essential characteristics: praxis is 'material', 'active', 'conscious', 'social', 'a whole' and 'universal'. Let us examine the matter more closely.

Narskij never tires of repeating that praxis is *material.* In Leninist usage this means not only that it is not spiritual but also and above all that it is real and not ideal. Since the process of theoretical knowledge is, of course, just as real and 'material' as the process of praxis, the decisive point here can only be that the immediate *objects* of praxis – as compared with the contents of consciousness – are real. In any case, Narskij does want to distinguish praxis from the acts of consciousness. 'Praxis' is not for him just another name for sense impressions or perceptions.[467] Therefore, the empiricist interpretation of this criterion of truth of diamat, which is often found in secondary sources, does not apply to Narskij.[468] Praxis is for him neither sense knowledge nor any other kind, for as such, it would be subjective.[469] Knowledge is rather 'only a side to praxis'.[470] In itself, it is transcendent of knowledge, it is real, extra-theoretical, objective, and in this sense, 'material'. It is precisely because it is not theoretical but objective that praxis can serve as ultimate proof of knowledge. Every theoretical justification must itself be verified.[471] With this view that praxis as criterion has to be outside of knowledge, Narskij joins the Rutkevič group against the more 'official' view

that praxis is a 'third stage' in knowledge (sense knowledge – thought – praxis), which was a thesis of Lenin.[472]

Secondly, Narskij calls praxis *'active'*. It is an action, an operation on an object; i.e., an external and transitive doing. However, this action is not unilateral but is an 'active interaction' since the activity of the subject is determined by the object.[473] This means that subject and object mutually change one another.[474] Thereby the limit between them is overcome; more exactly, this limit as a real limit does not at all exist for the acting (and knowing) subject. By means of this thesis, Narskij wants to distinguish his epistemology from 'idealist' sensualism and from positivism, where the knowing subject is passive and isolated from the objective world. The transcendence of truth is grounded in the transcendence of praxis over the acting subject.[475] In this context, Narskij criticizes the view that sense impressions, i.e., something contemplative, are the criterion of truth (as in Feuerbach and Helvetius).[476] This shows again that 'praxis' cannot be for Narskij another name for sense experience.

Thirdly, according to Narskij, praxis can be the criterion of truth only if – though not knowledge itself – it is *conscious* praxis, closely bound up with knowledge.[477] Intentional and goal-oriented activity contains consciousness in the form of intention and of knowledge about the result.[478]

In the fourth place, whenever Narskij speaks of praxis as criterion of truth he calls it '*social* praxis'[489], and even the 'praxis of mankind'.[480] One could think that Narskij has in mind a collective subject in the sense that mankind as a subject proves the truth of its knowledge in the course of its social, political and technological praxis. He does not make clear what he means but he never speaks of anything like a Hegelian objective spirit. When talking about knowledge, he does stress that social relations like language are presupposed.[481] But reflection happens explicitly 'in individual forms'.[482] That praxis is social would mean on this reading only that it happens in a close relationship between many doers[483] and 'the praxis of mankind' would mean the ordinary 'praxis of men'.[484] Narskij does not seem to want to adopt a collective subject of praxis as criterion of truth.

Narskij speaks, fifthly, of praxis as a connected *whole*, a unity of many aspects which cannot be separated.[485] It gathers together in itself the many activities into an organic process and it connects, as already mentioned, the subject with the object and the subjects with one another. In addition, praxis unites the separate impressions into a totality of experience[486], separate elements of knowledge (propositions) into the whole of knowledge (theories)[487], and the past with the present and future.[488] Narskij wants

very much to uphold the vital unity of the unitary and variegated process of praxis (and of knowledge) against its analytic reduction to 'atoms'. He holds that only the total process of praxis can serve as criterion of truth. Here – as already in the assertion of the social character of praxis – one could sense a tendency toward relationalistic hypostasization of the unity of many relations and connections into an organic whole, a collective process of the collective subject. However, Narskij goes no further, seemingly satisfied with closely connected and interacting but ultimately independent 'aspects'.

Finally, Narskij calls praxis *'universal'*[489], meaning not only its social and historical unity in diversity, but also that it guarantees[498] the knowledge of universal laws, the 'universality of objective regularities'.[491] Praxis is to be the basis and principle of verification for all scientific generalizations up to the most universal propositions of philosophy. To the assertion of the positivists that the non-formal propositions of philosophy are not verifiable and therefore senseless, he answers that philosophy cannot, of course, be proved through individual experiments but that the totality of praxis is universal.[492] Viewed in the context of Soviet philosophy's tendency toward social psychologism and social conceptualism (the thesis that the ideal is essentially social is particularly clear in Il'enkov's contribution to the *Philosophical Encyclopedia*[493]) and in conjunction with the Marxist-Leninist thesis on the unity of the logical and the historical, Narskij can be understood as saying that because of the social and historical 'universality' of its process praxis can ground and prove the logical universality of cognitive contents. Unfortunately, Narskij does not explicate this thesis, even though it is his only solid argument against empiricist nominalism.

In an effort to understand all this it might help to look at the *types* of praxis that Narskij introduces as examples. It is frequently a case of scientific experiments[494], of the whole of experimental sciences[495], with their technological applications[496], as well as economic and political action. Where no experiment is possible, there he deals with the efficacy of predictions. This is particularly the case with economic and political praxis.[497] (The economically productive and political activities are – despite this disadvantage – usually treated as the 'highest' or 'most important' forms of praxis.[498]) Finally, Narskij introduces the daily activities of men, 'the lives of men', as praxis.[499] The above description of praxis applies more or less to all these forms. In all cases there is the active interaction of a consciously acting subject with real, 'material' objects. The immanent activity of thought is not introduced as a form of praxis, agreeing with Rutkevič.[500] The collective tendency is also applicable to all these forms. It is not immediately clear how

the scientific experiment and daily activities are social and organic totalities. The answer is that these are necessarily parts of a whole, i.e., of science and of life; it is these totalities which are the real praxis, not the single experiment and the single daily occurrence. The totalities of life and science are 'universal' in the above sense.

After this description of the essential traits and the various forms of praxis, we have to ask what the precise meaning might be of Narskij's assertion that praxis is the criterion of truth. We will begin with what it is *not.*

From the above it should be clear that Narskij is not referring to prephilosophical *common sense* which convinces some people that they know the laws of an objective world. Such men also speak of a proof through 'praxis'. In fact, it seems that praxis came into Marxism-Leninism through Engels' confusion of his common sense with Marx' notion of praxis. This version is not possible in Narskij since his definition of praxis does not apply to common sense and his theses about praxis are certainly not meant to be prephilosophic.

It is also impossible to interpret Narskij's theses as an empiricist appeal to *sense experience.* As we have seen, Narskij rather asserts that praxis is no knowledge at all, either sensuous or other.

This brings us to the next interpretation which has to be excluded. Narskij stresses that praxis as criterion of truth is not to be interpreted as a *type of knowledge.* He will not admit solving the problem of how the nontheoretical can be decisive for the theoretical by merely interpreting praxis as something theoretical, as is possible in Lenin (or even in Kant, in another respect, whose 'practical reason' is highly theoretical). Praxis is for Narskij extra-theoretical.

The converse is just as impossible, i.e., to doubt the genuinely theoretical nature of his conception of knowledge and to interpret his epistemology *pragmatistically.* If truth were interpreted pragmatistically as utility, it would be easy to see how praxis would be its criterion. But Narskij holds a realistic view of truth as objective correspondence. He also states explicitly that truth is not to be taken as a result of praxis[501] and, following Lenin, success is to be taken as depending on truth, rather than truth on success.[502] Therefore, Blakeley's proposed dilemma – that praxis as criterion is to be interpreted either pragmatistically or empiricistically – is insufficient.[503]

As an effort at correct *interpretation,* Narskij seems to mean something like the following: man does not stand isolatedly over against things but is in a very special and close connection with them; namely, praxis. This connection is dynamic rather than static, organic rather than mechanical, dialec-

tical rather than schematic; it is at the same time material (real) and closely bound up with knowledge (and the ideal), i.e., conscious. For individual men this connection is at least in part mediated by society – which means that it exists between all men taken together and the things, even though Narskij does not hold for a collective subject. While man purely as knowing subject – if there were any such thing – is connected with things only indirectly through thinglike, reflected images, he is, through praxis, in direct and real unity with them.

In this unity the real world which stands over against the knowing subject is so to speak, really inside man; in any case, it no longer stands over against him. Truth as the unity of man and object is somehow really contained in praxis. This truth, realized in praxis, is the basis and guarantee for the truth of knowledge. Narskij apparently has in mind what the *Philosophical Encyclopedia* expresses more clearly in the article on 'Criterion of Truth': 'Praxis is the sole direct connection with the objective world and only it can be the basis of knowledge and the criterion of truth, i.e., a connective between subject and object, which guarantees their unity, nay incorporates the unity as reality *(obespečivajuščij, točnee, voploščajuščij v dejstvitel'nost' ix edinstvo).*[504] To this must be added Narskij's notion that praxis has or is some sort of real universality. In it man is along with innumerable other men in innumerable connections with innumerable things (or all of them?); and these connections are organic components of a complex whole. This guarantees the truth of even universal knowledge.

All of the statements of Narskij about praxis as criterion of truth belong to philosophical psychology and anthropology or to their ontological foundations. One could say that Narskij presents the cognitive process in ontological categories and tries to use this to ground the truth of its results. Praxis is the criterion of truth because in it the subject possesses truth in a non-cognitive way and can test the cognitively attained truth. This very original theory is not senseless – especially in the context of a philosophy which explains reality through relationalistic materialism, knowledge through 'reflection' and the contents of knowledge through social psychologism. Such a presentation enjoys many advantages over idealist epistemologies, which put too great a gap between the material world as object of knowledge and the cognitive subject. But the theory is certainly not satisfying. Even if one ignores the philosophical presuppositions and Narskij's assertion of a real universality, the very assertion that praxis is the criterion of truth remains unclear: How does a description of the situation of the knowing subject provide a

criterion of truth? – especially one that would be final and certain? In some way or other, praxis, in order to prove anything, has to set in motion a knowledge which is itself no praxis (and which needs a criterion of truth). A fact, e.g., a unity, cannot be a criterion; it would have to be *knowledge* of this fact. The most intimate unity of subject and object of knowledge in no way changes the fact that the object is object and stands over against the subject. This is equally true of the relation of such a unity itself: when it is known and asserted, it is an object of knowledge and as such open to the critical doubt that it could be erroneously known and asserted. Assertion of it requires a criterion of truth. (In fact, even if the unity became identity nothing would be different since, even in reflective knowledge of self, error is not completely excluded). Narskij seems to be like many who establish a criterion without noticing that the criterion is presupposed in its establishment. In the final analysis there is no proof for the existence of the external world and for the knowledge of the laws and essences. If, as is the case with Narskij for materialist reasons, one does not admit some sort of phenomenological insight, one is helpless in the face of scepticism. It would make sense to say that through the unity of the cognitive subject with the real world in praxis, an evidence comes to be, which is the criterion of the truth of knowledge. Narskij often seems on the verge of saying this but then again rejects any 'theoretical' criterion. What it then means to say that not such evidence but the process of praxis itself is the criterion is not at all clear. This is why Narskij's view does not satisfy. The various psychological and ontological notions cannot play the role of *criterion* of knowledge: there is no resolution of the contradiction between the description of the criterion of truth as extra-theoretical and the theoretical function it is asked to assume. Truth as a unity that is not possessed cognitively is no truth at all. Possession of it as final criterion is no criterion at all. Therefore, when Narskij says that praxis is not only the basis for but also the criterion of truth, we can only agree with Lobkowicz that this assertion is *unintelligible.*[505]

The fact that praxis cannot serve as the criterion of truth has dire *consequences for Narskij's whole argument.* The basis for his whole realist epistemology and metaphilosophy is gone. Knowledge of the real existence of the world and of objective essences and laws in this world is defenceless against empiricism. Narskij's claim of such knowledge against logical positivism is epistemologically and psychologically unfounded. The introduction of praxis into epistemology does not have the desired effect and Narskij's defence of philosophy is crippled.

The failure of Narskij's critique is due to his *inadequate method,* the

'Leninist method of historiography'. As we have seen, this requires that 'bourgeois' philosophies be combatted, exposed and reduced to their irrational sources, instead of dealing with what they say and/or want to say. Such a method is bound to leave the historian in confusion. Narskij obviously understands and correctly presents the epistemology of the positivists. However, in the 'heat of the battle' he fails to come up with a viable answer. Narskij does not fully see the radical epistemological doubt and therefore he does not and cannot answer it in a final way.

3.6. *Critical Summary*

It is understandable why Professor Narskij is seen in the Soviet Union as *the* authority in the field of critique of neopositivism. He has brought to his work deep knowledge, analytic interest in detail, a positive attitude toward formal logic, and he has tried to combine objectivity with the official style of Leninist critique.

The results are of uneven quality. It is true that the Soviet reader can learn a lot but the information is often not precise enough. (The worst instance of this is the confusing use of 'neopositivism' indifferently for any number of different things). The criticism, based on this presentation, of the positivist 'elimination' of philosophy and of the related epistemological views is basically correct and convincing. Narskij does show that a satisfactory grounding and analysis of the sciences cannot be done with just 'logical analysis' and without philosophy and especially epistemology. He sees the positivist rejection of philosophy as a latent idealism and a tendency to push philosophical problems into the realm of the irrational – attitudes which are anti-diamat, in any case.

In criticizing neopositivism's epistemology, Narskij concentrates on the attempt to interpret all of knowledge, especially that in science, as the logical ordering of elementary facts, conjoined with a phenomenalist version of the facts and a formalist version of logic. Narskij shows that the positivists' efforts at reduction fail and he is critical even of the mere attempt on their part; both phenomenalism and formalism (because of its conventionalism) are variations of subjectivism ('subjective idealism').

Narskij himself sees the specific character of philosophy in its epistemological view and he sees the verification of its propositions in praxis. Praxis as basis of knowledge and criterion of truth is the central concept in his answer to the empiricist-positivist critique of knowledge. It is difficult to see what Narskij means with this praxis. He avoids the Hegelian line toward a collective

subject, a collective cognitive process and a collectively psychologistic ideal content. He describes praxis as a special and very close connection between subject and object, as dynamic, organic, real and conscious 'unity' of them. This connection obtains between the set of objects and the set of subjects and thus has a 'universal' character. These are interesting ideas which could lead in many ways beyond empiricism to an ontological conception of the knowing subject in the world, i.e., to praxis as *basis* of knowledge. In the end, however, there is no satisfactory answer to the question of praxis as *criterion* of truth and its relevance for the critique of neopositivism.

4. VLADIMIR SERGEEVIČ ŠVYREV

4.1. *Some History*

The work of Vladimir Sergeevič Švyrev (sounding something like Shviryoff) is also of great importance for the Soviet critique of neopositivism. He has produced only one small book and some articles on the subject but they are of a high scientific level, dealing mainly with epistemological problems of theory of science rather than with the larger issues.

Švyrev is probably still young; he submitted his candidate dissertation in 1962.[506] In 1966 he was a 'scientific principal' in the Department of Philosophy at Moscow State University[507], where Narskij teaches.

In his works on neopositivist theory of science, Švyrev is mainly interested in epistemological problems like that concerning the relation between empirical and theoretical propositions in science. His dissertation criticizes the 'neopositivist conception of the logic of science'[508], which is also the topic of a longish article in the 1963 *sbornik* on neopositivism.[509] In 1961, he had already written an article on the neopositivist conception of inductive logic[510], followed in 1962 by works on empirical meaning[511] and on the application of symbolic logic in neopositivist logic of science.[512] Then there was a 1963 article on the failure of the neopositivist conception of scientific theory. Most of what Švyrev has to say on these subjects is to be found in his book, *Neopositivism and the Problem of an Empirical Grounding of Science*[514], published in 1966 and constituting the best Soviet work on neopositivism. That his authority is recognized in the Soviet Union appears in the fact that he wrote 'Inductive Logic', 'Philosophy of Logical Analysis' and 'Verifiability' for the third and fourth volumes of the *Philosophical Encyclopedia*.

In addition to his historical and critical works on neopositivism and related themes, Švyrev has also written some articles about the analysis of scientific knowledge, two in collaboration with P.V. Tavanec.[515]

4.2. *Švyrev's Presentation of Neopositivism*

Švyrev concentrates his attention on the central neopositivist question of the analysis of science – especially the relationship between the empirical and the theoretical.[516] He does not provide, as does Narskij, a general account of the history and doctrine of neopositivism. However, what he means by 'neopositivism' is clear: namely, the philosophical bases of the Vienna Circle – from their prefiguration in the 'logical atomism' of Russell and Wittgenstein to their influence on much later forms of 'logical empiricism'.[517] Thus, he also takes the term rather widely but this is of no consequence since he is always careful to specify the author he has in mind.

For Švyrev the central questions of neopositivist analysis of science have to do with the epistemological relationship between theory and the empirical and with the nature of logic.[518] Concentrating on the first of these, Švyrev deals not with formal logic or its methodological application, but with the philosophical or epistemological presuppositions and with the influence of false presuppositions on the methodology.[519]

In his book, Švyrev describes in detail the historical development and changes in the positivist logic of science. He deals with the following authors and themes: Russell's 'logical analysis of language' before the first war and his subsequent development of 'logical atomism', together with the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus*; the elaboration of the principle of verification in the Vienna Circle; the discussion between Carnap, Neurath and Schlick about protocoll sentences; Popper's critique of the principle of verification and of the theory of protocoll sentences and his own suggestions; Ayer's new formulation of the principle of verification; Carnap's later efforts to save the principle of verification through modifications; the theories of Pap and Carnap about dispositional predicates; the views of Carnap, Reichenbach and Popper about induction and probability theory; the development of hypothetical-deductive theories; the critique by Pap, Hempel and Quine of the strict division into empirical and analytic propositions, and the defence thereof by Feigl and Carnap; finally, the views of Hempel, Feigl and Carnap about the nature of theoretical concepts, into the 1950's. In constructing his description, Švyrev uses primary sources and secondary works – both Western (e.g. J.O. Urmson, *Philosophical Analysis. Its Development between the Two Wars,* London, 1957) and Soviet (especially those of Narskij).

Careful *differentiations* between the various authors is a characteristic of Švyrev's work. He distinguishes not only between the views of different authors but between those of the same author at different times. For exam-

ple, he shows that although logical atomism greatly influenced logical positivism, the two are distinct.[520] Both Popper and Hempel[521] are carefully distinguished from neopositivism as is operationalism.[522] Similarly, Švyrev avoids the simplistic Soviet identification of the views of neopositivism with those of earlier philosophers, like Mach or Hume.[523] Švyrev is particularly careful in his handling of Russell[524] and Carnap.[525]

All of these careful distinctions represent a great step forward on the road that Narskij had started toward objective historiography. This adds to the strength of what Švyrev has to say against neopositivism. Instead of combat, exposé and socio-analysis, we have conscientious exposition, careful study and critical refutation.

4.3. *Švyrev's Critique of Neopositivism*

From the beginning Švyrev zeroes in on the *epistemological* presuppositions and interpretations and on their effects on the neopositivist account of logic and methodology and on 'how the general epistemological views of the logical positivists filter into their logical-methodological views'.[526] Thus, he is after the specifically *philosophical* content of neopositivism.[527] This is very clear in the case of 'hypothetical-deductive theory': Švyrev criticizes not the 'concrete' results of the methodology but the empiricism which is bound up with it and which, according to Švyrev, is at least in partial contradiction with the methodology.[528] (Švyrev often uses 'methodological' for 'epistemological', as compared with the 'formal-logical' and 'logical-methodological viewpoints).[529] Science's epistemological questions have up to now not been discussed 'concretely', 'exactly' and 'in detail enough' in the Soviet Union. As we saw, he wants to deal with the theoretical and empirical, using on neopositivism the technique of immanent critique. He wants to show that on their own terms the neopositivists are inconsistent and more and more forced by their inconsistency into compromises, concessions, etc.[530]

Švyrev's critique can be summed up in *five points*:

(1) He is convinced that the neopositivists have failed in an effort to define the *empirical basis* of science, when they sought it in propositions which express individual sense perceptions, free from non-empirical content and absolutely elementary. In Švyrev's view, the discussion about protocoll sentences showed that this attempt had failed and that it had to fail.[531] Schlick's 'records' were never an alternative since they represented a 'hybrid' mixture of sense perception and the linguistic expression thereof.[532] Popper's 'facts' and Carnap's 'object language' no longer satisfied the primitive

requirements of an empirical basis as had been defined by the neopositivists themselves.[533] (In any case, they were not meant realistically but only 'expediently'. As Švyrev notes, no one asked why they are expedient).

(2) Švyrev comes out against the dichotomy of all propositions into *analytic and synthetic.* The analysis of dispositional predicates and of definitions through reduction sentences showed that this distinction is untenable. Švyrev depends mainly on Pap, Hempel and Quine for arguments and he shows that the defence of the dichotomy by Carnap and Feigl does not work. This confirms his claim that the dichotomy is epistemologically false.[534]

(3) Švyrev is critical of neopositivism's *reductionism,* especially of the *principle of verification.* He sees reductionism – i.e., the view that all knowledge is reducible to sense perceptions – as the core of neopositivism[535], and as false. Rather there is a radical difference and even opposition between the general character of even empirical but especially theoretical knowledge and the individual content of sensuousness. The empiricist standpoint is unable to explain the intersubjectivity of science and positivists have never been able to give a good answer to the question of what the non-sensuous 'formal' elements of knowledge (which they admit) might be like.[536] Švyrev sees his view confirmed in the fact that Carnap in the discussion about protocoll sentences was forced to give up the reduction and to take refuge in a conventionalist coherence theory of verification.[537] The bankruptcy of reductionism also appears in Carnap's and Hempel's admission that many theoretical concepts cannot have a full, empirical interpretation.[538] Feigl's effort to explain the irreducible elements of theoretical concepts as purely formal and syntactic fails, for Švyrev, precisely because it wants to reduce the irreducible, which corresponds to Hempel's 'paradox of theorizing'.[539] Švyrev agrees with Popper's critique of the principle of verification but disagrees with his alternative.[540] The later, weakened forms of the principle of verification are Švyrev's evidence for a continuing trend toward reductionism and, at the same time, proof of its futility.[541] He points out that the most recent Western writings have simply abandoned the principle instead of seeking ways out.[542]

(4) Švyrev further criticizes the *formalistic coherence theories* which were often used to replace the failed reductionist theories. Beginning with Carnap's effort to translate all propositions into a 'formal language' (formal mode) and with Neurath's development of a 'physicalist language', there was already in the 30's a formalist *Ersatz* for the primitive sensualist empiricism. (Cf. 'History of Logical Positivism', above). Instead of being compared with sense impressions – so goes this account – propositions can be verified only

through comparison with other propositions. Only convention and consistency are criteria for the 'truth', i.e., acceptance of a proposition.[543] Švyrev is critical both of the original empiricism with its subjectivism and of the conventionalist alternative which abandons the empirically given.[544] He sees it as characteristic of the later logical positivism and of logical empiricism to act as if 'the acceptance of the real traits of scientific knowledge and of the facts of the methodology of science (concretely here, of the fact that the agreement of the theoretical system with the 'empirical' presupposes certain 'propositions of perception') were only a matter of convenience and expediency in the selection of this language or that'.[545]

(5) Švyrev sees a fifth epistemological error of the neopositivist analysis of science in the fact that only *statically given results* are analyzed. Since neopositivism limits itself to the formal-logical angle and pushes into psychology all considerations of the development of the cognitive process, it cannot correctly solve problems of the relationship between the empirical and theoretical. For this relationship how the transition from present empirical and theoretical knowledge to new theories happens is very important. The neopositivist analysis wrongly ignores the 'objective logic of the development of knowledge' (which is not its psychology).[546] Švyrev finds this criticism valid from the *Tractatus*[547] to the later theories of Carnap and Feigl.[548] What he means by 'objective logic of the development of knowledge' is among the items we will examine below.

We can close this section with the additional comment that Švyrev also has some *compliments* for the neopositivists. He sees them as having contributed to formal logic, methodology, probability theory, syntax, semantics, etc. They also have contributed to the development of hypothetical-deductive theory, to clarification of definitions and scientific explanations and to similar questions.[549] What is more, they have correctly asked the question about the relationship between the empirical and theoretical[550]; they have thoroughly discussed protocoll sentences[551]; they have beat down the older forms of psychologism and inductivism[552]; and they have contributed significantly to the analysis of language.[553] But according to Švyrev, all of these accomplishments are not specifically positivist. They were achieved not because of but despite the false epistemology which forms the heart of neopositivism.

4.4. *Švyrev's own Systematic Views*

Compared with his clear and explicit critique, Švyrev's explication of his own views is not too well expressed. They are usually expressed only in

passing and even when they are firm convictions they are often not too easy to understand. Here are a few of them:

Although he does not say much *about philosophy,* one can see from Švyrev's frequent distinction between philosophical and non-philosophical themes in the works of various neopositivist authors, that he agrees with Narskij that philosophy is a special realm of scientific endeavor, and that epistemological problems play the main role in this domain. He is personally interested in only these problems.

Švyrev's main object is, against empiricism, *to stress the objective nature of scientific knowledge, which transcends sense perception.* 'Theoretical knowledge ... contains specific contents which transcend the empirical given.'[554] Theory is 'more than the sum' of its empirical elements.[555] 'The information about not directly perceptible objects and their connections, which is carried in scientific concepts and laws, transcends the limits of empirical information.'[556] It is such an irreducible theoretical content that is the 'essence' which is intended by a theoretical expression. This essence has to be distinguished from its symptoms. While the symptoms can be handled with operational definitions of the relevant theoretical concepts, the essence itself cannot be handled in this way. And only the essence is the 'full meaning' of the theoretical concept.[557] Parallel to this distinction between essence and symptoms, Švyrev demands another between the definite, singular and empirically determinable dispositions – which are expressed by dispositional predicates – and the 'internal structures' which cause them and are often confused with them. Such an internal structure rather serves as foundation to many different dispositions; it is open to future new effects; it is an 'essence'.[558] This knowledge of essences in science is objective. True scientific theories have a content which goes beyond sense-perception and the truth of which consists not in its coherence but in its agreement with objective reality.

In contradistinction to the strict separation, required by the neopositivists, Švyrev stresses the complex *unity and interaction of sensuous and rational knowledge.* It is this unity that explains why the neopositivists never succeed in defining a purely empirical basis for science. Such knowledge without rational elements does not exist.[560] Empirical knowledge occurs only as permeated by rational, theoretical and logical categories.[561] Without a rational element, empirical knowledge would be neither objective nor expressible in language.[562]

It is true that these remarks are here directed against empiricism. However, one has the impression that Švyrev would like simultaneously to solve

the problem of the (spiritual) nature of essential knowledge. He does not hold for a non-sensuous knowledge or a corresponding faculty. He says: 'Empirical knowledge is no 'pure' sense-knowledge; it is a certain mixture (*splav* = layers) of the sensuous with thought. The identification of the sensuous with the empirical unduly sensualizes the empirical level of knowledge. At the same time, the unavoidable identification of the theoretical level with purely 'extra-sensual' thinking unduly logicizes the theoretical level and leaves no possibility to understand the dynamic nature of the cognitive processes on the level of theory, i.e., the dynamic mechanics of so-called intuition and creative imagination'. Švyrev adds a reference to E.V. Il'enkov's article 'The Ideal' in the *Philosophical Encyclopedia.*[563] The last sentences can be understood only in the sense that there is a close connection between the so-called 'intuition' and sensuousness. The same idea is expressed more clearly in another context. Švyrev asserts against the 'logicisation' of theoretical cognitive activity that 'the process of formation, development and application of theoretical knowledge also presupposes the activation of the mechanisms of sensual knowledge – especially the so-called creative imagination.'[564]

All of this still leaves open the critical question as to whence the non-sensually given knowledge comes and how it could be verified. Švyrev does not carry on Narskij's attempt to answer this question with the help of *praxis as criterion of truth.* He admits that praxis is the criterion of truth[565] but goes no further.

One of the notions that resulted from Narskij's interpretation of praxis as criterion of truth was that in praxis real universality comes to be – a universality which is at least in part involved with social universality. There are in Švyrev statements which indicate that he even more clearly interprets *non-empirical knowledge as social.* In stressing the rational, linguistically expressible elements in all knowledge, he calls this element 'universal' *(obščeznačnyj)* in a sense which is primarily social but which simultaneously implies logical universality.[566]

Except as a form of social psychologism, it is difficult to make sense of Švyrev's *'contentful' (i.e., non-formal) logic of science,* and of his investigation of the 'objective logic of the development of knowledge'.[567] Švyrev sees as dangerous and unjustified the neopositivist rule that all that has to do with the genesis of knowledge belongs to psychology and has nothing to do with the purely formal-logical methodology. This results in pushing questions about the laws of genesis into the irrational. Švyrev demands, by contrast, a 'structural-genetic approach to the methodological problem'[568], and the

'investigation of the process of the formation of scientific, theoretical knowledge as logical process, i.e., as a movement of thought which is independent of the peculiarites of the individual consciousness and which is necessary from a given point of departure of knowledge.'[569] Such an investigation should also replace the as always epistemologically unsatisfactory 'inductive logic'.[570] That this investigation is not psychological but has to do with something objective can be understood only if one limits 'psychological' and 'subjective' to the individual sphere and locates the 'objective logic of the development of knowledge' in the realm of the social. The correctness of this interpretation shows itself most clearly in Švyrev's sentence: 'Since neopositivism does not understand the social-historical character of the genesis of scientific knowledge, it falsely identifies the genetic method *(genetizm)* in the investigation of knowledge with psychologism.'[571] Such a social version of knowledge is in line with Švyrev's use of Il'enkov. Another favorite of Švyrev in this context is G.P. Ščedrovickij, who has built up a 'contentfully genetic logic' specially designed for the analysis of language.[572] Is it no accident that language plays such a large role in this 'objective logic' – strongly reminding one of Hegel's 'objective spirit'? The advantages of such a social psychologism and conceptualism are evident: they provide an explanation of logic and of the ideal as independent of psychological, cognitive processes of the individual and, in this sense, as 'objective' – doing this in a way that is not open to ordinary brands of psychologism and conceptualism. On the other hand, the assumption of ideal being, independent of any cognitive process (even social), and the assumption of a soul able to know such ideal being is thereby avoided. In this way, Švyrev's statements about the social nature of knowledge play somewhat the same role as Narskij's about praxis as criterion of truth. One is able to avoid the epistemological consequences of empiricism without transcending its ontological and psychological premisses.

4.5. *Critical Summary*

The young Muscovite scholar, Švyrev, who has specialised in the epistemological aspects of neopositivist methodology of science, offers a very carefully worked out and pertinent picture of the history of discussions about the theoretical and empirical in logical positivism and logical empiricism up to the 1950's. In both the presentation and the critique, he avoids many of the weaknesses of Leninist historiography. His critique is the more powerful in that he carefully distinguishes historical as well as systematic differences. He also distinguishes very sharply between the specifically positivist epistemolo-

gy, the empiricist theses of which he sees as falsifying and impeding analysis, and the formal-logical and logical-methodological accomplishments of many neopositivists, whose works he has obviously studied and whom he recognizes (It is not uninteresting to note that he collaborates with Tavanec).

Švyrev's expert and relevant critique is mainly an immanent critique of neopositivist attempts to isolate purely sensuous elements in knowledge (above all as contents of protocoll sentences), and of the strict division of all propositions into synthetic and analytic; he also comes out against the reductionism of the principle of verification and the later conventionalist coherence theory of verification. In addition to these points, which most realists share with Švyrev, he accuses neopositivist methodology of investigating only ready-made knowledge instead of the 'objective' laws of the genesis of science.

One weakness of Švyrev's criticism is that he sometimes takes the statements of the positivist authors as apodictic: after the failure of the earlier empiricism, most logical empiricists rather issued careful contributions to discussions. These can be refuted only by proposing viable alternatives – which Švyrev often fails to do.

Among his own views, which appear only at the fringes of his presentation, we find that Švyrev stresses the contents of scientific theories as transcending the purely sensuous, as well as the 'intuition' of 'essence' and 'ideal contents'. On this point he is much clearer than Narskij. However, this transempirical intuition comes to be only in close unity with sensuous perception.

More interesting, though not too clearly expressed, are Švyrev's views on a *non-formal logic* of the scientific process of knowledge and on the social nature of transempirical and especially theoretical knowledge. Social psychologism and conceptualism serve Švyrev as a bridge between materialism and the recognition of a realistic, transempirical knowledge. (Materialism requires that one not abandon the psychological and ontological premisses of empiricism but the epistemological consequences of empiricism are to be avoided.) It is hard to see how the social theory of the ideal can be maintained without some sort of 'objective spirit' and without a relapse into Hegelian idealism.

In any case, it is interesting to note that a philosopher like Švyrev – who knows and defends modern formal logic and who is in this respect an 'Aristotelian' – is so strongly impelled toward Hegelianism in epistemology.

Though Švyrev's own views are not too clearly presented and the solutions seems sometimes inappropriate, it would be worth translating his book into

German and/or English because of the excellent presentation and pertinent criticism of neopositivism.

5. PAVEL VASIL'EVIČ KOPNIN

5.1. *Historical Background*

Our third author, Professor Pavel Vasil'evič Kopnin, is not a specialist on neopositivism like Narskij and Švyrev, but has written systematically on the very questions that are of interest in the discussion of neopositivism. In addition, he has taken positions in reference to logical positivism and is aware of the work of Soviet critics of neopositivism. Finally, Kopnin is one of the leading dialectical logicians and methodologists in the Soviet Union so that he can be expected to answer some of the questions more clearly than the historians, Narskij and Švyrev.

P.V. Kopnin was born in 1922[573], studied in Moscow, worked from 1947 to 1955 at the University of Tomsk, from 1955 to 1958 at the Academy of Sciences, and since 1959 he is director of the section for 'Dialectical and Historical Materialism' at the University of Kiev. He is also Director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and collaborator on many journals and other collective works including *Filosofskie nauki, Voprosy filosofii, Filosofskaja énciklopedija, Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii, Kratkij slovar' po filosofii.*

Kopnin has written a lot over the past fifteen years, expecially on 'dialectical logic' which, for him, means general epistemology and epistemology of science. Some of his main themes are: the nature of the dialectic, especially dialectical thought[574]; the forms of thought[575]; judgement[576]; syllogism[577]; the idea[578]; understanding and reason[579]; abstract and concrete[580]; methods and categories of philosophy[581], and its relationship to the sciences[582]; the logic and methodology of sciences[583], in particular the hypothesis[584] and the experiment.[585]

Kopnin has also contributed to many *sborniki*, including those edited by P.V. Tavanec[586] and D.P. Gorskij[587], who are formal logicians, and by M.M. Rozental'[588], who is a dialectical logician. Some of Kopnin's articles have appeared in *sborniki* devoted to the philosophy of science, including physics.[589] His great interest in science can be seen from his collaboration with a doctor on theory of diagnosis.[590] Kopnin has sometimes dabbled in critique of Western philosophy: his 1963 article was about method[591] and his 1966 book – co-authored with V.V. Mšvenieradze, an expert in the field – was on contemporary American philosophy.[592] Kopnin's first large

book, *The Dialectic as Logic* (1961), is one of the most interesting attempts to develop a dialectic logic.[593] He later wrote two smaller works: *Hypothesis and Knowledge of Reality*[594] and *The Idea as a Form of Thought.*[595] 1966 saw another interesting book by Kopnin, *Introduction to Marxist Epistemology*[596], which is very important for the present discussion. The same is true of his most recent *Logical Foundations of Science* (1968).[597] Both of these books deal directly with the problems which interest the critique of neopositivism. Also of interest are two collections of articles which Kopnin edited: *Problems of Thought in Contemporary Science*[598] and *Logic of Scientific Investigation.*[599]

Kopnin is a frequent participant in international conferences – which proves that he is trusted by the authorities. He has written reports about the international philosophy meetings in Venice and Mexico[600], and in Vienna he was one of the main speakers.[601] The report on the Mexico meeting is polemical and written in a popular style. It shows a bit of propagandism which has hurt Kopnin's reputation as a serious philosopher. Kopnin is also known in the West, since some of his work has been translated.[602]

There have already been studies of Kopnin's work in Western works, e.g., by Blakeley, Ballestrem and Rapp. From these we know that he is a typical representative and even 'pontif' of 'dialectical logic'.[603] On the *sovpadenie* and other questions he belongs to the majority middle group which is influenced by Hegel's dialectic but wants to avoid the extremes of Hegelianism.[604] Several years ago, Kopnin made very Hegelian contributions to the discussion about contradiction.[605] But he later joined with Narskij fighting the views of V.I. Čerkesov as too Hegelian.[606]

Rapp and Ballestrem report in their books on some of the most important ideas of Kopnin, including those belonging to metaphilosophy. He holds that the categories of philosophy have both 'formal' universality and essentiality of content.[607] However, the system of categories is not to be ontologically constructed (as, e.g., Tugarinov does) but epistemologically and methodologically elaborated on the basis of the cognitive process.[609] For, as Ballestrem points out, for Kopnin the sequence of categories – its 'logic' – reflects their historical development. (In a typical limitation of his Hegelianism, Kopnin refuses to extend the unity of the logical and the historical to an identification of the categorial series with the historical development of the objective world.[609]) Rapp notes that for Kopnin the objectivity of philosophical categories is proved by their emergence in the social-historical process of knowledge, since this is based on praxis and is itself objective.[610] Philosophy is related to science as follows: philosophy supplies an ordering

and an elaboration of the sciences by supplying a 'logical' net of categories for the results of the various sciences.[611] Therefore, philosophy is, on the one hand, itself dependent on the development of the sciences[612] – its categories and laws grow out of the process of development of (scientific) knowledge – and, on the other, it exercises a determining influence on this process since it is of heuristic and 'methodological' importance for the sciences.[613] This already shows that for Kopnin philosophy is essentially 'dialectical logic' as the study of the essence and dynamic laws of the scientific process of knowledge.[614] It is more epistemological than ontological and clearly distinct from science but closely bound up with it.

Kopnin has written more about these subjects in his two most recent books – which were not able to be included by Ballestrem and Rapp, and which are directed against logical positivism.

5.2. *Kopnin about Neopositivism*

As we said above, Kopnin does not belong among those Soviet philosophers who have specialized in critique of neopositivism. In his two most recent books, however, such critique plays a large role. He writes in the preface to his *Introduction* ... that he wanted this book to present the Marxist-Leninist conception of knowledge and to oppose it to the bourgeois conception, especially that of neopositivism.[615] A long chapter in *Logical Foundations of Science* is devoted to 'Positivism as Philosophy and Logic of Science'.[616] He presents no historical description, depending for this on Narskij, Švyrev and others. On particular points he brings in the views of 'neopositivists' like Russell, Frank, Reichenbach, Feigl, Carnap, Schlick, Popper, Wittgenstein – in the order of their importance for Kopnin.

Kopnin's critique corresponds *grosso modo* to that of Narskij. He is mainly interested in what the positivist authors have to say about the nature of *philosophy* and about its relationship to the other sciences.[617] What he has against their views is the usual: 'the elimination' of philosophy which all positivists have in common is an exaggerated reaction to the breakdown of a speculative philosophy of nature. According to Kopnin, their attempt to replace philosophy by the mere propositions of science and the formal analysis thereof is just as inadmissible from the standpoint of diamat as the speculative construction of a metaphysics and philosophy of nature, independent of the natural sciences.[618] The *logic of science* that neopositivism wants to find is a very legitimate preoccupation. But, the logical positivists have gone about the task badly by relying solely on the methods of formal logic and by excluding the really important epistemological viewpoint (dia-

lectical logic). For example, the question about the relationship between experience and theory, which is so central to science, cannot be answered in a purely formal-logical way. (For Kopnin, this is why Ernst Mach has a step on the neopositivists since in his psychologism he would allow the non-formal-logical question to occur.[619])

In his critique of the *epistemological foundations* of neopositivism Kopnin is also repeating what Narskij has said: the absolutization of sense evidence in the principle of verification leads to the exclusion of universal propositions from science[620], and the limitation of theoretical thought to formal analysis leads to denial of knowledge of essences.[621] In place of a realistic reflection theory, logical positivism keeps moving toward an ultimately conventionalistic coherence theory of truth and toward epistemological subjectivism.[622] It is, therefore, idealist and anti-science.

Kopnin discusses in a special section the *positivistic tendency within the Soviet Union.* He warns, on the one hand, against the error of Bogdanov and other Machists which tries to 'enrich' Marxism with elements of logical positivism, which penetrate the minds of scholars via their work in mathematical logic and science. (Unfortunately, Kopnin provides no examples.) On the other hand, he vigorously rejects the suggestions of some – including some Yugoslav writers – that a 'humanist' philosophy with elements of existentialism is the real Marxism and that the diamat of the Marxist-Leninist tradition is to be rejected as 'positivistic' because of its objectivism and scientific character.[623]

Kopnin rejects the same contention (about a decreasing distance between positivism and diamat) on the part of some Western authors. Even if the most recent statements of the positivists about knowledge are more and more realistic (Kopnin has in mind Feigl and Carnap), this is still quite far from the materialist answer to the basic question (Kopnin does not explain why).[624]

More important and interesting than anything he has to say about neopositivism, are Kopnin's own views on the very questions which have been occupying us in this study.

5.3. *Kopnin about Philosophy*

We pointed out above that Kopnin views philosophy in a mainly *epistemological* light. In his thorough development of this theme he provides an elaboration of Narskij's view that the 'basic question' is the formal object of philosophy. For Kopnin, the philosophy of diamat is a world-view – namely the scientific world-view. However, its object is neither 'the world as a whole',

as is often false asserted – all that can be meant by this expression is being studied by other sciences – nor an ontology, but the relationship between man and nature.[625] In philosophy this relation appears mainly as that between consciousness and the external world – which is the basic question's domain. 'Every problem of Marxist philosophy is, in one way or another, seen through *(čerez)* the basic question of philosophy'.[626] In addition to the basic question, Kopnin counts among the objects of philosophy the following: development in general, but especially that of society; the essence of man; his place in the world and his (social) ideals. All of these are said by Kopnin to depend directly on the solution of the basic question. For example, 'the dialectical conception of development is a logical extension of the materialist solution of the basic question of philosophy'.[627] (It is hard to see what this means.) This view of philosophy means that an ontology is excluded and concepts like that of matter have to be interpreted in a purely epistemological way.[628]

It is the epistemological perspective which distinguishes diamat for Kopnin from every metaphysics which views being as such. Instead of a metaphysical separation of ontology and epistemology, Marxism-Leninism holds for a 'coincidence' of the two domains.[629] According to Kopnin, they remain objects of special study – being, therefore, not identical – but are not to be taken as independent and separate from one another.[630] (Kopnin adds, as another point where diamat is distinct from speculative metaphysics, the fact that it works closely with science and in close conjunction with praxis while metaphysics proceeds in a purely speculative way.)[631] Since 'philosophy as world-view' is very close to being identical with epistemology for Kopnin, he also adds that it is method, where 'method' means 'logic'. Using a definition from Todor Pavlov, Kopnin asserts that method is the consciously employed internal laws of thought as reflection of the objective world.[632] (Most other philosophers would call this not 'method' but at most 'basis for a method'.)

This is a re-edition of the *sovpadenie* problem, about Kopnin's answer to which Ballestrem has written. Kopnin's theory of the relationship between world-view, epistemology and method, corresponds to the moderate interpretation of Lenin's thesis on the coincidence of dialectic, logic and epistemology. Important in the present context is Kopnin's extremely epistemological interpretation of philosophy. That Kopnin talks about three rather than two elements which 'coincide' seems to be a superfluous complication since all indications are that dialectical logic is by definition nothing other than epistemology. Perhaps one should say that Kopnin is using 'coincide'

ambiguously: on the one hand, (dialectical) logic and epistemology coincide in the sense that they are identical; on the other, the resultant 'logical' (not psychological) epistemology or 'dialectical' (not formal) logic is not identical with the materialistic dialectic or 'world-view'. If they 'coincide' this means – as shown above – that they must agree as to content.

In the epistemological view of philosophy the philosophical analysis of categories is also epistemological. Above all, the categories of philosophy are changeable since they are built on a progressing process of knowledge.[633] They have the same dynamic character as the latter. Since the only real knowledge is scientific knowledge, the object of philosophy is the further development of scientific knowledge.[634] This conditions in turn the close connection between philosophy and *the sciences*[635], that Kopnin never tires of stressing. Since the epistemological and 'methodological' viewpoints are typical of philosophy, philosophical method differs from that of the sciences not mainly by its universality but by the fact that 'it tries to discover the laws of *development* of human thought toward truth.'[636] The 'objective contentfulness' of the philosophical categories gives them the strength to determine the possible developments of knowledge and, at the same time, keeps philosophy from coming into conflict with the factual process of the sciences.[637]

The fact that epistemology studies the progress of science, distinguishes it from psychology. The latter has as its object the knowing, thinking, etc., of the individual human subject, while the former deals with the subject of science which is 'impersonal'.[638] We will see in 5.5 below what Kopnin means by this. In the meantime, we will examine what he has to say about logic of science, the only domain of philosophy according to neopositivism.

5.4. *Kopnin on the Logic of Science*

We have already mentioned that Kopnin holds the logic of science to be a very important field of research. He is not against it at all, but only against the way the neopositivists have developed it, namely in complete ignorance of the epistemological viewpoint and in a purely formal-logical way. We have also seen that Kopnin holds the epistemological and dialectical investigation of scientific thinking to be as central to philosophy as it is important for both philosophy and science. Kopnin has gone on to show how dialectical logic and dialectical methodology are to play their role in this important field.

According to Kopnin, the logic of science is one part (the most developed) of the larger field of the study of science. Other such parts are the sociology

of science and the psychology of science.[639] Logic of science is 'the analysis of scientific knowledge with the instruments of contemporary logic; i.e., with formal logic and the materialist dialectic'. It is what Tavanec and Švyrev call 'logic of scientific knowledge', what Sadovskij calls 'logic and methodology of science', and what Ovčinnikov calls 'theory of scientific knowledge'. What is important is that both formal-logical and dialectical viewpoints are taken into consideration. The logic of science has *one* object but it has to be elaborated with several methods.[640] Since scientific knowledge is the only true knowledge, toward which all other knowledge tends, the analysis of it is the analysis of knowledge in general; i.e., the logic of science is logic *as such*. 'There is only one logic, which is the logic of scientific knowledge.'[641] Kopnin means by this statement that there is but one logic, that the logic of science does not exist beside general logic; he does not mean that dialectical and formal logic are one. On the contrary, logic – which Kopnin defines as 'investigation of the structure, of the possibilities of proof, and of the origins and development of scientific theories'[642] – includes formal and dialectical logic as two quite different disciplines. Dialectical logic is defined as 'the science about truth, about the process of coincidence of knowledge with its object, and about the categories, on the basis of which thought coincides and agrees with reality'. Since these categories of dialectical logic are the categories of correspondence, dialectical logic is at the same time the theory of the laws of reality and epistemology.[643] While formal logic constructs an apparatus for controlling the transitions from sign to sign, dialectical logic deals with the transitions from concept to concept and this without firm apriori rules.[644] For Kopnin, the distinguishing characteristic of dialectical logic is this openness to development, where the categories are flexible – although he does not use Lenin's expression *'gibkost'* (flexibility). In any case, for him both types of logic are of great importance for the analysis of science and it is completely false to construct an opposition between them[645] or to demand a 'dialectic pure and simple'.[646]

For a better look at what Kopnin means by dialectical 'logic of science', we can examine what he himself does under this rubric. Here are some of the themes he treats: scientific investigation as a paradigm of knowledge and its social nature[647]; the essence of knowledge in relation to praxis, in its 'appropriation of the objects' as objective reflection for subjective goals, and in its linguistic objectification[648]; the forms of thought (e.g., understanding and reasoning)[649]; creativity[650]; speculative thought.[651] Further themes are: changeability and changes in sciences; the specific traits of contemporary science in comparison with earlier science[652]; changes in the content of

scientific concepts, like 'cause'[653] or 'material development'[654]; the progression of research from recognition of the problem to final theoretical system[655]; the coming-to-be and development of theories – especially the nature of hypotheses and criteria for accepting them.[656] Analysis of the structure of science is also an important object of this 'logic': Kopnin here distinguishes five elements: external and internal bases; laws; basic concepts; the theory; and the idea.[657] Finally, a central concern of logic of science is the grounding of the objective validity of science. This 'logical-epistemological' problem is very acute in today's abstract and mathematised science, and its solution is a very important matter for world-view.[658] It is a matter of protecting science from idealism and metaphysics.[659] In fact, this is the most important task of the dialectical logic of science in general.

In sum, we can describe Kopnin's 'logic of science' as a sort of *phenomenological description* of science.[660] While Western logicians of science work with formal logic to find out if and why science is successful, Kopnin presupposes that it is and describes and distinguishes its stages and methods in order to show *how* it works. This description is to be as *'concrete'* as possible, meaning that, instead of an analytic isolation of details, one looks at the connection of the various aspects within the object and at its relations with other phenomena outside of it. Forms of this concrete description are the genetic, psychological, practical and social methods of logic of science. This makes of logic of science and of methodology something that is far different from what is usually meant by these terms in the West. Classical Western methodology deals with the logical validity of scientific theories while 'dialectical methodology' looks for a description and an understanding of the process of scientific knowledge. To the extent that these processes have a regular character and do not fall into the domain of the accidental and irrational, the names 'logic' and 'methodology' are unusual but not unjustifiable. In fact, it is interesting to note that Kopnin's concerns are in line with the newest preoccupations of some leading English-speaking logicians of science who want to overcome positivist limitations to a purely formal-logical analysis of science.[661] Since Kopnin does not reject formal-logical methodology but just objects to an absolutization of it, there is room for collaboration on this point.

5.5. *Kopnin's Epistemology*

Since the positivist theses about philosophy and about logic of science which Kopnin criticizes are mainly based on a certain empiricist theory of knowledge, Kopnin's own epistemological basis for his opinions has to be exam-

ined. We can ask him the following questions: is there knowledge which transcends the immediately given contents of sense experience? How can this knowledge be described? What are the criteria of its truth? Here are some elements of answers, taken from his works.

Kopnin says relatively little about the problem of empiricism and what he says is vague and inconsistent. On the one hand, one reads that sense perception is only the 'foundation' of knowledge, that 'thinking' can understand in things something which is not reflected in our sense impressions.[662] Among these cognitive contents which 'transcend the limits of the given of sense' he lists 'the inner essence of the phenomena', 'the developmental laws of the finest processes', geometric forms, etc.[663] Kopnin also admits the existence of an 'intuition'[664], an intuitive 'understanding' which stands over against discursive 'reason'.[665] His whole conception of philosophy and of logic of science described above presupposes some sort of intellectual insight.

On the other hand, there are several elements in Kopnin's account, which exclude presupposing such knowledge. In dealing with rationalism, for example, he says that its 'direct' intellectual insight into the essence of things has torn knowledge loose from the sensuous which is the mediation between thought and reality.[666] It does not seem possible, however, that there is in thought an objective content (e.g., the essence) which transcends the limits of the sensuous if all contents of knowledge are mediated by sensuousness. In fact, Kopnin never speaks of intuition, of the 'leaps of thought' and of reason without each time stressing their connection with praxis.[667] Even the above sentence on the understanding of contents which are not reflected by sense impressions is also specified by 'based on praxis'.[668] Like Narskij however, Kopnin does not simply identify praxis and sense knowledge. Praxis is no knowledge: 'its reduction to knowledge is thoroughly false.'[669] (Kopnin also explicitly criticizes the 'third-level' theory of praxis.)[670] But, even though praxis is not sense perception, Kopnin sees its role as criterion of knowledge conditioned by the fact that it is closely bound up with knowledge and specifically with sense knowledge. Praxis has its ability to be criterion precisely because of its 'sensuous-material character'.[671] Thus, even though knowledge goes 'over the limits of the sensuous', it remains dependent on sense knowledge precisely because of its dependence on praxis. This empiricist stand is most clearly stated with respect to the objectivity of knowledge and its proof. The criterion of knowledge is praxis, meaning that the agreement of knowledge's contents with reality is proved in praxis. Kopnin's explication of this thesis of Marxism-Leninism contains clearly

empiricist elements: the certitude that knowledge is objectively true comes from sense evidence. 'Sense impressions connect men directly with the phenomena and processes which occur in the external world. This is why the sense impressions are as dependable as objective reality itself.'[672] In answer to Wetter's criticism of the theory of praxis as criterion of truth, Kopnin clearly admits that the truth of sense knowledge has to be assumed as indubitable and that it is the foundation of the materialist theory.[673] This seems to commit Kopnin to a limitation of knowledge to contents given by the senses because how could the objective truth of knowledge, the content of which transcends the content of sense impressions, be established if the only 'connection' to objective reality is (sensuous!) praxis?

There is a partial solution to this contradiction in Kopnin's epistemology, if one remembers that the notion of knowledge – and all that goes with it – includes two completely different phenomena. First there is the knowledge of the individual human subject, which Kopnin interprets in a completely empiricist way. It is based on the results of sense impressions; transcends these in speculation, intuition, etc., leads away from objective reality and finds in praxis a sense verification and thereby a connection with objective reality. If this process were the only one which was called 'knowledge' by Kopnin, he would be an ordinary empiricist and he would be unable to ground an objectively true knowledge of essences, laws, ideas, etc. There is, however, more: knowledge and science are social; their real subject is society. He says this quite clearly; '... essentially, man as real subject is not the single individual but society.'[674] 'In itself, consciousness is independent of the doings of individual people'[675] and 'man – that is, human society'.[676] This collectivist conception of knowledge goes so far that the problem of robot knowledge is simple for Kopnin: if the robots work in human society, it is and remains 'man' which 'knows' in them. Kopnin once calls the two forms of knowledge 'purely natural' and 'social-historical'.[677] He says: 'Knowledge as a social-historical process moves under the influence of social factors and the sense organs with their impressions represents only a certain necessary minimum which guarantees the access of human knowledge to the object.'[678]

Parallel to 'knowledge', 'praxis' is also ambiguous. Once, it is sensuous-material, like the single experiment. At other times, for example, as the criterion of the truth of scientific theories which in their universality cannot be verified by single experiments, it is a collective, concrete universal: 'the whole, variegated, developing human praxis'.[679] Praxis thus supplies a direct access to reality because it is material-sensuous and it permits the knowing of

universal connections (which transcend the sensuous) because it is universal.

Thus we find in Kopnin explicit expression of what was only hinted at in Narskij and Švyrev: many materialistically understood individual men with only sensuous contact with the environment combine to form as the human totality, the social subject of history and knowledge, with spiritual powers – above all that of recognizing ideal contents and of pursuing and realizing them. This ambiguity of 'knowledge' and 'praxis' is in no way an error of Kopnin. Rather it is a necessary part of his theory, one form of the so-called 'dialectic of singualr and universal'[680] – here between man and mankind as well as between knowledge and praxis, writ large and small. The whole theory can be put simply as follows: knowledge occurs on two levels; one is psychic, empirical, contingent and individual; the other is spiritual, ideal, necessary and social. The two are a concrete unity of opposites and their connection is praxis, where mankind acts through individual men. There is no need to stress how much this speculation has been influenced by Hegelianism and how radically opposed it is to positivist empiricism.

5.6. *Critical Summary*

It is as a systematic philosopher rather than as a historian of neopositivism that P.V. Kopnin finds a place in this study. In developing his moderate neo-Hegelian dialectical logic (i.e., epistemology, especially of science), he deals with the most important problems which arise in a conflict with neopositivism and he does so more thoroughly than the historians like Narskij and Švyrev. Kopnin sees his own work on theory of scientific knowledge explicitly as an answer to neopositivist errors, especially those committed in the Soviet Union.

His assertions can be classed under three headings:

(1) He is firm and clear in asserting that *knowledge is the specific object of philosophy.* This is not really a new thesis, but as compared with the official doctrine of diamat and also with Narskij, Kopnin carries it through to the conclusion that all other essential characteristics of philosophy – for instance, its concentration on essences, its universality, its attention to man – are secondary to and dependent on the epistemological basic question. With the thesis on the coincidence *(sovpadenie)* of ontology and epistemology, Kopnin wants to avoid a confrontation between them. He says, for example, that the (ontological) handling of development in the dialectic is dependent on the materialist solution of the basic question. He gives, however, no further explanation and one would seem necessary.

(2) Since, according to Kopnin, true knowledge is that of science, philo-

sophical epistemology *mainly investigates scientific knowledge.* As distinct from the formal-logical methodology – which has been illicitly absolutized by the neopositivists – it investigates the *objective laws of development* of the process of scientific knowledge. An effort at a complete description of the process of scientific knowledge and of the 'dynamic' laws that rule it can only be of great interest and use. It joins with similar efforts going on in the West to study, in addition to formal methodology, also the questions of genesis. But, even if one has in mind like Kopnin the genetic laws of a *social* phenomenon called science and if one calls this social cognitive process 'objective', the problems of psychologism are still here. For, it is not clear how one arrives from the 'objective' laws of the process, even if it be social or even 'historical', to an objective (i.e., transcending the process of knowledge) validity of propositions, like that being sought, e.g., by formal-logical methodology.

(3) Kopnin expresses more clearly than other Soviet philosophers the view that *knowledge reaches out over sense perceptions* to a grasping of essences, laws, etc. But, in direct contrast, he also asserts that knowledge is connected with reality only through the senses and that 'praxis' is basis and criterion of truth only because of its sensuous-material character. This inconsistency is due to a systematic ambiguity in Kopnin's notion of knowledge, which includes the empiricistically understood knowledge of the individual subject and, at the same time, an intuition by the social-historical subject of science into ideal contents. The *collective subject* of science appears much more clearly in Kopnin's works than it does in those of Narskij and Švyrev. The dialectical unity of singular and universal is used to explain the unity of collective and individual subjects as well as that of individual and social processes and contents. Unfortunately, this theory is also questionable. In the first place, it is not clear how the dialectical unity between single men and 'universal' social 'men' – however one understands it – might serve to ground the universality of universal propositions. It seems that Kopnin is confusing social and logical universality. In the second place, the social subject and the social process of scientific knowledge are problematic in the context of materialism. Even a social 'objective spirit' is a spiritualist concept: it is very hard to see how it can be based on single subjects and processes which are understood in a purely materialist and empiricist way.

We can note in conclusion that Kopnin develops a bit further the same problems that neopositivism worries about and which are dealt with by Soviet specialists in neopositivism. However, he has not solved – perhaps because of too great a distance from neopositivist problems – *the* main

problem, namely, in reference to the empirical meaning, grounding and provability of propositions that supposedly transcend the content of sense perceptions, it is of no help at all to shift to a social level. A description of the genetic regularities of their formation explains nothing about the objective validity of scientific theories. Kopnin has elaborated the answers that diamat gives to the questions which bother neopositivism but they thereby have lost the ability to be answers to the real questions.

6. VARIOUS OTHER SOVIET AUTHORS

Having looked at the three main Soviets who involve themselves with a critique of neopositivism, we can now glance at some others who deal with the same themes. We can be brief because the fundamentals are the same.

6.1. *Mšvenieradze*

The leading member of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Vladimir Vlasovič Mšvenieradze (b.1926)[681] is a specialist in the critique of 'bourgeois' philosophy and sociology – especially of neopositivism and semantics – as well as of anti-Communism. He is said to have been a student of the famous Soviet logician, S.A. Janovskaja[682] but his technical skill is often not up to par. For example, he was the first Soviet to write about Tarski's semantic definition of truth; but, the militant tone could not hide his lack of understanding.[683]

In an article of 1957[684] and a pamphlet of 1964[685], Mšvenieradze contributed serious historical information about neopositivism (even though he describes Wittgenstein as an 'Austrian prince').[686] He is more complete than Narskij in investigating the philosophical theories of semantics, as developed mainly in Anglo-Saxon areas, after the dissolution of the original Viennese positivism. Thus, he reports on Tarski and Carnap but also on Bridgeman's operationalism, Korzybski's 'general semantics' and the theses about meaning of meaning of Ogden and Richards. He criticizes these works (somewhat successfully) by proving that they are built on the epistemological presuppositions of neopositivism. His arguments are basically the same as those of Narskij but less systematic in elaboration and grounding.

6.2. *Begiašvili*

A.F. Begiašvili is a Georgian who works in Tiflis. His dissertation (1951) was published in Moscow and dealt with the unity of the historical and the logical in the first volume of Marx' *Capital*.[687] Since then he has written several articles and pamphlets about problems of language (protocoll sentences) in logical positivism[688] as well as about semantic[689] and analytic[690]

philosophy. Like Mšvenieradze, he is also interested in linguistic problems.

Already in 1959 there is a factual, careful and correct article by Begiasvili on the principle of verification.[691] However, he does not succeed well in showing the internal inconsistency of this principle. His small book of 1960[692] is detailed, historically accurate, and objective about 'Analysis and Atomism' (Russell), 'Analysis and Mysticism' (Wittgenstein), 'Analysis and Empirical Proof' (logical positivism) and 'Analysis in its pure Form' (the English analytic school). It is worth the effort to follow Begiašvili's account of the route from positivism to analytic philosophy. However, there is hardly anything in his critique which has not already been mentioned in our account of Narskij, Švyrev and Kopnin. Blakeley sees in this book on analysis a paradigm of the inability of diamat to cope with methodological thought. Worth mentioning is an article by Begiašvili in the big *sbornik* on neopositivism (1963), where he criticizes various authors (Richards, Ogden, Walpole, Morris) who try to deal with philosophical problems as purely linguistic problems.[693] In a discussion format, he reports on several theses of semantic nominalism and criticizes them from a conceptualist viewpoint. It is worth noting that Begiašvili, like Kopnin, clearly reduces the universality of concepts to the collective character of thought, i.e., logical universality to social universality.[694] However, this social conceptualism is not carried any further.

6.3. *Tavanec*

Petr Vasil'evič Tavanec is one of the best experts on and defenders of formal logic in the Soviet Union. He directs the section for logic at the Academy of Sciences and, therefore, has great influence without having written much and without being professor. He served as editor of three of the most important Soviet books on critique of neopositivism: Narskij's main work; Švyrev's book; and a *sbornik* on philosophical problems of formal logic.[695] He himself contributed to the last.

Tavanec is always objective, clear and authoritative in presenting the theses of Western authors. He is the first Soviet to have succeeded in correctly presenting to a Soviet readership Tarski's semantic definition of truth.[696] He carefully distinguishes between formal-logical theories (e.g., semantics) and the related philosophical questions. This distinction is parallel to that between formal and dialectical logic.[697] The latter handles, according to Tavanec, the philosophical, i.e., epistemological, grounding. This is the field of his critique of neopositivism. He demanded already in 1957 that one criticize not only the consequences (idealism) but above all the presuppositions of it.[699]

He is thus opposed to the assertion that the propositions of formal logic are tautological, without content and that they do not reflect any reality.[700] These theses mean, according to Tavanec, that only a conventionalist answer can be given to the question about the truth of such propositions. The efficacy of a formal system ('it works') cannot take the place of its truth since it can only be a consequence of this truth.[701] As a matter of fact, logical truth and empirical truth are not that different one from the other; both are reflections of reality and both have praxis as their criterion. The senses alone cannot provide a criterion for logic for it cannot be sensed, and inference presupposes it.[702] According to Tavanec, the laws and forms of formal logic have a 'formal content' (sic!) which is 'a reflection of universal properties of objective reality'.[703] Unfortunately, he does not carry this thought any further. Above all, he does not say how praxis, as a process which is distinct from sense preception and inference, leads to the establishment of logical truth. Thus, he goes no further than Lenin with his inductivist theory about the 'billion-time repetition' in praxis[704], which he quotes.[705] Tavanec criticizes Carnap's nominalistic denial of the ideal content of concepts and judgements[706], and distinguishes these contents very well from psychic processes.[707] However, since in another place he distinguishes dialectical logic from psychology in that the latter deals with individual developmental processes of knowledge and the former with the collective, 'historical' ones[708], one can conclude that he also understands the ideal in a psychologistic or social-psychologistic way – even when he joins Kopnin in calling it 'objective'. Such a philosophical grounding of logic agrees with the more or less implicit views of Narskij, Švyrev, Kopnin and Begiašvili about the universal, and about knowledge and verification thereof. It would be interesting to see Tavanec carry out his views to their logical conclusions.

6.4. *Aseev, Mixalenko and Žuravlev on the Connection Between Neopositivism and Religion*

We have already made short mention of the fact that Narskij sees an intimate connection between the rejection of a scientific treatment of ideologically relevant philosophical problems and the acceptance of irrational and religious pseudosolutions. Ju.A. Aseev, Ju.P. Mixalenko and L.A. Žuravlev have devoted special works to this connection.[709]

The arguments of these three can be summed up as follows:

(1) To the extent that neopositivism condemns the propositions of theology as 'senseless', the same could be said of their negations and of all of the propositions of atheism which would then be just as unscientific as theology.[710]

(2) If one limits oneself to sense perception and logic, then no atheism is possible, since God and soul are, without being sense-perceptible, 'logically possible'.[711]

(3) The thesis of 'alternative languages', the selection of which depends on the selection of the goal in question, makes religious language as acceptable as any other.[712]

(4) The denial of any logical relation between religious and scientific propositions excludes any scientific argument against religion.

(5) If one follows phenomenalism in making the decisive case of knowledge be the subjective experience of the senses, instead of objective reality, then any other type of experience, e.g., mystical experience, has to be admitted.[714]

(6) If world-view questions cannot be answered in any other way, then the religious answer is the good one.[715] 'The silence of reason opens the way to faith.'[716]

These arguments are supported by historical citations of a connection between irrationalism and positivism. Aseev shows that Dilthey had a certain sympathy for the positivism of Mill[717] and that Jaspers saw in positivist thoughts a preparation for existentialism.[718] On the other hand, they frequently refer to Wittgenstein's words in the *Tractatus* about the mystical[719] and to the openness of the contemporary English linguistic analysts to the language of religion.[720] (It should be noted that neither Wittgenstein nor the others can sensefully be called positivists.)

The supposed connection between neopositivism and irrationalism and religion is stressed by the Soviet critics as it accords with their ideas about the partisan unity of bourgeois philosophy.[721] It is above all a matter – totally in the spirit of *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* – of the 'ideological role' of positivism which is said to consist in irrationalist and anti-scientific opposition to the scientific world-view of Marxism-Leninism and in particular to its application to society in historical materialism.[422] Positivist sociology is seen as a special weapon in the ideological class war against histomat.

6.5. *Andreeva, Aseev and Kon about the Relationship between Neopositivism and Sociology*

Of the many Soviet writings about neopositivism in sociology, we can select three: G.M. Andreeva writes about the influence of neopositivsm over the whole range of empirical sociology[723]; I.S. Kon deals with a particular group of positivist sociologists in the U.S.[724]; and Ju.A. Aseev wants to detect positivist traits in the sociological thought of Marxist 'revisionists'.[725]

In criticizing the basic attitudes of empiricist sociology, *G.M. Andreeva* takes her examples from the publications of the world congresses of sociology in 1956 and 1959.[726] She notes a 'general methodology' (better, 'method') which consists in generalizing as little as possible and as narrowly as possible, which leads to psychologism and to individualism instead of an investigation of the essential historical developments.[727] It may be correct that sometimes empirical sociology empiristically absolutizes its methodological limitations, but it is hard to see how the empirical techniques of sociology – which Andreeva recognizes as valuable – could lead to the synthetic propositions of the Marxist view of history.

I.S. Kon's presentation of the positivist traits of empirical sociology is similar to that of Andreeva.[728] He finds their cause in the epistemological critique of the social sciences by Neurath and Popper, the elaboration of the methodology of the social sciences by Popper, Hempel and Kaufmann, and the work of a 'neopositivist' group of influential sociologists in the U.S.[729] These sociologists – Kon names Lundberg, Dodd, Lazarsfeld and Rashevski – try to carry on sociology as a strict science and thereby, according to Kon, fall into positivist errors. They proceed naturalistically, behaviouristically, operationalistically, purely quantitatively and objectivistically, denying the qualitative specificity of the social, the values, ideologies, class interests, and the global structures and developments of society.[730] Kon's critique is weak because it is done only from the viewpoint of philosophical histomat, rather than from that of sociology. The criticism is justified but incomplete.

Ju.A. Aseev comes out against the attempt of some 'revisionists' to combine bourgeois sociology and historical materialism. He has in mind in particular A. Malewski[731], as well as Kołakowski and the economists Drewnowski and Sadowski. These Polish thinkers all wanted to show that the opposition between Marxism and bourgeois sociology could be overcome. Sociology can recognize the rational core of Marxism – as Neurath and Popper have already done[732], and Marxism can be completed by use of the methods of bourgeois sociology.[733] Aseev sees in this effort a typical situation, where revisionism is infiltrated by positivist notions, gives up *partijnost'* and thereby falsifies Marxism.

The reaction of Marxism-Leninism to empirical and empiricist Western sociology is of great historical importance for the critique of neopositivism. Social theory is of greater direct ideological importance than the abstruse statements of epistemology. Only the discussions of social theory create the interest in epistemology. However, epistemology is still of primary importance: the important differences of opinion occur not so much within the

social sciences as in reference to the question of foundations – where the Soviet critique is based on methodological and epistemological presuppositions. The decisive discussion, therefore, is epistemological rather than sociological.

6.6. *Švarcman and Drobnickij about Neopositivist Ethics*

As in the case of sociology, in ethics the discussion gets very quickly back to the foundational problems. In a very informative article, Švarcman presents the meta-ethical views of Schlick, Reichenbach, Ayer and Stevenson, as well as those of the Oxford School (Novell-Smith, Hare and Tulmin).[734] In a sort of discussion, he critically responds to many quotations, and he says that the reduction of ethical propositions to expressions of feeling, without cognitive meaning and scientific basis, leads to the negation of objective ethical values and norms, to relativism and denial of social responsibility, and to cynicism and insecurity.

Drobnickij has similar but less carefully argued objections against some of the same authors. He thinks that the relativism of a positivist-type ethics leads to 'implicit encouraging of amoralism'.[739] (Narskij used against Ayer a similarly unfriendly argument which came out as a personal attack.)[737]

There are criticisms to be made of positivist ethics, but Švarcman and Drobnickij have missed the really interesting problems: the ontological question about the existential modes of values; the epistemological question about the criterion of values being known correctly; the psychological question about faculties to deal with them; and the logical problem of the nature of ought-propositions and their relationship to is-propositions. The critical objection that ethical values are objective and the object of rational knowledge, remains ungrounded.[738] No meta-ethical problems are solved by references to the social and historical nature of values and to their connection with social progress.[739]

6.7. *Kuznecov, Kedrov, Janovskaja and Zvegincev on Various Themes*

Most of the items in our bibliography which have not yet been mentioned are repetitions, propaganda or were not able to be found. There are, however, a few that are worth mentioning in closing.

Both *I.V. Kuznecov* (philosopher, theoretical physicist and historian of science) and *B.M. Kedrov* (philosopher, chemist and historian of science) wrote rather lengthy articles on 'Philosophy as Science' for *Voprosy filosofii*[740] as answer to Ayer's article which had been published earlier in the same journal (before Ayer's visit to the Soviet Union). In answer to Ayer's

contention that philosophy is not a science, both Soviet writers respond that philosophy meets all the requirements for being a science: it is the knowing of objective laws, which make both explanations and predictions possible and which are verifiable. It is worth noting that the examples of these authors are all taken from historical predictions (e.g., of revolution) or from latter-day theories of other sciences (e.g., atomic theory). Evidently, they did not think of any examples of scientific predictions for events (rather than theories) outside of the field of history. Both authors hold the standard views on the difference between philosophy and the other sciences, on the universality and verifiability of philosophy, and on its epistemological character.

S.A. Janovskaja – one of the pioneers in the fight for mathematical logic in the Soviet Union – has contributed to the fight against neopositivism in the field of *foundations of mathematics.* She criticizes A. Wittenberg's *Vom Denken in Begriffen*[742] which uses the foundational problem to show that final grounding of knowledge is not possible and that 'trust' and other irrational acts are needed. Ms. Janovskaja takes this occasion to show the connection between neopositivism and irrationalism and even religion. In contrast, one has to note that although Wittenberg's views can be called 'positivist', they are not shared by most of the representatives of classical logical positivism and logical empiricism. In any case, Janovskaja's views come back to the same epistemological foundations we examined above.

The linguist, *V.A. Zvegincev,* has written several works, critical of the influence of neopositivism on linguistics.[743] He deals at length with the Sapir-Whorf view that intellectual activity is determined by language rather than the converse. This radicalized version of an old Humboldtian idea strikes Zvegincev as the consequence of the extreme attention to language by Wittgenstein and the logical positivists. Zvegincev admits the influence of language – he sees it as 'feedback' of a derivative phenomenon – but he rejects any absolutization and criticizes the neopositivist confusion of the logical-linguistic with the ontological.

We have already looked at the Soviet critique of the neopositivist and analytic versions of language and particularly at the critique of nominalism. In addition to Narskij, Tavanec, Mšvenieradze and Begiašvili, such critiques are to be found in the works of L.O. Reznikov (Leningrad) and G.A. Zaičenko (Dnepropetrovsk).[744] Zvegincev's works are carefully done, objective and competent (he quotes extensively and has also done translations of neopositivists[745]) and are of historiographic importance. Philosophically, however, they do not open up new territory.

7. OUTCOME

We are now in a position to take an overview of the contemporary Soviet critique of neopositivism.

7.1. *General Nature of the Confrontation*

The extensive Soviet literature about 'neopositivism', i.e., about logical positivism and its heirs, shows the following peculiarities:

It is above all a case of *biting criticism*. Khrushchev's demand at the XXth Party Congress that peaceful coexistence not extend to the ideological realm has been the background for Soviet philosophy's serious attacks on all Western philosophy and for its special attention to the campaign against 'neopositivism'. This is understandable also in view of the 'anti-Machism' and 'anti-mechanism' of the Leninist tradition, causing violent reactions to any threatened limitation on philosophy by Soviet scientists or foreign revisionists.

Soviet writings about neopositivism give evidence of a certain *progress*. After an initial period of purely polemical and dogmatic condemnations, there developed – as of 1957 – a more careful and informed historiographical approach to the confrontation. Since 1964, the Soviets have been more or less content to rest on their laurels, synthesizing the results of the intervening efforts and going into more detailed questions. Of the three presented in detail here, Narskij is the *initiator maximus* and the leading representative of Soviet critics of neopositivism, although with relatively little development of his own views (until 1969). Švyrev achieved significant progress in the specialized domain of theory of science and Kopnin concentrated on development of the substantive issues.

The Soviet confrontation with positivism has been almost completely *epistemological*. The discussion about social theory has been limited in scope and based mainly on the epistemological aspects. This is surprising because the positivist negation of a special method for the study of society and history (distinct from the methods of natural science) offends Marxist-Leninists and is one of the main reasons for the confrontation.

The critics are *generally agreed* not only in their categorical rejection of the philosophic content of positivism but also on most of the particular issues of a historical or substantive character. There do not seem to be different schools of critique, although there are varying degrees of emphasis and of explication of various themes.

7.2. *The Historiographical Presentations*

Soviet critics cannot do without a presentation of what they are criticizing.

The presentations have the following traits:

Under the leadership of Narskij a lot of *informative material* has been presented. Some of the most important works have been translated into Russian. The Soviet authors more and more acquired a rather complete knowledge of the neopositivist writings. They extensively quoted and summarized the thought of the authors criticized. There has been a very encouraging progress in this historiographical domain.

Although there is some presentation of the history of earlier positivism, *main attention* is paid *to neopositivism.* The Soviets distinguish a first positivism (Comte, Mill, etc.), a second positivism (Mach and Avenarius) and a third period (neopositivism). They pay quite a bit of attention to the second period because of Lenin's involvement with it. However, detailed presentations and analyses are provided only of the most recent forms.

A serious and characteristic weakness of the presentations is the *lack of a clear delimitation of the object.* Even by the otherwise careful Narskij the term 'neopositivism' is used in a confusing way for the most varied doctrines of the most varied authors without even trying a delimitation, either historical or substantive.

There is also *no detailed and sophisticated presentation of the historical developments* in 'neopositivism'. The material is usually divided for convenience of critique and – with the exception of Švyrev's work – the chronological aspect is not taken into consideration.

The lack of a genuine historical perspective makes the whole enterprise rather unacceptable. This lack is due to the Leninist approach to critique, for which the descriptions are supplied.

7.3. *The Critique*

The express intent of the Soviet writers is the condemnation of positivism. In the pursuit of their goal they use both dogmatic methods and substantive arguments. Most of the time, the condemnation is limited to the philosophical content of the writings criticized.

Various *'technical'* works are carefully distinguished from positivist philosophy (epistemology) in the strict sense, and are *exempted from the critique.* The most important example is formal logic, including methodology and semantics. Among others, Narskij, Svyrev and Kopnin put great value on the accomplishments of the positivists in these fields and insist on separating them from the condemned theses of positivist philosophy of logic. The formal techniques are supposed to be compatible with dialectical logic while the epistemological and metalogical theses of the positivists are said to con-

tradict the dialectic and have to be condemned. Similarly, in the case of positivist sociology and linguistics, the Soviet critics distinguish valuable technical methods and results from the false philosophy.

A large part of the critique is *immanent* and points to difficulties which exist inside the theories under consideration. For example, Narskij and Švyrev show that the basic programmatic points of logical positivism – like elimination of philosophy; the principle of verification; the division into empirical and formal propositions; the reduction of substantive knowledge to atomic notation of facts; and the purely formal grounding of logic – are unworkable and in many cases cannot even be formulated satisfactorily. They further argue that the positivist theses lead to difficulties with the basic concepts of science, like causality and law, as well as with the rational content of the philosophy of history, ethics and esthetics. The Soviet authors can further show that conventionalism and subjectivism are at least implicit in the positivist assumptions. Though this critique is convincing, it is not original: the same problems had been evoked by the logical positivists and by their friends, leading to the dissolution of positivism.

An important part is also played by the use of one aspect of *transcendent critique.* It is above all Narskij, Aseev and Žuravlev who point out that the positivist rejection of philosophy causes and promotes its replacement by *irrational and religious answers to the important questions of life.* This assertion that positivism is tied up with irrationalism sounds completely devious at first; for what could be more rational than the logically strict, technically complex scientific methods of many positivists?! But the assertion has an important and quite correct nugget of truth: to the extent that positivism denies the possibility of a rational and scientific treatment of the most important problems of man, it plays into the hands of irrational pseudo-answers even if its representatives (contrary to Soviet assertions) do not at all have this in mind. If the epistemology of the positivists is correct, this is no valid objection against them; but if they are wrong, this is a legitimate element in a transcendent critique.

Alongside factual and serious objections, the Soviets continue to use the completely inappropriate *'Leninist method'* of critique. This includes seeing philosophic arguments as a *battle,* where the real views and motivations of the opposing philosophers are to be *exposed,* since many of their statements only serve as camouflage. Then, many different views are *combined* so as to be *identified* with previously condemned theses and attributed to the authors' *class viewpoint.* These procedures clutter access to the real problems, hinder the necessary distinctions and make the critique less valuable.

It is not true, for example, that the positivists set up their theses in order to use conventionalist conclusions to further idealism and to destroy science. On the contrary: as soon as they saw these possible consequences, they were discomfited and tried to deny or avoid them. Idealist and anti-scientific consequences were not what bound positivists together, but what caused them to separate and to revise their positions. But such facts do not fit the Leninist idea of *partijnost'* in philosophy.

Another part of the critique is made up of objections *from the viewpoint of specific philosophic positions of diamat.* For example, Švyrev and Kopnin feel authorized to fault positivist epistemology for ignoring the dialectic, i.e., the totalising and processual nature of knowledge, which is precisely the subject-matter of philosophy, in particular of the 'substantive' logic of science. They also fault the positivists for not recognizing praxis as criterion of truth and for rejecting as unverifiable all knowledge which transcends purely sensuous contents – including above all philosophy. This critique becomes clear only in the light of their own views.

7.4. *The Substantive Views of the Critics*

In their confrontation with positivism, the Soviet philosophers develop their own dialectical-materialist presuppositions, sometimes improving on the official version.

The philosophers in question use an *epistemological definition of philosophy.* It is Kopnin who best develops Narskij's view, that the 'basic question' is the formal object of philosophy, to its logical conclusion. He comes to an anti-ontological view on the 'coincidence' of dialectic and epistemology, which comes to mean complete identity of content. Philosophy has, thereby, no sections which are independent of epistemology. Like the positivists themselves, the Soviet critics see the *logic of science* as a central domain of philosophy: but it is to be carried out *dialectically* rather than purely formally. This means, for Švyrev and Kopnin, that the laws of the development of the content of science have to be investigated and this investigation is not understood as psychological.

In opposition to the positivist thesis on the non-verifiability of philosophy, some authors develop an explicit notion of *verification through praxis.* In Narskij this appears as an anthropological and ontological description of the dynamic unity of man and world, which makes knowledge possible. Its alleged function as criterion is not plausible. The examples of Kedrov and Kuznecov are unsatisfactory, too. Kopnin goes much farther in the elaboration of epistemology but he strays so far from the positivist problem that he

no longer deals with the real issue of verifiability.

There are some very interesting *anti-empiricist positions.* What remains unclear in most Soviet texts is clearly stated in those of Švyrev and Kopnin; especially in that the sciences (as 'intuition') transcend the contents of pure sense experience, e.g., to reach the 'essence' of things. The acceptance of an intellectual intuition does not agree with other statements of the same authors which sound quite empiricist.

The inconsistencies and confusions in their philosophic notions can best be resolved by the final and most interesting thesis of these authors; namely the *social nature of knowledge and science.* While the real world is given to individual subjects directly only in an empirical way, socially scientific knowledge has (ideal) contents which transcend this. This is why study of the developmental laws of science is no 'psychology' (i.e., of the individual): praxis is the criterion of truth because it is there that social and logical 'universality' converge with individual human reality: the ambiguity of the term 'universal' (social and logical) and of 'knowledge' and 'praxis' (social and individual) is part of the system, bound up with the theses on the unity of the logical and the historical and on the concrete universal.

These theses on epistemology and theory of science constitute *no genuine alternative* to the empiricist and positivist efforts at solution which are being criticized. Narskij asserts that diamat has an answer to these questions and one has the impression that he has understood them. But he does not develop the answers (e.g., with the help of 'praxis') far enough so that one can really understand them. Kopnin, who develops the Marxist-Leninist theses farther, has apparently not fully understood the problems; so that his quite interesting contributions do not constitute a real alternative to the positivist effort. The radically critical posing of the problem is lost. The issues – knowability, verifiability, intersubjective meaning – are always presupposed rather than being what they really are, namely, issues.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The questions we asked at the beginning can now be answered as follows:

In the first place, the Soviet critics of neopositivism use methods which are objective, based on fact, and differentiated as well as methods which are dogmatic and inappropriate. They follow in the wake of Lenin. The objective and informed methods seem to be gaining ground. The critique is sometimes convincing, even if not too original.

Secondly, in the confrontation with the theses of positivism, some philosophical theses of Marxism-Leninism have undergone some development. The scientific validity of philosophy as a special branch of knowledge is affirmed with energy and supported by a coherent epistemological definition of philosophy. Against empiricism, the Soviets more clearly invoke an intellectual intuition which is already implicit in Lenin. This intuition is generally attributed, like science in general, to a social subject of knowledge. Lenin's theory about praxis as criterion of truth is further developed and opposed to the positivist principle of verification. These and similar developments are in the direction of the well-known and questionable synthesis in diamat of Hegelian metaphysics of knowledge with realistic-materialistic theses.

Thirdly, the Soviet views we have examined do not solve the problems brought up by the positivists. If their supposed solutions are developed to any degree at all it becomes apparent that they assume what was to be proved: namely, the possibility of knowledge and of its communication, which the positivists challenge. The radical question of the positivists about the criterion of truth (or meaning) is simply not answered.

In retrospect, we see that, in the place of Marx' praxeological *Aufhebung* of philosophy and Engels' positivist dissolution thereof, Lenin undertook an energetic rehabilitation of philosophy. After the earlier Stalinist effort to eliminate philosophy's independence and to subject it totally to politics, there set in – as of 1947 – a liberation so that philosophy by its own definition was no longer threatened with *Aufhebung* or dissolution or politicization. It now sees itself as an independent, epistemologically grounded and very important domain of knowledge.

That the Soviet philosophers – despite their special idea of philosophy

and their streneous efforts – have not been able to find a satisfactory response to positivism is somewhat astounding. *Wissenssoziologie* is the only help in trying to find an explanation. Soviet philosophers live all their lives with people who share the same basic views. Consensus (grounded in ideology) characterizes their whole philosophical formation and milieu. This 'social intersubjectivity' is certainly not conducive to the perception of critical problems – which are precisely the ones at issue here. Psychologically, this consensus replaces the semantic intersubjectivity, so ardently desired by the positivists. Such an explanation is in line with two peculiarities we pointed out above: namely, the confusion of social and logical universality, and the supposed verification through social praxis. Nevertheless, this is a merely psychological explanation for the disappointing failure of Soviet work in this domain.

REFERENCES

Recent soviet works on neopositivism are cited by the number they have in our Bibliography. Bibliographical data for other works occur in the appropriate reference. Abbreviations and transcription are those of *Sovieta* and *Studies in Soviet Thought.*

1 We will see later that the expression 'positivism' is used very imprecisely, e.g., by Soviet authors.

2 The most important general reference works used are: W. Windelband: *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie,* mit einem Schlusskapitel 'Die Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert' und einer Übersicht über den Stand der philosophiegeschichtlichen Forschung hrsg. v. H. Heimsoeth, 15. Aufl., Tübingen 1957. *Friedrich Überwegs Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie,* 5. Teil, Die Philosophie des Auslandes vom Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts bis auf die Gegenwart, 12. Aufl., Berlin 1928. *Enciclopedia Filosofica,* Centro di Studi Filosofici di Gallarate, Istituto per la Collaborazione Culturale, Venezia-Roma 1957, Bd. III; including: C. Carbonara: 'Positivismo', pp. 1525-1543 and F. Barone: 'Neopositivismo', pp. 857-873. I.M. Bocheński: *Europäische Philosophie der Gegenwart,* 2. Aufl., Bern-München 1951, W. Stegmüller: Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie, Eine Kritische Einführung, 2. Aufl., Stuttgart 1960. J. Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy,* 2nd ed., London 1962. For the older positivism, it is usually enough to read works like Windelband's. Others will be mentioned below.

3 For the most important works used on logical positivism, cf. note 35, below.

4 E.g., H. Feigl: 'Logical Empiricism' in D.D. Runes (ed.); *Living Schools of Philosophy* (Twentieth Century Philosophy), Paterson, N.J., 1962, pp. 325-367, with 8 pages of bibliography (also in: D.D. Runes: *Twentieth Century Philosophy,* 1943 and in H. Feigl and W. Sellars: *Readings in Philosophical Analysis,* N.A., 1949) pp. 325: 'Probably the most decisive division among philosophical attitudes is the one between the wordly and the other-wordly types of thought. Profound differences in personality and temperament ... an irreconcilable divergence ... deeper than disagreement in doctrine ... difference in basic aim and interest.' – James' division of philosophers into 'tough-minded' and 'tender-minded' (quoted by Feigl, *loc. cit.*) also belongs here.

5 G.A. Wetter: *Der dialektische Materialismus, Seine Geschichte und sein System in der Sowjetunion,* 5. Aufl., Wien 1960, S. 17. (English: Routledge, 1958). Professor Wetter speaks of "latent positivist elements", "even in Hegel".

6 This conclusion about Mill is made, e.g., by Carbonara, *op. cit.,* p. 1536.

7 Engels is precisely such a case. Cf. p. 27.

8 E.g., A. Lalande: *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la Philosophie.* 9e ed. Paris – 1962. 'Rationalisme', pp. 889-890. Meaning D.

9 "mitigated scepticism", e.g., D. Hume: *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, in *Enquiries* Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals by David Hume, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge, 2. ed., Oxford 1902 (reprinted 1963), p. 162.

10 See, e.g., W. Windelband, *loc. cit.,* Ss. 407 f. and N.K. Smith: *The Philosophy of David Hume,* A Critical Study of its Origins and Central Doctrines, London 1964, pp. 446 ff.

11 D. Hume: *A Treatise of Human Nature,* ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford 1888 (reprinted 1965), I, IV, 1 und 2, pp. 180 ff., especially pp. 186 f.

12 D. Hume, *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding,* p. 12: "We must submit to this fatigue, in order to live at ease ever after: And must cultivate *true metaphysics* with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate" (my italics).

13 See, e.g., D. Hume: *A Treatise of Human Nature,* p. XIX: "The sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas."

14 On mathematics and logic, see: F. Zabeeh: *Hume, Precursor of Modern Empiricism,* An analysis of his opinions on Meaning, Metaphysics, Logic and Mathematics, The Hague 1960, especially Ch. Five: 'The Domain of Deductive Reason', pp. 113ff.

15 "All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, *Relations of Ideas,* and *Matters of Fact.*" D. Hume: *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,* p. 25. (his italics)

In a famous passage at the end of the *Enquiry,* Hume distinguishes "abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number" and "experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence". Whatever does not belong to either of these classes can only be "sophistry and illusion". (*ibid.* p. 165).

The affinity between logical positivism and Hume is stressed by Weinberg: "Many, if not all, of the principal doctrines of contemporary positivism derive from Hume." (J.R. Weinberg: *An Examination of Logical Positivism,* London 1950, p. 3); similarly, A.J. Ayer (ed.): *Logical Positivism,* Glencoe, Illinois 1959: 'Editor's Introduction', pp. 4 und 10. Zabeeh seems to exaggerate this similarity when he interprets Hume as an empiricist linguistic analyst. (*ibid.* pp. 32ff.)

16 Hume calls this "belief" a "feeling" or "sentiment". (D. Hume: *A Treatise of Human Nature,* p. 624. "Belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cognitive part of our nature." (*ibid.* p. 183)

17 Cf. A. Lalande: *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la Philosophie.* 9. ed., Paris 1962, 'Positivisme', pp. 292-294, Meaning A.

18 "Positive" was first used in the technical sense by C.H. de Saint-Simon in *Catéchisme des industriels,* ed. A. Comte, 1822 (and 1824 with the title *Système de politique positive*). In *Doctrine de Saint-Simon,* Bougle and Halevy show that "tout le positivisme ... en germe" is to be found in Saint-Simon before 1814. See, e.g., M. Daillie 'Notice' in A. Comte, *Cours de philosophie positive* (1re et 2eme leçons), Classiques Larousse, Paris 1936, pp. 5-13; here p. 7. Cf. C. Carbonara, *loc. cit.* p. 1525. Comte's own description – e.g., when he says that he "discovered" the law of the three stages (1re leçon, II (2), p. 20 – can only be considered as false.

19 *ibid.,* 1re leçon, VI(5), pp. 51 ff.

20 Cf. C. Carbonara, *idem.*

21 A. Comte, *op. cit.,* 1re leçon, II(5), pp. 21 f.

22 Cf. C. Carbonara, *op. cit.,* pp. 1526 f.

23 A. Comte, *op. cit.,* 1re leçon, V(3), p. 34.

24 *ibid.,* 1re leçon, II(2), p. 20. Cf. 18 above.

25 Comte wants to investigate the "logical laws" of human spirit 1) through psychology (and anatomy) and 2) through the study of the history of science (*ibid.* 1re leçon, VI(1), pp. 41 f.). The "logical art" is a doctrine on method. It is interesting to note that Comte says: "La méthode n'est pas susceptible d'être étudiée séparément des recherches où elles est employée." (*ibid.* 1re leçon VI(2), p. 45). He, therefore, rejects formal abstraction as the foundation of logic.

26 *ibid.,* 2e leçon, VI(1), p. 92.

27 Cf. J.St. Mill: *Comte and Positivism,* London 1865. T. Whittaker: *Comte and Mill,* 1908, J. Passmore, *loc. cit.,* pp. 14ff.

28 "Mill knew practically nothing of Hume" (*ibid.* p. 11) can refer only to direct but not indirect acquaintanceship.
29 Mill preferred to call himself an "experimentalist" (rather than an "empiricist"); cf. *ibid.* p. 23.
30 *ibid.* p. 30. Passmore quotes Mill's article, 'Berkeley's Life and Writings' (1871): "If, therefore, we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past or future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind or Ego is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which *ex hypothesi* is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself." Passmore adds: "In this statement of the case, some of Mill's successors thought they could see the breakdown of this phenomenalism; to others it was a challenge to restate the phenomenalism in a more satisfactory way." Cf., also, Überweg, *op. cit.*, p. 98.
31 E.g., C. Carbonara (*op. cit.* p. 1536) defines 'positivism' in such a way that Mill *cannot* be called a 'positivist'. "L'esigenza realistica del positivismo resta delusa e prevale l'istanza fenomenalistica propria del empirismo". Mill's doctrine is termed 'positivism' by Windelband (*op. cit.* p. 548), by Überweg (*op. cit.* p. x) and by most historians who use 'positivism' in a general and imprecise sense.
32 Cf., above, pp. 4ff.
33 Überweg (*op. cit.*, p. 383) reports that F. Jodl speaks of the three positivists of the developed countries: Feuerbach, Comte and Mill. Wetter (p. 18) says that Feuerbach may "in general be called one of the major representatives of German positivism".
34 The designation "logical positivism" is meaningful as long as it is used to describe real positivists and not just any members of the analytic school or just modern logicians. For example, it is hard to see why Ayer (*op. cit.* pp. 381 ff.) includes purely logical works which neither contain nor consider positivist ideas – like J.M. Bocheński's *Précis de logique mathematique* – in his 'Bibliography of Logical Positivism'. On the other hand, there is no good reason to (*op. cit.* p. xlvl) stop using the term "positivism" as W. Stegmüller suggests: even if there are no longer any logical *positivists* in the strict sense, there once *were* some.
35 The most important reference works we have used for what follows are: I.M. Bocheński: *Europäische Philosophie der Gegenwart, op. cit.* W. Stegmüller, *op. cit.* F. Barone, *op. cit.* J. Passmore, *op. cit.* V. Kraft: *Der Wiener Kreis,* Der Ursprung des Neopositivismus, Ein Kapitel der jungsten Philosophiegeschichte, Wien 1950. R. von Mises: *Kleines Lehrbuch des Positivismus,* Den Haag 1939. A. Pap: *Elements of Analytic Philosophy,* New York 1949. A. Petzall: 'Logischer Positivismus, Versuch einer Darstellung und Würdigung der philosophischen Grundanschauungen des sogenannten Wiener Kreides der Wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung' in *Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift,* XXXVII, 1931, 3, Göteborg 1931. G.J. Warnock: *English Philosophy since 1900,* London 1958; J.O. Urmson: *Philosophical Analysis,* Its Development between the two World Wars, Oxford 1956. F. Waismann: *The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy* (R. Harré, ed.), London 1965. In addition to the lengthy 'Editor's Introduction' and other works to be mentioned below, there is a 66-page bibliography in A.J. Ayer (ed.) *op. cit.* A selective and descriptive bibliography of "original classical neopositivism" is to be found in K. Dürr, *Der logische Positivismus,* Bibliographische Einfuhrungen in das Studium der Philosophie, 11, hrsg. v. I.M. Bocheński, Bern, 1948. (Our thanks to D.D. Comey for his bibliographical help).
36 H. Hahn said in 1929: "We declare ourselves as successors of the empiricist trend in philosophy". (H. Hahn, 'Die Bedeutung der Wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, insbesondere für Mathematik und Physik', *Erkenntnis,* Leipzig 1930, 1, 96). Mach's importance is already clear from the name of the *Verein Ernst Mach* in Vienna, to which the 'Vienna Circle' was closely related. Cf. F. Zabeeh, *op. cit.* and Ayer, *op. cit.* p. 4.

[37] B. Russell and A.N. Whitehead: *Principia Mathematica,* Cambridge 1910 (vol. I), 1912 (vol. II), 1913 (vol. III): 2. ed. 1925-27.

[38] L. Wittgenstein: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (German and English), London 1922; first in German as 'Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung' in *Annalen der Naturphilosophie* 1921, 185-262.

[39] According to V. Kraft (*op. cit.* p. 1), M. Schlick's *Raum und Zeit in der gegenwärtigen Physik* (Berlin 1917) was the first attempt at a philosophical evaluation of the theory of relativity.

[40] This expression was made popular by M. Schlick's 'Die Wende der Philosophie' (first in *Erkenntnis* 1, 1930; then in *Gesammelte Aufsätze 1926-36,* hrsg. v. F. Waismann, Wien 1938).

[41] E.g., A. Petzall, *loc. cit.,* S. 5: "methodische *Grundeinstellung*", – G.J. Warnock, *op. cit.,* p. 44: 'respect for science .. distate for metaphysics", While I.M. Bocheński (*op. cit.* SS. 66ff.) lists gemeinsame *Grundanschauungen* (my italics in all cases).

[42] Cf. W. Stegmüller *op. cit.* pp. 368 ff., 411 ff., 429 ff. and 441. Special bibliographies of works by and about Carnap are to be found in F. Barone, 'Rudolf Carnap' in *Filosofia* 4, 1953, 353 ff.; M. Del Pra (ed.) in *Rivista Critica della Storia di Filosofia* **10,** 1955, Fasc. V-VI (Double issue on Carnap).

[43] On the distinction between positivism and mathematical logic, see Bocheński, *op. cit.* p. 256. Stegmüller (*op. cit.* p. 422) explicitly distinguishes between "the positive work ... on logical and scientific questions" and "the polemic attitude ... toward traditional metaphysics" (cf. also p. 348 ff.). But he promptly (p. 350) drops this distinction when he characterizes the departure from positivism as technical progress in the old direction instead of as a victory over philosophic views which have proved to be false.

[44] M. Schlick, 'Die Wende der Philosophie' in *Gesammelte Aufsätze 1926-36,* S. 35 and 'Positivismus und Realismus', *ibid.,* S. 83-115 (first in *Erkenntnis* 3, Leipzig 1932), here S. 89 ff.

[45] *isdem,* 'Form and Content, an Introduction to Philosophical Thinking', three lectures at the University of London in November 1932; *ibid.* pp. 151ff.

[46] R. Carnap: *Der logische Aufbau der Welt,* Berlin 1928, unveränderter Wiederabdruck 1961 (together with *Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie*) Hamburg 1961.

[47] A.J. Ayer: 'Verification and Experience', (first in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* vol. 37 (1936-37)) here p. 228 ff.; and *Language Truth and Logic,* London 1936.

[48] O. Neurath: 'Radikaler Physikalismus und "Wirkliche Welt" ', in *Erkenntnis,* 1934.

[49] R. Carnap: *Logische Syntax der Sprache,* Wien 1934 (Engl.: *Logical Syntax of Language,* London-New York 1937.).

[50] *isdem,* 'Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft', in *Erkenntnis* 2, Leipzig 1931-32, (Engl.: *The Unity of Science,* London 1934) 'Uber Protokollsätze', in *Erkenntnis* 3, Leipzig 1932-33, here pp. 216, 223 f.

Carnap regards this theory as the "expulsion of the last remains of 'absolutism' from philosophy" (*ibid.* p. 228). He is in part following the line of argument of K. Popper who later called the Basissätze 'Festsetzungen' (*Logic der Forschung,* Wien 1935, S. 62). The history of this can be found in Ayer's 'Verification and Experience', *op. cit.* and J.O. Urmson *op. cit.,* pp. 121 ff. In the 'Editor's Introduction' to his *Logical Positivism,* Ayer says that the principle of verification was "in fact" accepted by the Vienna Circle as a convention (p. 15).

[51] Carnap wrote a whole series of semantic works in the 1940's. One of the most important is his *Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic* (Chicago 1947).

[52] Schlick developed his theory of "Konstatierungen" further in opposition to Carnap and Neurath. Cf. M. Schlick, 'Ueber das Fundament der Erkenntnis' (*Erkennt-*

nis 4, 1934; also *Ges. Aufsätze* ... pp. 289ff.; here p. 308f.). Ayer says in 1936 that the validity of the *Basissätze* rests not on convention but on direct sense-perception ('Verification and Experience', in *op. cit.* pp. 240 ff.). In his 'Editor's Introduction' he admits that this involves "considerable difficulties" (p. 21) but leaves it at that.

53 E.g. F. Waismann, *op. cit.*, p. 63: "we ourselves by the rule 'Red and green are mutually exclusive' have decided that red and green shall be incompatible, therefore different from each other."

54 H. Reichenbach: *Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre.* Eine Untersuchung über die logischen und mathematischen Grundlagen der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung, Leiden 1935.

55 *isdem, Experience and prediction,* An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge, Chicago 1938.

56 Cf. note 50 above.

57 R. Carnap: 'Testability and Meaning, I-IV', in *Philosophy of Science* 3, 1936, 419-471; 4, 1937, 1-40. Cf. W. Stegmüller, *op. cit.*, S. 407.

58 *isdem,* Cf., also, Stegmüller, *op. cit.* p. 456. For later positions on the principle of verification, see C.G. Hempel's 'Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning', in *Revue internationale de philosophie,* (in *op. cit.* pp. 108-129) and 'The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration', in *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* vol. 80 (1951), 1, pp. 61-77.

59 See Hempel's article above.

60 A. Pap: *Analytische Erkenntnistheorie.* Kritische Übersicht über die neueste Entwicklung in U.S.A. und England, Wien 1955, above all: 'Das empiristische Sinnkriterium'. pp. 1-26.

61 Quine, W.V.: 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' in *Philosophical Review,* 1951, Reprinted in *From a Logical Point of View.* Cambridge, Mass., 1953.

62 A.J. Ayer: 'Editor's Introduction', *op. cit.*, pp. 15 und 21.

63 A. Pap: *Elements of Analytic Philosophy,* New York 1949. p. 321.

64 J. Wisdom: 'Philosophical Perplextity', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* 1936-37; and 'Metaphsyics and Verification', in *Mind* 1938; both in *Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis,* Oxford 1953.

65 On the decline of logical positivism in England, see Urmson *(op. cit.)* and Warnock *(op. cit.).*

66 I.M. Bocheński, A. Church, N. Goodman: *The Problem of Universals,* A Symposium, Notre Dame 1956.

67 H. Feigl: 'The "Mental" and the "Physical" ', in H. Feigl, M. Scriven and G. Maxwell: *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science,* vol. II, Minnesota 1958.

68 C.L. Stevenson: *Ethics and Language*, Yale 1945 (Ed. 5, Yale 1950). R.M. Hare: *The Language of Morals,* Oxford 1952.

69 Cf. R. Carnap: 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology' in *Revue internationale de philosophie,* vol. 4, 1950, pp. 20-40.

70 There are several aphoristic definitions along these lines, e.g., Wittgenstein: " Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" (*Philosophical Investigations,* Oxford-New York 1953, Fragment 109); "What is your aim in philosophy? To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.' *(ibid.,* Fragment 309); H. Feigl: "..we may define philosophy as the disease of which it should be the cure." ('Logical Empiricism', *op. cit.*, p. 329.)

71 On this division, see A. Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy,* pp. ix f.

72 On Marx' notion of philosophy, see: J.-Y. Calvez: *La pensée de Karl Marx,* 6e édition revue et corrigée, Paris 1956 (especially pp. 13-40) and 'Critique de la religion et de la philosophie', pp. 41-157; I. Fetscher: 'Von der Philosophie des Proletariats zur proletarischen Weltanschauung', in *Marxismus-Studien,* 2. Folge, hrsg. I. Fetscher, Tübingen 1957, SS. 26-60, especially, 'Die Überwindung des Gegensatzes von Materia-

lismus und Idealismus in der selbstbewussten Aktion des Proletariates', SS. 33-40; S. Landshut, 'Einleitung', in K. Marx: *Die Frühschriften,* hrsg. S. Landshut, Stuttgart 1953, SS. IX-LX; K. Ballestrem: *Die Sowjetische Erkenntnismetaphysik und ihr Verhältnis zu Hegel* Dordrecht, 1968, especially 'Marx', SS. 52-65. These works, which discuss in detail the questions only touched upon in what follows, are responsible for the essential outlines of what we have to say. A more detailed discussion would require these and many more sources.

73 On this point, see in particular the last chapter (VIII) of G.W.F. Hegel: *Phänemenologie des Geistes,* 'Das absolute Wissen.' (Ausg. Lasson-Hoffmeister, 6. Aufl., 1952, SS. 549-564) and the last paragraphs (572-577) of *Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundriss* (Ausg. Lasson-Hoffmeister, Leipzig 1949, SS. 476ff.

74 K. Marx: 'Vorarbeiten zur Dissertation' in K. Marx: *Frühe Schriften,* 1. Bd., hrsg. H.J.Lieber u. P.Furth, Darmstadt 1962 (henceforward, 'Lieber'), here p. 103.

75 *isdem,* note (2) to the missing Chapter IV of the first part of his dissertation (cf. Lieber p. 71).

76 The preface to the dissertation (1840) contains statements of an antireligious philosophy (cf. Lieber pp. 21 f.). Later (1843/44) Marx regarded the critique of religion ("the presupposition of all critique") as "essentially ended" ('Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung', first sentence; Lieber,p. 488). Marx considered Feuerbach to be the originator of the "theoretical revolution" of Humanist and naturalist critique (cf. Lieber p. 508).

77 E.g.,'Vorarbeiten zur Dissertation', Lieber, SS. 102f..; 'Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte', Lieber SS. 642 ff.; *Die deutsche Ideologie, MEW,* Bd. 3, S. 39; K. Marx: *Das Kapital,* 'Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage' des 1. Bds., *MEW,* Bd. 23, SS. 27f.

78 See K. Marx, F. Engels: *Die Heilige Familie,* oder Kritik der kritischen Kritik. Gegen Bruno Bauer & Consorten, Lieber, SS. 667-925, *passim; Die Deutsche Ideologie,* Kritik der neuesten deutschen Philosophie in ihren Reprasentanten Feuerbach, B. Bauer und Stirner, und des deutschen Sozialismus in seinen verschiedenen Propheten, 'Vorrede', *MEW,* Bd. 3, S. 13, and *passim.*

79 In 'Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung' (Lieber pp. 488-505), Marx criticizes Hegel, saying that philosophy as a 'copy' of reality instead of reality itself has to be criticized because it is "the only *German history* that is *al pari* with *official* presence" (Marx' own italics, Lieber, p. 495). Philosophy not in particular but in general is condemned. In the *Manuscripts* (Lieber p. 639) Marx describes Feuerbach as the "true victor over the old philosophy" (meaning the philosophy of Hegel) and goes on to assert that philosophy "is to be condemned" as the "existential form of the alienation of human essence". The identification of Hegel's philosophy with philosophy in general is explicit in the *Holy Family* (Lieber p. 838). Similar loci are to be found in the 'Theses on Feuerbach' and the *German Ideology* (MEW Bd. 3, SS. 5, 13, 20, 26f.).

80 K. Marx: 'Anmerkungen zur Dissertation', Lieber, S. 71; 'Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, Einleitung', Lieber, S. 495; 'Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte', Lieber, S. 639; K. Marx, F. Engels: *Die Deutsche Ideologie, MEW,* Bd. 3, S. 27.

81 "The result is that the becoming-philosophical of the world is a secularisation of philosophy, i.e., its actualization is its loss". (Lieber, p. 71).

82 *"You cannot eliminate (aufheben) philosophy without actualizing it.* The same injustice but with *reversed* factors, was committed by the *theoretical* political party originating from philosophy. ... *They thought it possible to actualize philosophy without eliminating it."* (Lieber p. 495f.) "It is not enough that thought forges toward actualization; reality itself must forge toward thought." (pp. 498 f.) – and this is already in the context of revolution! "Just as philosophy finds in the proletariat its *material* arms, so the proletariat finds in philosophy its *spiritual* weapons and as soon as the spark of

thought has struck deeply the naive earth, the *Germans* will be emancipated as *men*". (Lieber, p. 504). "Philosophy cannot actualize itself without the elimination of the proletariat; the proletariat cannot eliminate itself without the actualization of philosophy". (Lieber p. 505). (Marx' italics)

83 "Philosophers have only variously *interpreted* the world; the point is to *change* it" (*MEW*, Bd. 3, p. 7. Marx' italics) is the sentence on Marx' gravestone in London.

84 Th.G. Masaryk, *Die philosophischen und sociologischen Grundlagen des Marxismus*, Studien zur Socialen Frage, Wien, 1899, pp. 52-89 *et passim*. Tomas G. Masaryk is the founder and first president of the Czechoslovak Republic.

After this study was written, Z.A. Jordan published *The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism* (N.Y. 1967), which contains a lot of interesting information on the relationship between Marxism and positivism. The differences between his version and ours are not due to his use of other material but rather to differences on some basic concepts and issues. It would take us too far afield to go into them here.

85 G.A. Wetter: *Der dialektische Materialismus*. Seine Geschichte und sein System in der Sowjetunion. 5. Auflage, Wien, 1960, SS. 17 ff.

86 K. Marx, F. Engels: *Die deutsche Ideologie, MEW*, Bd. 3, S. 27.

87 The six volumes were published between 1830 and 1842. Cf. A. Comte, *Cours de philosophie positive* (1re et 2eme leçons), Paris 1936, p. 4: 'Resumé chronologique de la vie d'Auguste Comte'.

88 *loc. cit.*

89 *op. cit.* pp. 11 ff.

90 Cf. the very interesting article, 'Is the Soviet Notion of Practice Marxian?' by N. Lobkowicz in *Studies in Soviet Thought* VI (1966) 25-36, especially pp. 30f. It is as anachronistic and false to turn Marx into a phenomenalist as to use a critically interpreted 'praxis' to protect him from this accusation.

91 Cf. note 93 below.

92 K. Marx, F. Engels: *Die Deutsche Ideologie, loc. cit.*

93 Masaryk *op. cit.* On this point Masaryk's whole presentation is unsatisfactory. Statements of Engels (even from after Marx' death!) are brought in support of the assertion that Marx was a positivist (pp. 63f. and 72). What is more, the use of 'positivist terminology' (like 'law' and 'study of the facts') purported to be an indication of positivism, etc.

94 Wetter *op. cit.*, p. 17: It "was especially French positivism that, according to Masaryk, influenced Marx because of his contact with it during his stay in France in 1943". In regard to the "dose of positivism, in Marxism" Professor Wetter points out that Engels stands close to positivism but also that Marxism joins positivism in "rejecting fixed 'metaphysical' entities and in limiting themselves to facts or phenomena in their constant change" (p. 19). Such a similarity is present but the rejection of metaphysics means something quite different in the two cases. Any 'positivism' that is so widely defined as to include the dialectical ontology of Marxism-Leninism is historiographically useless.

95 *MEW*, Bd. 27.

96 K. Marx, 'Entwürfe zum Burgerkrieg in Frankreich' (1871) (*MEW*, Bd. 17, S. 555) contains a half-page, entitled: 'Die Arbeiter und Comte', where we read: "Comte is known to the workers of Paris as the prophet of Caesarism (personal *dictatorship*) in politics, capitalist domination in political economy and hierarchy in all spheres of human action, including even that of science; and as the author of a new catechism with a new Pope and new saints in place of the old ones". There is, here, no question of Comte's positivism. A few pages later, we find 'Comte's Views', i.e., on property (pp. 562f). In a footnote in *Capital* (vol. 1, Book I, 4, Section 11, Footnote 22a) there is negative reference to Comte's idea on the necessity of capitalists. Finally, in a letter to

Engels from London on July 7, 1866: "I am now reading Comte on the side, because the French and English are making so much noise about this fellow. What is fascinating them is the encyclopedic nature of this work – *la synthèse.* But, it is pitiful beside that of Hegel (although as a professional mathematician and phycisist Comte is superior to Hegel on details. For the overview Hegel is far superior to Comte). Otherwise, there are only infrequent references in the letters of 1869 and 1870 to the so-called Comtists among the English workers (*MEW* Bd. 31, p. 302, 463; Bd. 33, p. 162, 228).

97 It is a distortion of history to claim that Marx "drank of Comtean positivism", from Saint-Simon (Masaryk *op. cit.*, p. 36).

98 Cf. p. 12, above.

99 K. Marx: 'Thesen über Feuerbach', 1. These, *MEW*, Bd. 3, S. 5 (Marx' italics). See also theses 2 and 5 (*ibid.*, S. 5 f.).

100 On the differences between Marx and Engels on philosophy, see Fetscher's section on 'The Development of Dialectical Materialism by Engels' (*op.cit.*, pp. 41ff and pp. 27ff) and Wetter's section 'Friedrich Engels' (*op. cit.*, pp. 49ff.).

101 F. Engels: *Dialektik der Natur* (Entwürfe und Fragmente aus den Jahren 1873-1883 mit Ergänzungen von 1885/86, zum erstenmal veröffentlicht Moskau-Leningrad, 1925); here taken from *MEW*, Bd. 20, Berlin 1962.

102 F. Engels: *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft,* called *'Anti-Dühring'*, (1876-1878); taken from *MEW*, Bd. 20, Berlin, 1962. *The Development of Socialism from Utopia to Science* (first in French, 1880; German 1882) is a revision of three chapters from *Anti-Dühring.*

103 F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie* (1886). We have used *MEW* Bd. 21, 1962, quoted as *Feuerbach.*

104 Engels, *Anti-Dühring:* "As soon as each individual science is required to make clear its position in the totality of things and of knowledge, a special science dealing with the totality is superfluous. What still independently remains of all earlier philosophy is the study of thought and its laws – formal logic and dialectics. Everything else is absorbed in the positive science of nature and history." (p. 24). *idem, Feuerbach*: "The view also puts an end to philosophy of history just as the dialectical view of nature makes all philosophy of nature unnecessary as well as impossible. There is no longer any question of thinking out connections in the head but of finding them in the facts. Excluded from nature and history, philosophy has only pure thought and its laws – logic and dialectic – as its field." (p. 306) See also *Anti-Dühring* pp. 34 and 129, and *Feuerbach* 270ff and 291.

105 In *Dialectic of Nature* (p. 472) Engels calls philosophy the "pride of Germany" and says that scientists "can do what they like, but will be ruled by philosophy" (p. 480). In *Anti-Dühring* (p. 11) he says that Hegel "in many respects is superior to his empiricist contemporaries" and on p. 19 he talks about the contributions of recent German philosophy.

106 See *Dialectic of Nature* (p. 330) on the necessity of "theoretical thought" for natural science and about the spiritist consequences of a rejection of theory. Theory is here called "what has hitherto counted as philosophy" (p. 345 ff. see also *Anti-Dühring* pp. 14 and 19. K.G. Ballestrem ('Engels', in *Sowjetsystem und demokratische Gesellschaft,* Bd. II, Freiburg, 1968) says that Engels does not have in mind a "positivistic methodology of science". But, what Ballestrem does attribute to Engels – that philosophy be the generalisation and systematization of the results of science as well as reflection on its methods – is precisely the positivist notion of the task of philosophy (p. 135).

107 *ibid.* "The dialectic is nothing more than the science of the universal laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought". (p. 131)

108 Cf. note 104 above.

109 Cf. F. Engels, *Dialektik der Natur* pp. 330 ff.; *Anti-Dühring* p. 14; *Feuerbach* pp. 294-296.
110 On the historical and philosophic development from the young Marx to the old Engels, see Fetscher *op. cit.* and F. Neubauer, *Das Verhältnis von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels dargestellt an der Bestimmung der menschlichen Freiheit* (dissertation at Mainz) Meisenheim/Glan 1960, where the pretended 'unity and solidarity' of Marx (young and old) and Engels (young and old) is not proved.
111 E.g., Engels, *Anti-Dühring:* "There is no longer any philosophy at all but only a simple world-view which does not constitute a separate science but which proves itself out and is active in the real sciences. Philosophy is, therefore, *aufgehoben* which means both 'eliminated and preserved'; eliminated in form, but preserved in its actual content" (p. 129). Cf. also *Feuerbach* p. 273.
112 E.g., *ibid.* p. 306.
113 *Ibid.*, p. 291. In a letter (October 27, 1890) to Conrad Schmidt Engels calls religion and philosophy "ideological domains which float still higher in the air" and which contain "what today we would call nonsense". *MEW* Bd. 37, p. 492.
114 Engels, *Anti-Dühring* p. 24; *Feuerbach* pp. 267 ff.
115 Engels tries to solve the problems of induction, causality and the thing-in-itself by having man "test them" in praxis (*ibid.* p. 276; and *Dialektik der Natur* pp. 497f). Engels misses the Kantian and empiricist points. The knowing subject meets his own activity and everything else as a particular phenomenon. Engels can be understood here only as giving a purely psychological description, preliminary to posing the critical question (although he states that he wants to refute Hume and Kant!). See Lobkowicz *op. cit.* (Note 90) above).
116 F. Engels: *Anti-Dühring,* S. 295.
117 F. Engels: *Feuerbach,* SS. 289 f.
118 See p. 6, above.
119 The objects of mathematics are described as "stereotypes of reality" (*Dialektik der Natur* p. 484).
120 *ibid.* p. 506: "There is, in addition to vision, not only the other senses but also our cognitive activity."
121 *Feuerbach* p. 306: "It is a matter ... of discovering connections ... in the facts."
122 E.g., *Dialektik der Natur* p. 507.
123 Cf. note 115 above.
124 E.g., F. Engels: *Feuerbach,* p. 276 and *Dialektik der Natur,* pp. 337 ff.
125 Engels' letter of January 21, 1895 to F. Tönnies, *MEW* Bd. 39, quoted in G. Mayer, *Friedrich Engels,* Eine Biographie, Den Haag, 1934, p. 552. Engels here criticizes Comte for (1) "insufficient development", (2) "limited and narrow-minded points of view", (3) the later religious views of Comte as well as the plagiarism of Saint-Simon. Cf. also *Dialektik der Natur* p. 515.
126 That Lenin closely identified the doctrine of Marx and Engels is clear from the fact that in his article about Marx he again and again quotes Engels. He even uses a quotation of Engels, to give "Marx' definition of dialectic". Cf. Lenin, *Soč.* vol. 26, p. 54. (*"Soč."* = fifth Russian edition of Lenin. The fourth edition will be quoted as *"Soč. IV".*)
127 Cf. p. 6, above.
128 Cf. I.M. Bocheński: *Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus (Diamat),* 2. Aufl., Bern 1956, S. 33 (English: Dordrecht, 1963).
129 In 1899 Lenin wrote to his friend, Potresov, that he was aware of his lack of philosophic formation and wanted to learn more in order to be able to write about philosophy. (*Soč. IV,* 34, str. 20).
130 Among the Russian Marxists, including Lenin, Plekhanov's philosophic authority was very great. It would be interesting to see to what extent Marxism-Leninism is more

his work than that of Lenin.

131 V.I. Lenin, *Materializm i émpiriokiritcizm* (Materialism and Empirio-Criticism) Moskva 1909. (Hereafter: M&E, referring to *Soč.* 18, 1961).

132 The "Machists" were Russian Communists who wanted to combine the economic and political views of Marxism with the empirio-criticist views on knowledge of E. Mach and R. Avenarius. Cf. p. 12 above.

133 Lenin's main argument against the uniting of Marxism and empirio-criticism is that the latter is identical with epistemological idealism (Berkely), agnosticism (Hume, Kant) and, above all, with theism ("fideism"), all of which contradict the views of Marx and Engels.

134 First published in *Leninskij sbornik* T. IX, 1929; constitutes volume 39 in Lenin's *Collected Works* in English (*Tetradi* in what follows).

135 A series of such works is named in what follows.

136 Marx and Engels "put science in the place of dreaming" (Lenin, 'Fridrich Engels', 1895, *Soč.* 2, str. 6.) "Marx' doctrine is almighty because it is true." "... materialism is the only consequent philosophy which remains true to all science and which is the enemy of superstition and pietosity, etc." (Lenin, *Soč.* 23, str. 43). The main themes of M&E are the objectivity of truth, the knowability of the world, agreement with science, and rejection of the irrational. In the *Notebooks* Lenin speaks of the "dialectical path of the knowledge of truth, of the knowledge of objective reality" and then says that "materialism increases knowledge" (over against faith). (*Tetradi* str. 153).

137 "There can be no firm socialist party if there is no revolutionary theory which unites all socialists, whence they all gain their convictions, which they can use in their battle-methods and in their work-style." (Lenin, *Soč.* 4, str. 183). Cf. *Soč.* 6, str. 24-25.

138 *Ibid.* str. 30-31.

139 "The irresistible force of attraction of this theory for socialists of all countries consists precisely in the fact that (as the last word in the social sciences) it unites strict and lofty science with revolutionary spirit and not accidentally ... but in an intrinsic and inextricable way. In fact, the task of theory, the task of science, becomes here the direct support ... of the oppressed class." (Lenin, *Soč.* 5, str. 341).

140 Cf. *op. cit.* str. 308 and 84 ff.

141 "For Hegel *Handeln,* praxis, is a *logical 'inference'.* And this is the case: naturally, not in the sense that the logical figure has its otherness in human praxis (= absolute idealism) but, vice versa, that human praxis, through billion-fold repetition, imprints itself in human consciousness as logical figures." (Lenin *Tetradi* str. 198, his italics).

142 M&E deals exclusively with epistemological (rather than metaphysical) praxis; this is true also for the universal cry of unity of theory and praxis (M&E str. 199).

143 See pp. 35ff, below.

144 M&E str. 356-367. Professor Bocheński analyses Soviet *partijnost'* in *Studies in Soviet Thought* V (1965), 1-11.

145 M&E *loc. cit.* Lenin always comes back to this "either-or" and to the impossibility of a "middle", and wants to prove that the idea occurs in Marx and Engels.

146 M&E str. 321.

147 M&E str. 364.

148 "The relationship to religion and to science shows well how the bourgeois reactionaries use empirio-criticism *factually* for class interests." (Lenin, M&E *loc. cit.*, his italics).

149 "In a wage-slave society it is just as naive to look for a non-partisan science as it is to look for non-partisanship of producers about the question whether to raise wages by accepting lower profits." (*Soč.* 23, str. 40). "In the philosophic domain revisionism sails the water of bourgeois professorial science." (*Soč.* 17, str. 19). Lenin talks about the "connection between the class interests and the class situation of the bourgeoisie,

about the support that they afford every form of religion and stylish philosophies.." (*Soč.* (IV!) 33, 202-203). M&E pays less attention to the subjective *partijnost'* of those in error because Lenin's scientific opponents are precisely his political allies. This is why he works so hard at distinguishing Lunačarskij's subjectively 'good' intent from his 'socially harmful' writings. (str. 366). In the *Tetradi* there is no mention of *partijnost'*.

150 See p. 29f. above and notes 145 to 147, as well as M&E str. 137 and 146.

151 'verno'e.g., *Soč.* 23, str. 43. 'pravil'nost' ' e.g., M&E str. 142.

152 'peredovaja', e.g., *Soč.* 6, str. 25.

153 M&E str. 39, 138; *Soč.* 6, str. 43f.

154 *idem.*

155 It would be interesting to find out if Lenin ever speaks of a *partijnost'* of *progressive* knowledge.

156 Fetscher seems to identity Lenin on this point too closely with his successors, especially with Stalin, who made Lenin's philosophy into a party-philosophy and a rationalisation for the party (Fetscher *op. cit.* p. 51f. and 'Die Entstehung des dialektischen Materialismus als metaphysischer Weltanschauung' in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 1953, 50/2, S. 187).

Another example of the false assertion that Lenin "brutally subordinated all theoretical questions to the interests of the party" is in Karl Korsch' *Marxismus und Philosophie* (Frankfurt 1966, S. 55). The passages used by Korsch as proof are those where Lenin energetically rejects *false* theories as harmful and as something to be fought. This has little to do with the subordination of theory in general.

157 Joravsky describes in detail the whole development: Lenin's agreement to philosophic neutrality among the Bolsheviks once Plekhanov went over to the Mensheviks and his attempt to ignore his opponents' assertion of a connection between philosophic differences and political conflicts; his efforts to meet this threat on a propagandistic level; finally his decision to write M&E in order to refute this connection and to break the Menshevik monopoly on philosophical publications without wanting to establish his own. (D. Joravsky, *Soviet Marxism and Natural Science 1917-1932,* London, 1961). B.D. Wolfe (*Three who made a Revolution,* N.Y. 1948, 661 pp.) sees M&E as a settlement of internal conflicts among the Bolsheviks. Joravsky refutes this view and is supported by H. Dahm. The latter's arguments refute those of D. Grille (*Lenins Rivale – Bogdanov und seine Philosophie,* Köln 1966) in a review in *Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger* XX, 6, November/Dezember 1967, SS. 321-329.

158 V.I. Lenin' 'Ob otnošenii rabočej partii k religii' (The Relation of the Workers' Party to Religion) 1909, in *Soč.* str. 415-426.

159 V.I. Lenin: 'Čto takoe "Druž'ja Naroda" ..'. *Soč. op. cit.,* str. 308, *Tetradi* str. 195.

160 Lenin frequently spoke of the "philosophy of Marx" (e.g. *Sŏc.* 23, str. 43). In 1894/1895, when he knew little of philosophy, he wrote of Marx' and Engels' *Aufhebung* of philosophy (*Soč.* 1, str. 438).

161 "...*only* science which reflects the external world in human 'experience' is capable ... of giving us objective truth" (M&E str. 127, my italics, W.B.)

162 "Materialism... in full agreement with science ..." (*ibid.* str. 39). Cf. also str. 372-374 and 332.

163 *ibid.* str. 265-266.

164 *ibid.* str. 273-276.

165 *ibid.* str. 363-364.

167 The sole explicit loci on philosophy are very unclear: *Tetradi* str. 103 and 108. It is not clear what these sentences say and whether they express views of Hegel or those of Lenin.

167 *Tetradi* str. 321 and 248.
168 V.I. Lenin: 'O značenie voinstvujuščego materializma', *Soč.* IV, 33, str. 207.
169 Cf. K. Ballestrem: *Die sowjetische Erkenntnismetaphysik und ihr Verhältnis zu Hegel.* Dordrecht 1968, here: 'Lenin', SS. 77-94.
170 Alizerin, M&E, str. 100. Nature before man: M&E str. 71-84 and 239. Thinking with the brain (also by Engels): M&E str. 84-92 and 239.
171 The definition of matter as a "philosophic category": M&E str. 131 and 275-276. Sensation: M&E str. 40-41. Infinity and inexhaustibility: M&E str. 277. Motion: M&E str. 281-290.
172 In the *Tetradi* the objective dialectic is discussed in a generally ontological way, which certainly could or should not be absorbed by the individual sciences. On the dialectic of appearance and essence and of relatum and relation, see e.g., *Tetradi* str. 190; further: 98-100, 124, 126-127, 131 and 229.
173 A. Pastore (*La filosofia di Lenin* Milano 1946) questions Lenin's scientific and philosophic competence and calls his doctrine "una concezione generale della vita e del mondo". (p. 12).
174 M&E str. 120 *et passim.*
175 E.g., *ibid.* str. 131.
176 "The 'naive' conviction of man is *consciously* used by materialism as foundation for its epistemology." (M&E str. 66, his italics).
177 E.g., Hume: *ibid.*, str. 26-28.
178 Thus, Lenin identifies Bogdanov's epistemological (subjective) idealism – holding that nature is 'created' by the subject – with the 'objective idealism' of a Divine creation of nature. This leads one to believe that he did not want to see the real concerns of epistemological subjectivism. (cf. M&E str. 240-241).
179 Lenin accuses Plekhanov of "terminological confusion" because he speaks of "belief" (in quotation marks) in the existence of the external world and of "salto vitale". But, in principle, he himself agrees that a "leap" (into praxis) is necessary in the basic epistemological question. Cf. M&E, str. 144. The result of such a belief is a *petitio* in the alleged grounding of the object of belief; e.g., "... it is *self-evident* that a reproduction cannot exist without the original while the original exists independently of the reproducer (M&E str. 66, my italics).
180 see note 170 above.
181 "not only the transition from matter to consciousness but also that from experience to thought *(mysl')* etc." (*Tetradi* str. 256.) Enumeration of the stages: 'Impressions', 'something', 'quality' and quantity", 'identity', 'essence', 'causality'. 'All these aspects (steps, stages, processes) of knowledge move from subject to object..." (*Tetradi* str. 301). "In order to understand, one must mount from the empirical to the universal." (*ibid.* str. 187.) On 'comprehension', cf. also p. 231.
182 "the concept (knowledge) exposes in being (in immediate phenomena) the essence (the law of causality, identity, difference, etc.) – this is really the *general course* of all human knowledge (all science)." (*ibid.* str. 298).
183 On the subject of G. Noel's sentence, "the sensuous is a premonition of the intelligible and the intelligible is the conceived sensuous", Lenin says: "not bad!" and "even a poor idealist like you profits from Hegel." (*ibid.* str. 295).
184 "The (human) understanding's approach to the particular thing and the making of an impression (= of a concept) of it, is *no* simple, direct and specular act but a complex, ambiguous, non-linear one..." (*ibid.* str. 330).
185 In this section the word 'praxis' will be written in quotation marks when it means Lenon's notion.
186 "that men in their praxis let themselves be completely guided by the materialist theory of knowledge". (M&E str. 143). Lenin extensively uses Engels' arguments in

support, including "The proof of the pudding is in the eating" from *The Development of Socialism from Utopia to Science* (M&E, str. 109).

187 "that ... human praxis imprints itself as logical figures in human consciousness by being repeated billions of times. It is precisely (and only) because of this repetition that the figures have the firmness of prejudice or axioms." (*Tetradi* str. 198). Cf. also str. 172.

188 Lenin contrasts it with "theoretical arguments" and "syllogisms" (M&E str. 28) as well as with an "epistemology, where one must puzzle out with words intricate 'definitions' "(*ibid.* str. 198). He speaks about the "praxis of astronomical observations, discoveries, etc." (*ibid.* str. 143).

189 "Human knowledge reflects absolute truth..., and human praxis tests the correctness of our ideas confirming in them what corresponds to absolute truth." (M&E str. 106; cf. also str. 109-110, 142). This thought is fully elabotated in the *Tetradi:* "From living contemplation to abstract thought *and thence to praxis* – this is the dialectical path of knowledge of truth, knowledge of objective reality." (*Tetradi* str. 152-153). "... that man proves through his *praxis* the objective correctness of his ideas, concepts, knowledge and science." (note the term 'proves'! *ibid.* str. 173, his italics). "in Hegel praxis as a link in the analysis of the process of knowledge." (*ibid.* str. 193; cf. also str. 184 and 302).

190 "This is why A. Levy is correct when he says that for Marx "phenomenal activity" of mankind corresponds to an "activity of things"; i.e., human praxis has a meaning which is not only phenomenal (in the Humean and Kantian meanings of the term) but also objectively real." (M&E str. 106). "the objective, i.e., independent of men and mankind, meaning of the criterion of praxis" (*ibid.* str. 317). "Praxis not only has the dignity of the universal but also of the directly real." (*Tetradi* str. 195). "From subjective ideas man comes to objective truth through *(čerez)* 'praxis' (and technology)." (*ibid.* str. 183, his italics; maybe only rephrasing of Hegel?!). "The movement of knowledge *toward* the object can always occur only dialectically ... the nodal point is the praxis of man and mankind." (*ibid.* str. 252 his italics). Cf. also str. 200.

191 "the entire living human praxis" (M&E str. 198; cf. also str. 145). "the notion that *life* is to be included in logic is intelligible and a stroke of genius" (*Tetradi* str. 184). "The reproduction of movement in thought is always a simplification and deadening, not only through thought but also through sensation and not only of movement but of *any* concept." (*ibid.* str. 233, his italics).

192 As Lenin finally proposes an epistemologically critical question with clarity – "how can man ... *have knowledge* of the knowledge of what he does not know", i.e., of the thing-in-itself – he answers: "The development of the consciousness of each individual man and of the collective knowledge of the whole of mankind evidence step for step the transformation of the unknown thing-in-itself into the known 'thing for us'." (M&E str. 197). This is the direction taken by his interpretation of Engels' alizerin argument (*ibid.* str. 102). See also: "The domination over nature which shows itself in human praxis ... is the result of objectively correct reflection ... and the proof that this reflection (within the limits of what praxis shows) is objective, absolute, eternal truth." (*ibid.* str. 198).

193 "Needed is the *unification of knowledge with praxis.*" (*Tetradi* str. 198; cf. also str. 200).

194 Lenin's main critique boils down to: (1) "The last word of the 'newest positivism' is that old assertion of fideism." (M&E str. 173, *et passim*); (2) positivism is 'half-baked'. For example, in the *Tetradi* Lenin praises G. Noel for criticizing positivism in this way (str. 295).

195 In the section on *partijnost'* Lenin says: Marx "contemptuously rejected Comtean positivism" and "the intentional ignoring of the hybrid projects of reconciling material-

ism and idealism" is "the greatest contribution of Marx". And, Engels never takes seriously any 'new way' besides materialism and idealism (M&E str. 358-359).
196 Notes 194 and 195 show Lenin's critical style. Here is another: "Marxism rejects not what distinguishes one positivist from another but what is common to them and what distinguishes them from materialists." (M&E str. 214).
197 Karl Popper mentions this "socioanalysis" in *The Open Society and its Enemies,* ed. 5, London, 1966. Vol. 2, pp. 212 ff.
198 Cf. note 196 above.
199 Ahlberg, R.: *"Dialektische Philosophie" und Gesellschaft in der Sowjetunion,* Berlin, 1960.
200 Minin, O.: 'Filosofiju za bort' (Philosophy Overboard!) *Pod znamenem marskizma* 1922, II/12. Cf. Ahlberg R., *op. cit.,* S. 12.
201 *ibid.,* S. 17.
202 Following Deborin, Ahlberg distinguishes four theses of mechanicism: (1) 'Over board with philosophy!'; (2) 'Science is its own philosophy'; (3) 'The dialectic is Scholasticism'; (4) 'For Lenin science is itself philosophy while Plekhanov as abstract philosopher is a Scholastic and a Hegelian.' (Ahlberg *op. cit.* pp. 39-44)
203 As representatives of Deborin's 'dialectical school', Ahlberg names: Ja.É. Stén, N.A. Karev, B.N. Gessen, V.F. Asmus, I.K. Luppol, I.I. Agol, M.L. Levin, I. Podvolockij, S. Levit, F. Teležnikov and S. Novikov.
204 Cf. Ahlberg, *op. cit.,* S. 19-20.
205 *ibid.* S. 39.
206 *ibid.* SS. 40-41.
207 *ibid.* pp. 65 ff. The resolution is entitled 'Contemporary problems of the philosophy of Marxism' and is printed in *Trudy vtoroj vsesojuznoj konferencii marksistsko-leninskix naučnyx učreždenij* (Works of the Second All-Union Conference of Marxist-Leninist Research Institutions) M., 1929, str. 196-198.
208 Ahlberg, *op. cti.,* S. 81.
209 *ibid.,* S. 82.
210 *ibid.,* SS. 84-86.
211 *ibid.,* S. 89.
212 This critique is repeated unchanged today; e.g. in the *Filosofskaja énciklopedia* (71), t. 1, str. 439.
213 Ahlberg, *op. cit.* SS. 90-99.
214 *ibid.* S. 104.
215 Cf. T.J. Blakeley's *Soviet Scholasticism* (Dordrecht, 1961) for many examples of this dogmatic 'method' and its presuppositions.
216 (132).
217 G.A. Wetter: *Der dialektische Materialismus.* Seine Geschichte und sein System in der Sowjetunion. 5. Aufl., Wien 1960. J.M. Bocheński: *Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus (Diamat).* 2. Aufl., Bern 1956. T.J. Blakeley: *Soviet Theory of Knowledge.* Dordrecht 1964.
218 E.g., Wetter, *op. cit., S.* 589, and Bocheński, *op. cit.,* S. 73, 78.
219 Cf. T.J. Blakeley, *Soviet Scholasticism.* Dordrecht, 1961.
220 Ždanov, A.A.: 'Vystuplenie na diskussii po knige G.F. Aleksandrova "Istorija zapadnoevropejskoj filosofii" ' (Speech at the Discussion about the Book of G.F. Aleksandrov, *History of West European Philosophy) Bol'ševik* 1947, 16, 7-23, and *VF* 1947, I, and as pamphlet M., 1951.
221 On the history of these years, see Bocheński and Wetter – especially their most recent editions.
222 (107)
223 (119).

224 (210).
225 (135).
226 (114).
227 (108), (109) and (110). Many of these works – including the articles by Mitin – draw their information from Cornforth.
228 Cf. the section on Lenin, above. Mitin explicitly advocates Lenin's methods. See also (135), (136), (137) and Axlibinskij (2) and Aseev (9).
229 (17) and (18).
230 (153), str. 35.
231 Blakeley, T.J.: *Soviet Theory of Knowledge.* Dordrecht, 1964, pp. 1-4.
232 In chronological order: Russell, B.: *Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Its Limits.* Russian: Rassel, B.: *Čelovečeskoe poznanie, Ego sfera i granicy*. Per. N.V. Vorob'ev, R.E. Kol'man, IIL, M., 1957. Wittgenstein, L.: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.* Russian: Vitgenštejn. L.: *Logico-filosofskij traktat.* Per. I. Dobronravov i. D. Laxuti, Pred. V.F. Asmus, IIL, M. 1958. Carnap, R.: *Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic.* Russian: Karnap, R.: *Značčenie i neobxodimost'.* (Also contains a translation of 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology' from *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 4, 1950, 20-40). Per. N.V. Vorob'ev. Pred. S.A. Janovskaja. (87) IIL, M., 1959. Frank, Ph.: *Philosophy of Science.* Russian: Frank, F.: *Filosofija nauki.* R.G.A. Kursanov. IIL., M., 1960. Reichenbach, H.: *The Direction of Time* (ed. M. Reichenbach). Russian: Rejxenbax, G.: *Napravlenie vremeni.* IIL, M., 1962.
233 E.g., (163), (178) and (97).
234 (105).
235 (144), (145), (147) and (148).
236 (104) and (105).
237 (22), (23) and (24).
238 (139) and (140).
239 It was supposed to be called *Tri étapy razvitija positivzma* (Three Stages of the Development of Positivism) and was announced for publication in 1962, in Leningrad.
240 (6), (7) and (10).
241 (65), (66), (67), (68) and (69).
242 Ms. Gornštejn who knew neopositivism even before the war – cf. (76) and (77) – wrote in these years two articles on neopositivism and physics ((78) and (79)).
243 (223).
244 (246).
245 (204).
246 (234).
247 (274) and (275).
248 (8).
249 (229) and (230).
250 (291), (292) and (293).
251 (255), (256) and (257).
252 (59).
253 (97) and (99).
254 (5).
255 (29).
256 (206).
257 (11).
258 (141) and (142).
259 (294).
260 (44). Cf. also (33), which was not available to us, and Volkov's report (283). S. Müller-Markus has also reported in *SST* II (1962) 57-59, where he speaks of over 500

participants and 70 speakers.
261 See D.D. Comey's report, 'A Positivist Among the Dialecticians' in *SST* II (1962) 204-219.
262 (3).
263 (175), (183) and (196).
264 (215), (216) and (227).
265 (214).
266 (91).
267 (122).
268 (258).
269 (192).
270 (60).
271 (252).
272 (100).
273 (4).
274 (193), (195), (270) and (271).
275 (271).
276 (241).
277 (33).
278 (63).
279 (103).
280 (86).
281 (71).
282 (288), (289) and (27).
283 See the article 'Narskij' in (71), t. 3, str. 551.
284 *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie.* Ed. by J.M. Bocheński in the *Sovietica* series. Seven volumes. Dordrecht/Holland. 1959-68. Narskij's works which do not deal with neopositivism are designated in what follows by the number from this bibliography. He has written about East European, especially Polish, philosophy in 493(1), (2), (3); 495; 645; 1190; 6242(4). (9). 11; 8909.
285 *ibid.*, Nr. 493(4), 1929(3), 3629(7), 12574(14). See also (174), (187), (198), (200).
286 *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie* Nr. 9270(6). See also (176).
287 *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie* Nr. 12574(1), (6).
288 *ibid.*, Nr. 12574(5), (8). Also in (197).
289 *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie* Nr. 1929(1), 12101, 12574(2).
290 *ibid.*, Nr. 9270(7), 12574(10).
291 *ibid.*, Nr. 3557.
292 Hume, D. (David Jum): *Sočinenija* (Works in 2 Volumes). Moskva, 1965.
293 *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie* Nr. 137.
294 *ibid.*, Nr. 8909.
295 *ibid., Nr. 1115, 3785, 4286.*
296 Narskij has not worked in the field of formal logic, as can often be seen in his arguments against neopositivism; for example, he evidently has not understood the issue when he demands (e.g. (167) str. 40) repeatedly that meaningless propositions be counted among the false ones. He once goes so far as to assert that correct inference from false premisses results in false conclusions (*ibid.* str. 220). See G. Küng, 'Soviet Philosophy and Semantics', *SST* V (1965) 51-56 and Ju.A. Aseev's review ((13) str. 155).
297 (158) str. 24-25.
298 (210) str. 90ss.
299 (197) str. 9-19;
300 (167) str. 14. On Ms. Janovskaja, see J.M. Bocheński, 'Sof'ja Aleksandrovna Ja-

novskaja', *SST* VII (1967) 66-67, and *SST* 13 (1974) 1-10, on the occasion of her death.
301 (153) str. 35.
302 See pp. 37f. above and 53 below.
303 See the fuller enumeration in the bibliography.
304 (167).
305 (163).
306 E.g., (153), (154), (156), (159).
307 (157) and (164).
308 (108), (161) and (165).
309 (159) or (160) and (162).
310 (170).
311 (49). This work is not available even on international inter-library loan. Narskij assures the author that it does exist.
312 (70).
313 (185).
314 (183).
315 (175). Ayer's Article: (3).
316 (194).
317 (188).
318 (192).
319 (186), (187).
320 (169), (173).
321 (196).
322 (179), (180), (181), (182), (199), (201).
323 See p. 37 above.
324 (167) str. 8.
325 *ibid.* str. 33 and (157) str. 17.
326 E.g., (167) str. 90, 155, 159, 307.
327 *ibid.*, str. 68.
328 *ibid.*, str. 77.
329 (180) str. 217.
330 (167) str. 227.
331 *ibid.* str. 384.
332 *ibid.* str. 112.
333 *ibid.* str. 371.
334 *ibid.* str. 183.
335 (196) str. 86. He elucidates his judgment about Tarski in (165) as follows: "... the main mistake of Tarski and his followers ... does not consist in his limitation of the analysis of truth to the logical-linguistic sphere (though we note that he could not hold himself to this) but in his assertion that analysis of the relation between sense-data and external world and the problem of the relation between theory and praxis do not belong to epistemology as *theory*." (str. 84) In (163) Narskij makes a clear differentiation: "Some important Polish logicians of the 20's and 30's exerted an influence on neopositivism through their formal-logical theses but their philosophic positions were very diversified." (str. 141) But Narskij himself does not always observe this distinction.
336 E.G., (167) str. 75-76, 134.
337 (163) str. 142.
338 (180) str. 216.
339 For example, he quotes a whole page of M. Schlick in (167) (str. 246-247).
340 See note 232 above.
341 (167) str. 14.

342 See pp. 37 f. above.
343 The origin and development of neopositivism are "inseparably bound up with the battle of bourgeois philosophy against dialectical and historical materialism." (196) str. 82. That, in fact, most of the authors in question have no interest in Marxist-Leninist philosophy, is explained by Narskij as follows: "The majority of the neopositivists make a point of not talking about the philosophy of dialectical materialism." ((156) str. 203-204).
344 The whole book (167) is devoted to exposing the "masked", "subjective-idealist core" of neopositivism (str. 9). Even in the reputable *Filosofskaja énciklopedija* (71) Narskij does not fear saying that the statements of Popper and Carnap on intersubjectivity are based on an effort "to hide neopositivism's inclination toward solipsism" ((181) str. 297. See also (155) str. 39).
345 Cf. note 197 above.
346 E.g., (153) str. 21 and (180) str. 217.
347 E.g., (167) str. 84-85, 234-242 and (202).
348 (159) str. 16 (my addition in parentheses, *W.B.*)
349 E.g., he just confuses fact and thing in a report on Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* ((167) str. 193).
350 E.g., (161) and (165).
351 (182) and (200).
352 (167) str. 249 ff. On protocol sentences, *ibid.* str. 275 ff. On intersubjectivity. *ibid.* str. 307 ff.
353 *ibid.* Chapter I: 'The Object of Philosophy', str. 15-113.
354 (157) and (164).
355 E.g., (167) str. 40. On Narskij's theory of praxis, see pp. 66 ff. below.
356 *ibid.* str. 54 ff.
357 *ibid.* str. 78.
358 *ibid.* str. 57-58.
359 *ibid.* str. 346 ff.
360 *ibid.* str. 108-111.
361 *ibid.* str. 91.
362 *ibid.* str. 58 ff.
363 *ibid.* str. 110 ff.
364 *ibid.* str. 374 ff.
365 *ibid.* str. 192 ff.
366 *ibid.* str. 154.
367 *ibid.* str. 200.
368 *ibid.* str. 50-51.
369 *ibid.* str. 56.
370 *ibid.* str. 307 ff.
371 *ibid.* str. 59-50.
372 (202). Narskij here deals in detail with the ethical views of the authors in question as well as with further developments in the works of J. Stevenson. See also (167) str. 344-345 and (185) str. 53.
373 (167) str. 346.
374 *ibid.* str. 344. In (183) he connects Ayer's supposed dishonesty during and after his trip to the Soviet Union with the "amoral inferences" from emotivism. (str. 86).
375 (75) str. 440.
376 (167) str. 144-145.
377 *ibid.* str. 237 and 295.
378 *ibid.* str. 60 ff and (164) str. 131.
379 (167) str. 60.

380 *ibid.* str. 62.
381 *ibid.* str. 61.
382 *ibid.* str. 62.
383 *ibid.* str. 64 ff.
384 *ibid.* str. 67.
385 (185) str. 48.
386 (167) str. 64.
387 *ibid.* str. 59-60. See, also, (156) str. 203-215. On str. 132 of (170) Narskij names O. Bauer and K. Renner. The Polish "revisionists" in question are criticized in (159) str. 21 and more in detail in (160) str. 354-358.
388 (175) str. 57-58 and (185) str. 80.
389 (167) str. 79ff. and (202).
390 (157) str. 3.
391 (185) str. 43.
392 *ibid.* str. 63-64. Narskij quotes mainly from Schlick.
393 Cf. pp. 15 f. above.
394 (185) str. 44 and (167) str. 214-216 and 230. Narskij again mentions mainly Schlick.
395 (185) str. 66-67. Narskij names Ayer and Hempel.
396 *ibid.* str. 75-77.
397 *ibid.* str. 46 and 54-55.
398 *ibid.* str. 79.
399 (171).
400 *op. cit.* and in addition (167) str. 111, 129ff., 163 ff., 294 , 250 ff., 323, 334 ff., and (185) str. 51 ff., 56, 59, 70, 74.
401 (171) str. 96.
402 (185) str. 67-69, and (158) str. 262.
403 *op. cit.*
404 (167) str. 363 ff. and 374 ff.
405 *ibid.* str. 218-219.
406 *ibid.* str. 302-303.
407 *ibid.* str. 130 ff.
408 *ibid.* str. 287 ff. and 355-356.
409 (185) str. 69.
410 (167) str. 279 ff.
411 (185) str. 73-75.
412 *ibid.* str. 75-76 and (167) str. 305.
413 (75) str. 402-403. Cf. (167) str. 269.
414 *ibid.* str. 137 ff. and (185) str. 45 ff. and 64 ff. The clearest quotation is from P. Frank in *Erkenntnis* 2, 186.
415 (167) str. 158. Narskij quotes Reichenbach's *Der Aufstieg der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie* S. 298.
416 (167) str. 164.
417 *ibid.* str. 192 ff. and (185) str. 47-48.
418 (167) str. 269 ff.
419 *ibid.* str. 307 ff.
420 (185) str. 46.
421 See note 142 above.
422 (191).
423 (167) str. 111 and (185) str. 46.
424 (191) str. 392.
425 (167) str. 90 ff. Narskij rejects all objections to formal logic which are based – in

his opinion (even those of Engels!) – on a confusion of formal logic itself with its metaphysical (antidialectical) misuse. See, also, (197) – especially str. 9 ff. In a 1959 article Narskij already began to distinguish clearly between the "serious scientific contributions" of Carnap and others in formal logic and the philosophy of neopositivism (158) str. 24-25).

426 (191) str. 393.

427 *idem.*

428 *ibid.* str. 401.

429 (167) str. 10 and 111.

430 (185) str. 47.

431 *ibid.* str. 74.

432 *ibid.* str. 52-53.

433 *ibid.* str. 74.

434 (167) str. 146 ff. In addition to Russell, Narskij mentions Carnap, Adjukiewicz and Quine.

435 *ibid.* str. 172 and 190-191.

436 *ibid.* str. 157 ff. Narskij refers to *The Principles of Mathematics,* Cambridge, 1903.

437 (167) str. 143-144.

438 *ibid.* str. 188.

439 *ibid.* str. 121-122. Narskij quotes Carnap's *Meaning and Necessity* (1947) and *Logische Syntax der Sprache* (1934).

440 E.g., (167) str. 86.

441 *ibid.* str. 86-87. Cf. also, (164) str. 136. On the relationship between philosophy as most universal science and as specific science, see also (157) str. 6 and str. 33-61.

442 (167) str. 81.

443 *ibid.* str. 89.

444 *ibid.* str. 56 ff.

445 *ibid.* str. 89.

446 *ibid.* str. 13 and 88.

447 Narskij rejects Bocheński's division of Soviet philosophers into Hegelians and Aristotelians, according to their rejection or acceptance of formal logic (cf. *ibid.* str. 91).

448 In detail in (191). This thesis is more understandable if one remembers that for Narskij the "... laws and rules of formal logic ... are more or less communicable reflections of universal connections and relations of objective reality." ((163) str. 174).

449 "In consideration of the problem (of the relationship between formal logic and dialectic) the foreground must be occupied by critique of the 'independence' of formal logic from the dialectical-materialist method." ((166) str. 52; my addition in parentheses, *W.B.*). "Dialectical logic is 'metatheory' in relation to formal logic." (*ibid.* str. 62).

450 (167) str. 108. Cf. also (164) str. 137-138.

451 (167) str. 40 and (157) str. 30-31.

452 (197).

453 (167) str. 269.

454 *ibid.* str. 118.

455 *ibid.* str. 81-82.

456 *ibid.* str. 256.

457 *ibid.* str. 270 and 324.

458 *ibid.* str. 194.

459 *ibid.* str. 167.

460 The most complete statements about praxis as the criterion of truth are scattered throughout (167). We will be quoting amply from it. Compare also (158) str. 169-173.

461 "The criterion of the truth of scientific and of every adequate knowledge in gen-

eral ... is the process of social praxis." ((196) str. 92). "Proof for the objective existence of the external world – which is reflected in sense impressions, perceptions, concepts and judgements – is the social praxis of mankind." ((167) str. 211). On Narskij's realistic theory of truth as correspondence, see e.g. *ibid.* str. 223-228.

462 *ibid.* str. 217, note 15.

463 E.g., in (211), Chapter X, Section V: 'Praxis as Basis of Knowledge and Criterion of Truth' (str. 320-325) and (75) str. 218.

464 T.J. Blakeley (*Soviet Theory of Knowledge*, p. 144): "Practice as basis of truth is worse than nonsense." N. Lobkowicz calls the thesis "unintelligible" (pp. 29 and 32) and "queer" (p. 34) in *SST* VI (1966).

465 E.g., "Praxis as criterion of truth is the material activity of men, which intentionally changes objects to serve human interests." ((167) str. 297)

466 "According to dialectical-materialist epistemology, the criterion of truth cannot be subjective." "Praxis as criterion of truth is the material activity of men." *(ibid.)*

467 "The biggest mistake ... to see the criterion of sensefulness and of truth in the sensations and experiences of a subject." *(ibid.)* "Marxist philosophy studies experience in organic conjunction with human social praxis, where men do not have to do with their sensations and experiences as such but with the objects of the objective world, in that they are actively interacting with them." *ibid.* str. 116.

468 Cf. T.J. Blakeley, *op. cit.*, pp. 39 f. and 144.

469 "... the measure of truth and falsity cannot depend on the process of knowledge itself; it cannot be inferred from and therefore dependent on the result of the very knowledge that it is to serve to test, since there could then be no objectivity. This is why the criterion of knowledge has to be other than the theoretical means of discovering truth and cannot, therefore, be reduced to a set of purely theoretical operations." (167) str. 329-330.

470 *ibid.* str. 330, 332 and also 249.

471 "If one takes the criterion of truth ... to be a merely theoretical thesis, then one cannot avoid the question: 'what is the criterion for the truth of the criterion of truth?' One theoretical thesis cannot serve as the criterion of truth for another since, in turn, it needs a criterion, and so on without end. ... No idealist school could solve this problem." (*ibid.* str. 330). Cf., also, (158) str. 270, where Narskij concludes from similar considerations: "The criterion of truth must ... by its very nature be extra-theoretical."

472 On Rutkevic's views and about the discussion, see G.A. Wetter: *Der dialektische Materialismus.* Seine Geschichte und sein System in der Sowjetunion. 5. Auflage, Wien, 1960. SS. 585 f. J. de Vries: *Die Erkenntnistheorie des dialektischen Materialismus.* Munchen 1958, S. 44, and T.J. Blakeley, *op. cit.*, with bibliography. pp. 41-42. M.N. Rutkevič: *Praktika – osnova poznanija i kriterija istiny* (Praxis as Basis of Knowledge and Criterion of Truth) M., 1952, 243 str., is in German as M.N. Rutkewitsch: *Die Praxis als Grundlage der Erkenntnis und als Kriterium der Wahrheit.* Berlin, 1957.

473 See the second quotation in note 467 above. On str. 297 of (164) we read "active interplay of subjects and objects" (cf. *passim*). "From the viewpoint of dialectical materialism the test of the truth of an assertion is an interplay of the subject and object, where the subject is active but the object has the determining role." (*ibid.* str. 256)

474 "In the process of praxis the subject influences the object and changes it. ... In the process of praxis the subject is influenced by the object that is changed and is itself changed." (*ibid.* str. 298).

475 "The Scholasticism of the neopositivists consists particularly in the fact that their principle of verification separates the knowing process from the practical interaction of the subject with reality around him. It condemns him to difficult and useless efforts to solve the problem of knowledge, with a firmly established cleft between the subject and the world – between the world of his experiences and sensations, on the one hand, and

the object, i.e., the material things and processes, on the other. In fact, there is no such fixed limit and its non-existence makes it possible for even sensations to be verified in the course of praxis, whereas the neopositivsts are condemned to use them uncritically." (*ibid.* str. 301-302). "The view that praxis serves as instrument for obtaining a final criterion of truth in epistemology is radically opposed to the positions of the sensualist-idealists and positivists." They reduce 'praxis' to "human sensations which are taken as a collection of passive cognitive 'facts', either in complete isolation from the problem of their origins or in conjunction with the assertion that sensations are the only existing reality." (*ibid.* str. 332).

476 (158) str. 272.

477 "... The criterion of truth cannot be used in isolation from the theoretical form of the discovery of truth since it would otherwise not be able to serve for its verification. It has to be organically connected with the acts which lead to knowledge of truth." (167) str. 330. "This is how the epistemological interplay of theory and praxis arises: truth is tested by a praxis which is interconnected with theory." (*ibid.* str. 360).

478 Praxis "transforms objects purposefully to serve human interests". (*ibid.* str. 297). Narskij goes on (in relation to a comment by Plekhanov): "while the contemplative view of the criterion of truth means its interpretation as agreement of thought with the object, the dialectical-materialist version, on the contrary, makes possible its interpretation as a certain agreement of the object with thought". (*ibid.* str. 297-298). "Every practical activity is itself more or less strongly bound up with the foresight (knowledge) if its results." (*ibid.* str. 301). "Praxis includes the activity of thinking since work and all other human activities are conscious and organized." ((158) str. 271).

479 "Praxis has a social character; social praxis has a class-character." (*ibid.* str. 298; see also note 461 above and the second quotation in note 467).

480 E.g., in the second quotation in note 461 above.

481 Cf. (167) str. 298-299.

482 *ibid.* str. 313.

483 In this sense, "... praxis not only does not enclose man in his personal subjectivity ... but, on the contrary, 'unites' him with other men in the most definite way..." (*ibid.* str. 82).

484 Cf. note 465 and note 467 above.

485 Narskij speaks of the "Unitary process of social praxis" (*ibid.* str. 300) and "the *completeness* of human praxis" (*ibid.* str. 301; his italics). "It includes the whole diversity of human praxis in their interaction throughout history." (*ibid.* str. 82). It is "no aggregate of isolated operations of verification but a unitary and complex process". (*ibid.* str. 360). "The criterion of the truth of knowledge – scientific and other – is in fact not the sum of separate acts of comparison of propositions with atomic facts but the historically developing and basically material process of social praxis in all of its multiplicity of connections and mediations." ((196) str. 92).

486 Narskij says that there are no "atomic" sense experiences, but only the "integral process of perception *(vosprijatie)*", which contains "an element of thought". "The development of social praxis exerts a determining influence on this process." ((167) str. 194; cf. below).

487 "...it is clear that one cannot reduce the testing of the truth of propositions to the comparison of subjective impressions with isolated sentences, i.e., to acts of verification. As a rule, we do not verify isolated sentences but scientific theories. ... The testing of the truth of scientific theories requires consideration of all aspects of the object, ... and of the theory. Such testing can occur only in the course of the interplay between the theory and the life of men which transform nature and their own social conditions." (*ibid.* str. 298-299).

488 "The verifiability of judgements about the past and about the future has a common

ground. It lies in the causal relations between the phenomena of objective reality itself and in the connection between the contemporary and future praxis of man. ... The praxis of the past conditions its present state and retains its epistemological significance for the whole succeeding time." (*ibid.* str. 300).

489 Narskij speaks often of the 'universality' *(vseobščnost')* of praxis. Cf., e.g., *ibid.* str. 82 and 330; (158) str. 271; (163) str. 157).

490 (167) str. 313.

491 "Through its universality praxis 'connects' men with other men and with the *whole of* reality." (*ibid.* str. 82; my italics). Narskij sees a connection between the "reduction of the operations for verification of a sentence to a certain finite number of single observations" and the "nominalist error of neopositivism". (*ibid.* str. 296).

492 *ibid.* str. 81-82.

493 Il'enkov, É.V.: 'Ideal'noe' (The Ideal), in (71), t. 2, M., 1962, str. 219. Cf. also 'On the Psychic as Ideal' (str. 41-54) in S.L. Rubinštejn, *Bytie i soznanie* (Being and Consciousness), M., 1957. Further, T.R. Payne, *S.L. Rubinstejn and the Philosophical Foundations of Soviet Psychology,* Dordrecht, 1968, pp. 129ff. and 138 ff.

494 E.G., (167), str. 211, 299 and 331.

495 "... dialectical materialism is closely connected with the concrete sciences, thus expressing the unity of philosophy and praxis". (*ibid.* 89; cf. (157) str. 48).

496 (167) str. 211 and 300.

497 *ibid.* str. 331 and 359-360.

498 *ibid.* str. 331-332 and (201) str. 348.

499 See note 487 above and *ibid.* str. 325.

500 Cf. M.N. Rutkevič *op. cit.* and 'K voprosu o roli praktiki v processe poznanija' (On the Role of Practice in the Process of Knowledge) *VF* 1954,3 34-45.

501 "... praxis evidences and tests the truth of the judgement but does not create it." ((167) str. 298)

502 "The utility of knowledge is a consequence but not the cause of its truth." ((201) str. 348; cf., also, (167) str. 305, where Narskij refers to Lenin).

503 T.J. Blakeley, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

504 (71) tom 3, str. 90.

505 N. Lobkowicz, *idem.*

506 (263).

507 *'Kandidat* in philosophy and senior collaborator of the Faculty of Philosophy of Moscow State University" (cf. *VF* 1966,2, 190).

508 (263).

509 (266).

510 (262).

511 (264).

512 (265).

513 (267).

514 (271). Partially summed up in (270).

515 (265). Tavanec, P.V., Švyrev, V.S.: 'Nekotorye problemy logiki naučnogo poznanija' (Some Problems of the Logic of Scientific Knowledge), *VF* 1962,10, 10-21. English: 'Some Problems in the Logic of Scientific Knowledge' in *Soviet Studies in Philosophy,* New York, 1962/63, I,3, 33-41. 'Logika naučnogo poznanija' (The Logic of Scientific Knowledge) In *Problemy logiki naučnogo poznanija* (Problems of the Logic of Scientific Knowledge) Ss. Red. P.V. Tavanec. Izd. "Nauka", M., 1964, 410 str. Švyrev, V.S.: 'Nekotorye voprosy logiko-metodologičeskogo analiza otnošenija teoretičeskogo i empiričeskogo urovnej naučnogo znanija' (Some Questions of the Logical-Methodological Analysis of the Relation Between the Theoretical and Empirical Levels of Scientific Knowlede) *ibid.* str. 53-86.

516 Švyrev cites P. Frank in order to show that the neopositivists themselves saw this problem as central. ((270) str. 90).
517 (266) str. 315 explicates what 'neopositivism' is to mean and rejects the indiscriminate use of the term (cf. also (271) str. 3).
518 *ibid.* str. 8.
519 See the distinctions, *ibid.* str. 6-7.
520 *ibid.* str. 14-15, 19, 29-30.
521 On Popper: *ibid.* str. 58 and 74; on Hempel: *ibid.* str. 125-126, 178 and 202.
522 *ibid.* str. 32 and 90-92.
523 *ibid.* str. 23 and 67-68.
524 *ibid.* str. 17-19.
525 Frequently, e.g., *ibid.* str. 45 ff. on protocol sentences.
526 *ibid.* str. 6.
527 Cf. (266), str. 317 and 321.
528 (271) str. 111-113, (266) str. 326-327.
529 Particularly clear in (268) and (269).
530 (271) str. 35-36.
531 *ibid.* str. 45-67; here especially str. 65.
532 (264) str. 303-304 and (271) str. 57.
533 *ibid.* str. 61-64 and (264) str. 304-305.
534 (271) str. 87 and 180-192 and (266) str. 336-338.
535 (271) str. 92.
536 *ibid.* str. 42-44.
537 *ibid.* str. 52.
538 *ibid.* str. 89-90 and str. 121.
539 *ibid.* str. 122-124.
540 (270) str. 92-96.
541 (271) str. 140-142, 154 and 168-179.
542 (270) str. 92. Švyrev quotes G. Schlesinger: *Method in Physical Science.* London-New York, 1963, p. 110.
543 (271) str. 45-51.
544 *ibid.* str. 52-53.
545 *ibid.* str. 65.
546 *ibid.* str. 102-104.
547 *ibid.* str. 26.
548 *ibid.* str. 131 and 139.
549 *ibid.* str. 6-7.
550 *ibid.* str. 70.
551 *ibid.* str. 195.
552 *ibid.* str. 101, (262) str. 75.
553 (271) str. 206.
554 *ibid.* str. 129.
555 *ibid.* str. 130.
556 *ibid.* str. 103.
557 *ibid.* str. 120.
558 *ibid.* str. 88-89.
559 E.g., *ibid.* str. 48.
560 *ibid.* str. 41-42.
561 *loc. cit.* and cf. *ibid.* str. 93.
562 *ibid.* str. 41-42.
563 *loc. cit.* Il'enkov's article is in (71) t. 2, str. 219-227.
564 (270) str. 99. Here, too, Švyrev quotes Il'enkov; namely his article 'Ob éstetičes-

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565 E.g., (271) str. 52.
566 *ibid.* str. 42-44.
567 E.g., *ibid.* str. 102-104. Cf. also (268) str. 223.
568 (270) str. 99.
569 (271) str. 102.
570 (262) str. 83.
571 (267) str. 103.
572 Cf. G.P. Ščedrovickij: 'Jazykovoe myšlenie i ego analiz' (Linguistic Thought and its Analysis). In *Voprosy jazykoznanija* (Questions of Linguistics), 1957, 1, and 'O principax issledovanija ob'ektivnoj struktury myslitel'noj dejatel'nosti na osnove ponjatii soderžatel'no-genetičeskoj logiki' (On Principles of the Research into the Objective Structure of Cognitive Activity on the Basis of the Notion of a material-Genetic Logic). In *Voprosy psixologii* (Questions of Psychology). 1964,2.
572 Cf. 'Kopnin' in (71), t. 3, str. 62.
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576 *ibid.* Nr. 5870 (4), (7) (= Dissertation).
577 *ibid.* Nr. 5870 (2).
578 *ibid.* Nr. 3457 (1).
579 *ibid.* Nr. 8880 (10).
580 *ibid.* Nr. 5870 (3).
581 *ibid.* Nr. 3457 (4), 5870 (5), 12097 (3), 12099 (1).
582 *ibid.* Nr. 3457 (2), 12097 (3), (6).
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606 *ibid.* Nr. 12101.
607 Rapp, F.: *Gesetz und Determination in der Sowjetphilosophie.* Zur Gesetzeskonzeption des dialektischen Materialismus unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Diskussion über dynamische und statische Gesetzmässigkeiten in der zeitgenössischen Sowjetphilosophie. Dordrecht, 1967. S. 12.
608 *ibid.* SS. 25 f. and 31. Cf. also Ballestrem, *op. cit.* SS. 129 f.
609 *ibid.* SS. 145 f. Cf. Rapp, *op. cit.*, SS. 22 and 26 f.
610 *ibid.* S 9.
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612 *ibid.* SS. 8 f. and 19 f.
613 *ibid.* SS. 5, 12 and 20.
614 On Kopnin's work on 'dialectical methodology', see Boeselager, 'Soviet Dialectical Methodology', *SST* 6 (1966) 135-144, reprinted in *Philosophy in the Soviet Union,* Dordrecht, 1967, pp. 94-103.
615 (101), str. 4. That Russell is called a typical representative of neopositivism and the book is called "anti-Russell" shows again how loosely the term 'neopositivism' is used in the Soviet Union.
616 (102) str. 110-154.
617 *ibid.* str. 111.
618 *ibid.* str. 110, 127-128 and (101) 24-25.
619 (102) str. 129-139, 240-243 and 254.
620 (101) str. 163.
621 *ibid.* str. 176.

622 *ibid.* str. 129-131, 149 and 153.
623 (102) str. 140-146. The Yugoslavs quoted by Kopnin here are M. Životić and M. Kangra.
624 *ibid.* str. 114-122. Kopnin refers to the remarks of R. Koćn and Ph. Frank about a mutual rapprochement between logical positivism and diamat.
625 Kopnin criticizes the definition of the *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii* (211) str. 10, as well as those of Pancxava, Rutkevič, Cornforth and others.
626 (101) str. 15.
627 *ibid.* str. 16.
628 (102) str. 160-161. In (101) str. 40-41 Kopnin criticizes Tugarinov's ontological definition of matter.
629 *ibid.* str. 25-31.
630 *ibid.* str. 36-37.
631 *ibid.* str. 25-26 and 33-34. Cf. also (102) str. 158-160.
632 (101) str. 20. Kopnin quotes from Pavlov, T.: *Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedenija* (Selected Philosophic Works) T. 3. 'Teorija otraženija'. (Theory of Reflection), M., 1962. str. 490.
633 (102) str. 171-173.
634 *ibid.* str. 229.
635 *ibid.* str. 231.
636 *ibid.* str. 229 (My italics, *W.B.*).
637 *ibid.* str. 230.
638 (101) str. 64-66.
639 (102) str. 7-15.
640 *ibid.* str. 258-259.
641 *ibid.* str. 204.
642 *ibid.* str. 60.
643 *ibid.* str. 77.
644 *ibid.* str. 171.
645 *ibid.* str. 259-260.
646 *ibid.* str. 262.
647 (101) str. 217.
648 (102) str. 15-26.
649 (101) str. 201-203.
650 (102) str. 172-174.
651 *ibid.* str. 90-91.
652 *ibid.* str. 26-35.
653 *ibid.* str. 191.
654 *ibid.* str. 193.
655 (101) str. 219-224.
656 *ibid.* str. 224-234.
657 (102) str. 210-212.
658 *ibid.* str. 35-38.
659 *ibid.* str. 93.
660 For a more thorough presentation, see Boeselager *op. cit.*, especially pp. 137-140. Cf., also, D.D. Comey, 'Current Trends in Soviet Logic', *Inquiry* 9 (1966),1, 94-108 and in *Philosophy in the Soviet Union* (cf. 614).
661 Comey *op. cit.* specifically names Putnam, Feyerabend, Hanson, Toulmin and Scriven.
662 (101) str. 172.
663 *ibid.* str. 176 for all these examples.
664 *ibid.* str. 182-185.

665 *ibid.* str. 210-212.
666 *ibid.* str. 177.
667 E.g., *ibid.* str. 183 and 185.
668 *ibid.* str. 172.
669 *ibid.* str. 156.
670 *ibid.* str. 187. On Lenin's view of praxis, see pp. 34 ff. above.
671 (101) str. 160. Cf. also str. 157.
672 *ibid.* str. 167. Also: "The sense organs with their sensations are only a necessary natural minimum to guarantee to human knowledge access to the object." *ibid.* str. 172.
673 (101) str. 158. Wetter's critical views, which are answered here, are found in his *Sowjetideologie heute,* Frankfurt 1962, Ss. 144-145.
674 (101) str. 62.
675 *ibid.* str. 63.
676 *ibid.* str. 62.
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680 (101) str. 64.
681 Cf. (71) t. 3, str. 513-514.
682 Cf. Küng, G.: 'Soviet Philosophy and the Semantic Definition of Truth', *SST* 5 (1965),1/2, p. 55.
683 (146) and (148). Cf. also Küng, *op. cit.,* pp. 51-52.
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691 (22).
692 (23).
693 (25).
694 *ibid.* str. 400.
695 (167), (271) and (74).
696 (276). Cf. Küng, *op. cit.* pp. 52-54.
697 (276) str. 145-150.
698 (275) str. 14.
699 (274) str. 193-194.
700 *ibid.* str. 194-195.
701 (276) str. 146.
702 (274) str. 195-196.
703 (275) str. 10.
704 See the section on Lenin, p. 35 above and note 187 above.
705 (274) str. 196.
706 (276) str. 146-151.
707 *ibid.* str. 148.
708 (275) str. 11.
709 (11), (141), (142), (294).
710 E.g. (294) str. 9-10.

711 *ibid.* str. 14-16.
712 *ibid.* str. 22-23.
713 *ibid.* str. 32.
714 (11) str. 179 and (142) str. 195.
715 *ibid.* str. 195.
716 (294) str. 42.
717 (11) str. 181-182.
718 *ibid.* str. 187-188.
719 E.g., (294) str. 37-38.
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732 (7) str. 66-67.
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734 (257).
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736 *ibid.* str. 503.
737 (183) str. 86.
738 (59) str. 508, 513 and (257) str. 519-520, 525-526.
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744 (229) and (288).
745 (291).

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Recent Soviet Works on Neopositivism

This list includes Soviet works about positivism and 'neopositivism' and related questions from the period 1947-1967. Books and articles on broader subject-matters are included, if they contain longish sections on neopositivism. Such sections are singled out for mention. Bibliographical data on all other Soviet and Western works, mentioned in the text, are given in the appropriate references. To find such works, one will find the name index of some help. We have not included the Russian translations of works by people like Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Frank and Reichenbach. Most of them will be found in Reference 232.

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Suvorov, I.N.: see (202).
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INDEX OF NAMES

For individual members, cf. also 'Vienna Circle' in Index of Subjects

Ahlberg, R. 39
Ajdukiewicz, K. 58
Aksel'rod, L.I. 39
d'Alembert, J. 8
Allaxverdjan, S.D. 48
Andreeva, G.M. 47, 98f.
Aristotle 5
Aseev, Ju.A. 47, 97f., 104
Avenarius, R. 12
Ayer, A. 51

Bacon, F. 7f.
Bakradze, K.S. 46
Ballestrem, K.G. 84f.
Begiašvili, A.F. 47, 95f., 101
Beljaev, E.V. 47
Bentham, J. 10, 11
Bergmann, G. 53
Berkeley, G. 7, 53
Birjukov 53
Blakeley, T. 46, 70, 84, 96
Bocheński, J.M. 53
Bogomolov, A.S. 48
Bridgeman, P. 95
Bukharin, N. 40

Carlyle, T. 10
Carnap, R. 14f., 46f.
Chase, S. 57
Coleridge, S.T. 10
Comte, A. 5f.
Condillac, E. 8
Copleston, F. 53
Cornforth, M. 46, 53
Čerkesov, V.I. 84

Darwin, Ch. 12
Deborin, A.M. 39f.
Descartes, R. 7
Dilthey, W. 98
Dodd, S.C. 57, 99
Drewnowski 99
Drobnickij, O. 47, 100
Durkheim, E. 11

Enčmen, E.S. 39
Engels, F. 21f.

Fataliev, X.M. 47
Feigl, H. 14, 20, 77
Feuerbach, L. 12
Fischl 53
Frank, P. 46

Gornštejn, T.N. 47
Gorskij, D.P. 83
Guyau, J.M. 11

Hahn, H. 14
Hamilton, W. 10
Hare, R.M. 20, 100
Hegel, G.W.F. 5, 21f., 32
Hempel, C.G. 14, 77
Hume, D. 7f., 38, 53

Il'enkov, E.V. 80

Janovskaja, S.A. 95, 100f.
Jaspers, K. 98
Judin, P.F. 40f.

Kant, I. 12, 14, 37, 53
Kedrov, B.M. 62, 100
Khrushchev, N. 102
Kokoszynska 52
Kol'man, A. 53
Kon, I.S. 47, 98f.
Kopnin, P.V. 42, 48, 83-95, 105
Korzybski 52, 95
Korneeva, A.I. 46-47
Kraft 53
Kursanov, G.A. 46
Kuznecov, O.P. 100

Lazarsfeld 57, 99
Lenin, V.I. 12, 21f., 53

Lesnewski, S. 52
Littré, E. 11
Łukasiewicz, K. 52
Lundberg, G. 57, 99

Mach, E. 12f.
Malewski, A. 99
Marx, K. 5f., 21f.
Masaryk, T.G. 23f.
Mill, J(ames) 10f.
Mill, J.S. 10, 98
Minin, O. 39
Mitin, M.B. 40f., 46f.
Mixalenko, Ju.P. 47, 97f.
Moore, G.E. 20
Morris, W. 52
Mšvenieradze, V.V. 46, 48, 83, 95, 101

Narskij, I.S. 42, 46, 49-74, 91, 95, 104
Neurath, O. 14
Nikitin, E.P. 47
Novell-Smith 100
Novikov, N.V. 47

Ogden 95f.
Omel'janovskij, M.E. 46

Pap, A. 52
Passmore, J. 53
Plekhanov, G. 27f.
Popper, K. 14
Pozner, A.R. 47

Ral'čevič, V.N. 40
Rapp, F. 84f.
Rappoport, A. 52
Rashevski, N. 99
Reichenbach, H. 14
Renan, E. 11
Reznikov, L.O. 101
Richards, I.A. 95f.
Rozental', M.M. 83
Russell, B. 13, 46
Rutkevič, M.N. 69

Rykov 40
Ryle, G. 14

Sadovskij, V.N. 47, 99
Saint-Simon, H. de 8f., 24f.
Schaff, A. 53
Schlick, M. 13
Sextus Empiricus 7
Skvorcov-Stepanov, I.I. 39
Spencer, H. 11f.
Spinoza, B. 7
Stalin, J. 39f.
Stegmüller, W. 53
Stepin, V.S. 47
Stevenson, C.L. 20
Šubbotin 53
Šerdakov, V.N. 48
Švarcman, K.A. 47, 100
Švyrev, V.S. 42, 47, 48, 74-83

Taine, H. 11
Talmin 100
Tarski, A. 14, 52
Tavanec, P.V. 47, 53, 83
Timirjazev, A.K. 39
Tomski 40
Twardowski, K. 52

Urmson, J.O. 53

von Mises, R. 53

Waismann, F. 14
Weinberg, J.R. 53
Whitehead, A.N. 13
Wisdon, J. 14
Wittenberg, A. 101
Wittgenstein, L. 3, 13f., 46, 95, 98
Wolff, C. 7

Zaičenko, G.A. 101
Zinov'ev, A.A. 53
Zvegincev, V.A. 47, 100
Ždanov, A.A. 45
Žuravlev, L.A. 47, 97f., 104

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

abstraction 34
analytic and synthetic 77
analytic philosophy 18f.
Aufhebung 23f., 107

basic question 30

coherence 77
coincidence 87f.
concept 36
conventionalism 17f.
critique 22f., 44f., 53f.

dialectic 26, 89f.
dialectical logic 83f.
dogmatism 32f.

empirical, theoretical and 76
empiricism 9f, 38, 43f., 91
empirio-criticism 12f.
epistemology 6, 24, 58f., 86f., 90f., 105
evolution 12

formal logic 62
formalism 17f.

general semantics 51
genetic method 81

historiography 52f., 102f.
history 9f., 22f.

idealism, materialism versus 30f.
image 27
induction 10f.
irrationalism 56f.

knowability 43
knowledge 79
  social- 92f., 106

laws of logic 35f.
logic 2, 49, 55, 82
  of science 16f., 88f.
  dialectical- 83f.
  formal- 62
logical positivism 13f.

materialism versus idealism 30f.
metaphilosophy 54f.
method 2
  genetic- 81

neo-Kantianism 12f.

ontology 33f., 71, 87f.

partijnost' 29f., 105
Party 41
perception 94
phenomenology 90
philosophy, analytic 18f.
positivism 3f.
  logical- 13f.
practice, theory and 22f.
pragmatism 12f.
praxis 35f., 66f., 91f., 105
proletariat 23

question, basic 30

rationalism 38
realism 42f.
reduction 19f., 77
religion 11, 31
revisionists 57
science 6f., 26f., 75f., 79, 85f., 94
  social- 9
scientism 38f.
semantics 2
  general- 51

sensualism 17f., 60
social knowledge 92f., 106
social science 9
synthetic, analytic and 77

theoretical and empirical 76
theory and practice 22f.
Thomism 56
truth 59

verification 15f., 77 *et passim*
Vienna Circle 13f., 51f., 61f., 85f.

Wissenssoziologie 108

SOVIETICA

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of East-European Studies, University of Fribourg, Switzerland

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